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Preface

This project grew out of an appreciation for Faulkner
that began with the reading of As I Lay Dying during my last
semester as an undergraduate English major.

It is a

continuation of a Masters thesis focused on Faulkner's image
of time in his characterization of Quentin Compson and Harry
Wilbourne.

I read A Fable for the first time while working

on this thesis, and my fascination for this most
intransigent of Faulkner's texts suffered no diminishment
from the work that resulted in the text that follows.
Indeed, the project has elicited questions about Faulkner—
the writer, the thinker, the man— that inspire still more
attention to the novel.
The assistance and support Professor Lewis P. Simpson,
who directed the project, greatly facilitated my work.
Besides the inspiration of his extraordinary literary
criticism and the excitement of intimate conversations on
literature and history in general, and Faulkner in
particular, his encouragement, remarkable patience, and
friendship enabled me to complete the project.

Professor

John R. May, in addition to providing a careful reading of
the text as well as extremely helpful formal and ideational
suggestions, offered genuine friendship and indispensable

111
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support throughout my association with the Department of
English.

Most of the discursive ideas and texts that inform

the dissertation were disclosed in conversations with
Professor Cecil Eubanks, whose positive influence, both
personal and professional, will accompany me henceforth.
Professor Rick Moreland carefully read and re-read the text,
offered valuable insights from his infinite reservoir of
knowledge about Faulkner, and inspired further thought on
Faulkner's image of the relation of art and life in A Fable.
Thanks are owed also to Professors Bainard Cowan, Fred
Schwarzbach, John Lowe, and Bill Demastes for invaluable
help along the way.

A debt of gratitude is also owed to

Professor Michael Grimwood of North Carolina State
University, who directed my first big project on Faulkner
and at whose polite insistence I first read A Fable.

And

special thanks is due Professor Jim Springer Borck.
For the love, support, and guidance of my parents,
Harold and Margie Matthews, whose influence positively
informs all of my achievements— both tangible and spiritual-I shall always be indebted.

Triche saw me through much of

it with love and self-sacrifice.

And Sydney, Gabrielle, and

Amy, the darlings of my existence, cannot know of the joy
they brought to the process.
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Abstract for "Faulkner, Truth, and the Artist's Directive:
A Reading of A Fab le," a dissertation by Bobby L. Matthews.
The old general in A Fable embodies the resolution of
questions about the relation of art and life that Faulkner
evoked in his invention of Quentin Compson in The Sound and
the Fury and pursued in a series of subsequent
characterizations.

This artist-figure motif discloses

Faulkner's implication of the relation in the modern crisis
of faith.

Faulkner images in narrative fiction what

Nietzsche asserts in discourse, namely, the need for a
reversal of the Platonic valuation of eternal "truth"
(ideality) over art.

The characterization of Quentin shows

the potentially terrible consequences of man's propensity
for mythopoeic invention, as Quentin's unconscious
remythologizing of Christian mythos results in the nihilism
it seeks to overcome.

In A Fable, several characters repeat

the paradigm of artist-figures who attempt through
mythopoeia to override ontological conditions and establish
ideal projections.
open—

The general, by contrast, recognizes the

"aestheticist"— condition of existence, predicated on

man's physiology, which entails the universality of
perspectivism and makes valuation essential to the well
being of man's existence.

Aware of both the mythic

proportions of his public image and the need of his culture

VI
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for a sustaining grand illusion, the old general consciously
develops a legend of himself that satisfies this need
through a reaccentuation of Christian mythos.

In this

action he suggests Heidegger's reinterpretation of
Nietzsche's reversal, a reading that postulates the "strife"
between closure and disclosure as the inherent existential
operation whereby art allows truth "to happen."
dissertation includes four chapters:
for Faulkner's Aestheticism";
Spoliation:

The

(1) "The Textual Case

(2) "Remythology and

The Mythopoeic Utterances of Faulkner's Failed

Artist-Figures";

(3) "Strife, Structure, the Dissemination

of Voices and the Destruction of Truth in A Fable" ; (4) "The
Artist's Directive:

Remythologizing the Kerygma in A

Fable."

Vll
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Introduction;

Two Approaches to Art

A Fable is a novel far too rich to lend itself easily
to holistic analysis. Though given time and space the critic
might well attempt such a study, the aim here is to isolate
a primary element of the whole, to offer a rhetorical
evaluation and interpretation of the

novel in relation

this element, and to suggest, on the

basis of this

to

evaluation, the relation of the novel to some of Faulkner's
earlier major fiction.

My intention

characterization of the "marshal" or

is to explore how

the

"old general" of this

novel culminates— in a convincing image of the relation of
"truth" to language or art— Faulkner's personal quest
through writing to comprehend existence.
The questions that Faulkner first images in the
characterization of Quentin Compson in The Sound and the
Fury dominate the history of western thought.

Do

identifiable constants inform existence and human
experience?
and truth?

Is truth knowable?
Of art and life?

What is the relation of art

Although Faulkner never

explicitly poses these questions, his fiction is virtually
controlled by them.

The underlying discursive problem

pertains to the ageless question of will, insofar as this
term is defined in the somewhat crude traditional sense of a
presumed human capacity for making conscious decisions that
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change the composition of an upcoming moment of experience
from what it otherwise would have been.

By the time

Faulkner was working on The Sound and the Fury in 1928 his
interest in this question had set him on the course of
narrative inquiry that would shape his fiction.

In the

texture of the mature fiction he does not merely express
what happens to his characters; instead, what happens to
them is always posed in the light of conditional factors
that influence the events in their lives.

Consequently, the

Faulknerian narrative always implicitly asks, "Might not the
event have occurred differently from the way it did?"

As

Rosa Coldfield speculatively asserts to Quentin in Absalom,
Absalom!, "there is a might-have-been which is more true
than truth."1

If Rosa is correct, then experience is not

fixed but contingent.

The general problem Faulkner poses

throughout the mature fiction entails ascertaining whether
her assertion is affirmable and, if it is, how man might act
so as to realize the "might have been."

If it is not, then

the question of the value of life itself is raised.

In

consonance with the views of prominent modern discursive
writers, Faulkner's resolution of this problem hinges on his
view of an inherent relation of aesthetics and ontology.
Faulkner's fictional consideration of the problem of
truth rises in A Fable to levels beyond those imaged in

^William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom!
Vintage, 19 72), p. 143.

(New York:
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earlier texts devoted to the same problem.

In various

characters and narrative situations in other novels, he
presents two major historical perspectives on the question.
Isaac McCaslin's discussion with McCaslin Edmonds about the
ghost buck is perhaps the outstanding of several examples of
the Platonic view that truth is inherent and thus knowable
from within.

Faulkner's "verities," which he expressed in

public and incorporated in the fiction, seem to correspond
to Kant's postulation of synthetic a priori truths.

But

major voices in the novels suggest Faulkner's ultimate, if
reluctant, embrace of the pre-Socratic view of truth as
aletheia, or happening.

Truth, to speak in the simplest

terms, is what occurs, or at least what an individual
perceives to be occurring.
experiences.
consciousness'

It is what the individual man

Truth lies in the operative condition of
relation both to itself and to the world, a

relation that not only enables but actually compels the
invention of mythopoeia designed to account for experience.
In a letter to Malcolm Cowley the Platonic strain of
Faulkner's internal dialectic of metaphysics is disclosed.
Art is simpler than people think because there is so
little to write about.

All the moving things are

eternal in man's history and have been written before,
and if a man writes hard enough, sincerely enough,
humbly enough . . .

he will repeat them, because art
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like poverty takes care of its own, shares its bread.^
Faulkner suggests, first, that "man's history" is
constituted by the repetition of "eternal," "moving"
occurrences and, second, that the implicit valuative
definition of art is a synecdochal image of one such
occurrence.

Calling them "moving things," Faulkner thus

implicitly asserts the reality of what Kant termed
"universal categories."

He also asserts the capacity of art

to image ("repeat") these "eternal" aspects of existence,
which, he implies, are categorically few in number.

History

is seen as the ineluctable unfolding of events that, while
they differ in terms of specifics, fall generically under
one of a few metaphysically constant categories.

Of course

Faulkner, not discourser but artist, never names these
categories, but his frequent recitation of the "eternal
verities" offers insight into his thinking along this line.
In the familiar words of McCaslin Edmonds in Go Down, M o s e s ,
"Truth is o n e .

It doesn't change.

It covers all things

which touch the heart— honor and pride and pity and justice
and love. Y e t

if Faulkner iterated his conviction of

metaphysical constancy when he told creative writing

" t o Malcolm Cowley, Saturday, early Nov. 1944," in
Joseph Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William Faulkner
(New York:
Random House, 1977), pp. 185-86.
^William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York:
1973), p. 297.

Vintage,
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students at the University of Virginia that each new
generation will "inherit" the "ageless, eternal struggles,
he also at times spoke in a negative vein, as when he wrote
Cowley that "life is a phenomenon but not a novelty, the
same frantic steeplechase toward nothing everywhere and man
stinks the same stink no matter where in time.
Still, Faulkner frequently suggested that the
conditions of man's existence are not inherently static.
Setting up a contrast between himself and writers who
despair over the ameliorative potential of humanity, he
asserted that "one can hate man's condition," yet "try to
change it, and possibly will change it."®

Asked whether or

not the American language is developing, he said, "the only
alternative to change and progress is d e a t h . T h e

optimism

evident in such remarks stands in contrast to the above
statements that support the claim for the universality of
the conditions of experience.

The contradiction in

Faulkner's commentary thus ironically exemplifies his regard
for conflict as the essential characteristic of being.

He

^Frederick L Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds., Faulkner
in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 239.
®"To Malcolm Cowley," in Blotner,

Selected Letters,

p.

185.
®Gwynn, p. 122.
The specific reference in this case is
to H. L. Mencken, who, according to Faulkner's paraphrase,
suggests that "man stinks and always will stink.
I don't
agree with that."
^Gwynn, p. 151.
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lived his own characterization of man's existence as "the
human heart in conflict with itself," and in no aspect of
his life more decisively than in his irrepressible
epistemological compulsion, which posed the antipodal
questions of whether art is simply a synecdochal image of
one of life's "moving things," or whether it is inherent in
human being and thus entails what Alan Megill terms
"ontogenesis," the principle of radical creativity that
makes possible genuine amelioration of the quality of life.®
A recurrent canonical motif of conflict as an inherent
paradoxical condition informing existence underscores
Faulkner's inability to accept unreservedly the reality of
the verities.

Besides his compulsive Platonic inclination,

Faulkner suffered the cogent, ultimately undeniable
influence of genuine doubt, which is manifest in the
agnosticism expressed by numerous prominent voices in the
fiction.

As a consequence of the internal strife created by

this collision of a powerful urge to believe in the
actuality of "courage and honor and pride, and pity and love
of justice and of liberty" and a doubt-informed urge to
know, Faulkner's modernistic confidence in man's capacity
for "truth," like that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, succumbed
to a postmodernistic reservation about this capacity.

The

drive for "objective truth," imaged most starkly in the

®Alan Megill, Prophets of Extremity (Berkeley:
California Press, 1985).

Univ. of
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characterizations of Quentin Compson in both The Sound and
the Fury (1929) and Absalom, Absalom!

(1936) and Isaac

McCaslin in Go Down, Moses (1942), gives way to an assertion
of the primacy of aesthetics and aletheia in the image of
the old general.

Yet, paradoxically, this conception of

truth holds open the possibility, be it ever so ambiguous,
for conscious, future-directed input into the stream of
experienced event.
The dust jacket of the first printing of A Fable
asserts the inevitability of "many controversial
interpretations" that will be "read into" the book.

My

treatment reads the novel as a narrative image that in a
general sense comports with a reading of existence that
occurs in post-Nietzschean discourse.

Following the

terminology in Megill's analysis of Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Foucault, and Derrida, I have elected to use the term
"aestheticism"

(the adjective being "aestheticist") in my

study of A F a bl e.

Aestheticism emphasizes being over

knowledge, perpetual crisis over historicism, an "eternal
present" over temporal linearity, differentiation over
unity, interpretation over definition.

Fundamentally,

aestheticism regards existence as radically potential rather
than consistent, static, and yielding of universal truths.
In the chapters that follow I aim to show that the texture
of Faulkner's fiction indicates that Quentin Compson and the
series of important Faulknerian artist-figures who succeed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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him fail adequately to understand this characteristic of
existence and that the old general in A Fable is their
singular opposite.
A Fable demonstrates the consonance of Faulkner's major
works with the main line of western discourse from its roots
in Pre-Socratic texts to its postmodern incarnations in
texts contemporary with Faulkner's own.

I am thinking here

most especially, though not exclusively, of Heidegger, whose
four-volume analysis of Nietzsche's writings perhaps reveals
as much about his own conclusions about the nature and
constituents of Being as it does about those of his subject.
My argument that A Fable presents a distinctively postmodern
image of existence draws heavily from Volume One, entitled
Nietzsche;

The Will to Power as Art , and suggests a major

parallel in the relative weltanshauungs of Faulkner and
Heidegger, who probably knew little, if anything, of each
other's works.

In using other writers' conceptions of the

relation of art and life, especially those of Nietzsche and
Heidegger, it is not my intention to place the philosopher's
hat on Faulkner, but merely to elucidate some of the ideas
that underlie images in the fiction.

If, incidentally,

particular discursive works and ideas are illuminated in the
process, this result will be a happy consequence of my
primary goal of letting heretofore unexpressed ideas that
inhere in Faulkner's fiction see the light of day.
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Chapter I

The Textual Case for Faulkner's Aestheticism

In concert with the tendency of modernist writers to
acknowledge the fluctuant character of experience while
seeking simultaneously to disclose more basic— constant—
forces such as Nature or History underlying it, Faulkner
frequently expressed his conviction that "man's condition"
is one "in which he is in conflict with himself or with his
environment or with others," and he reprised throughout his
mature fiction images of conflict as the defining
characteristic of man's existence.

Asked at the University

of Virginia whether his characters are "universal," he
stated that man's "struggle is against his own h e a r t ,
against— with the hearts of his fellows, and with his
environment. E m i l y

Grierson was a case

"of the poor

tragic human being struggling with its own h e a r t , with
others, with its environment.

"You write a story . . .

to

tell about people, man in his constant struggle with his own
he ar t, with the hearts of others, or with his environment.

^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds., Faulkner
in the University (New York:
Vintage, 1965), p. 197, my
italics.
^Gwynn, pp. 184-85, my emphasis.
^Gwynn, Faulkner in the University, p. 239, my emphasis.
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This triad of self pitted against self, against others, or
against environment appears too frequently in his remarks to
be a position that Faulkner had not thought through
carefully and fully embraced.

His metaphysic of conflict as

imaged in the fiction, however, falls short of the category
of theses that purport to identify the ground of existence.
Faulkner's sense of the primacy of conflict notwithstanding,
the texture of the mature fiction suggests that existence
resists final definition.

In accentuating the relative over

the absolute, Faulkner's texture asserts his hard-won
conclusion that the search for objective truth is quixotic
and delusory, and ought therefore to be replaced with an
awareness of man's essentially aesthetic condition and of
the consequential importance of valuation.
Faulkner's aestheticism occurs as a general narrative
composite of emphases on (1) time, imaged as the
adventitious experience of consciousness;
physiological basis of "human being";

(2) the

(3) perspectivism as

the basic condition of man's experience and communication,
both with himself and others; and (4) man's propensity to
embrace mythopoeia in attempting to understand and accept
his place in the world.

This composite informs Faulkner's

textual motif of conflict as both the basic characteristic
of existence and the enabling open condition for man's
inherent faculty for creative responses to the world of his
experience.
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The inventing of Quentin Compson during the writing of
The Sound and the Fury embodied a purgation of Faulkner's
inability to accept in his life the consequences of temporal
process.

In this novel he imaged for the first time in the

texture^ of his fiction— specifically, in Quentin's
monologue— the kinetic backdrop of man's existence that
would henceforth appear in all of the major texts.

Quentin

constitutes Faulkner's recognition that, the strength of
one's sense of it notwithstanding, a projected invisible,
providential dimension that overlays or undergirds, as the
case may be, the visible, "fallen" universe, has only
noumenal existence.

Had Faulkner been able to convince

himself of the reality of such a metaphysical overlay, he
would have had universal justification for the unfortunate
occurrences in his own life that informed the
characterization of Quentin.

Accordingly, Quentin would

have taken a characterological shape quite different from
what he came to be.

But in developing Quentin, Faulkner was

responding to his need to work through an extreme personal
conflict between the world as he was experiencing it and the
world as he wanted it to be.

As Faulkner's fictional

By texture I simply mean, following C. Hugh Holman in
A Handbook to Literature (Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill, 1980),
p. 443, "the elements which remain in a work of literary art
after a paraphrase of its argument has been made. Among such
elements are details of situation, metaphor, meter, imagery,
tone color, rhyme— in fact, all elements that are not
considered to be a part of the structure of the work."
I
would also specify syntax and diction.
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surrogate, Quentin challenges the phenomenal world in an
attempt to force it to disclose its perceived metaphysical
foundation.

The harm he thereby perpetrates upon himself

stands as Faulkner's self-acknowledgement of the quixotic
nature of the quest for formal transcendence of contingency.
Yet despite the lesson that inheres in Faulkner's
characterization of Quentin and several successor artistfigures in his fiction, the strife that informed the
inception and development of A Fable, the late novel that
Faulkner intended to be his "magnum o," manifests the
writer's failure to overcome the urge to embrace, and
thereby make real, Platonic shadows of his imagination.^
His narrative inquiry into the problem of the discrepancy
between desire and reality assumes its structure on the
basis of an internal dialectic between the two poles of his
impulse to believe that fundamental changes in human being,
both individually and socially, are possible, and his sense
of the ontological impossibility of such transformations.
His basic narrative vision moves between these two poles
which demarcate in the fiction what Heidegger terms the
beginning and the end of western philosophy— (l)Platonism,
expressed most forcefully in what Faulkner referred to as
the verities, and (2)aestheticism, based on a conviction of

"To Malcolm Cowley, Tuesday, April 23, 1946," in Joseph
Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William Faulkner (New York:
Random House, 1977), p. 233.
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the open character of existence.^

The opposition between

these two positions can be reduced to two hypothetical
syllogisms:

(1) If being is invariable, then fundamental

change is impossible, and value resides in universels.
Truth in this sense is Platonic, a priori, inevitable.

(2)

If being is contingent, then the possibility for creative
interpolation exists, but it exists within a value-less
vacuum; that is, values are relative and subject to
creation.

Truth in this sense is Pre-Socratic, immanent,

and variable.

Faulkner's textual accentuation of this

latter view of truth marks his hard-won transition from

^Aestheticism is not a word Heidegger specifically uses
to denominate this postulated transition in western discourse.
I borrow the term from Alan Megill in his Prophets of
Extremity (Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1985),
because it effectively suggests what Heidegger sees occurring
as a result of Nietzsche's concept of "will to power," namely
the end of metaphysical discourse and the beginnings of a new
attentiveness to manifest existence.
Nietzsche's
term
essentially parallels Plato's metaphysical nihilism (a term
that, for Heidegger, would be a redundancy), but makes
possible the new focus of post-Nietzschean thought.
For
Megill aestheticism marks the general "postmodern" debunking
of historicism in texts of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and
Derrida. My reading of Faulkner owes much to Megill's thesis
that traditional readings of Romanticism which assert a
dialectic of "alienation, through spiritual crisis, to a
redemptive reintegration" with an undergirding "primal unity"
ignore the more compelling "idea of primal difference or
differentiation
that Nietzsche and his
successors
put
forward." The Romantic concept of "empathetic understanding,
with its concern for mere reproduction, gives way to a notion
of 'active' or 'productive' interpretation . . . ."
This
accent on production and its concomitant of "truth" as an
"open" moment of the perpetual unravelling of experience, at
the expense of reproduction and its intrinsic assumption of
the representation of truth, provides the basis for my
borrowing of Megill's term.
See especially pp. 1-25.
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modernist to postmodernist, from absolutist to
"aestheticist."
In ascribing to Faulkner the aestheticist label, I
suggest his ideational concurrence with the school of
thought which finds the whole of existence to be basically
aesthetic.

Aestheticism as here defined holds that the

condition of man's existence, or of his experience,
precludes knowledge of objective truth.

Experience is

perspectival, not general, so the mind's particular slant on
a segment of its experience is necessarily anomalous and
relative.

Writers who subscribe to this general description

of existence find "art," or "creativity," or
"interpretation," for instance, as opposed to some
identifiable constant such as Man, or Culture, to be the
basis of

knowledge.

Faulkner's adherence to this view of

man's condition is evident in his textual image of
consciousness, which he largely casts as a matter of the
subject's immediate sense of time.

Whether it be an

individual's or a group's, consciousness or time exists as
the perpetually unfolding product of the interplay of man's
physiology and his environment.

This generic narrative

image offers the sustained implicit argument that the
recurrence of experiential conflict in man's relations
occurs as the inevitable result of a condition of
physiologically based conflict that fundamentally informs
consciousness.

Faulkner consistently images this condition
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in the texture of his mature fiction, making the relation of
texture to unfolding narrative event analogous to the
relation of physiology to experience.

As the predominant

image in the canon, this metaphor of man's fundamental
condition establishes Faulkner's aestheticism, which
generally agrees with the conception of existence developed
by Henri Bergson, whose influence Faulkner acknowledged on
several occasions.

Faulkner's aesthetic ontology, moreover,

generally parallels the shared view of Nietzsche and his
most insightful reader to date, Martin Heidegger, that man's
impulse both to create and to respond aesthetically to
creation constitutes the very ground of his being.

Thus,

juxtaposing his fiction with prominent elements of their
discourse on art creates an inter-illuminative relationship
between the texts.

± mean to avail myself of this

reciprocity in my attempt to establish Faulkner's
aestheticism, indicating affinities, though, only for
purposes of elucidation, eschewing the less interesting and
more laborious and speculative practice of demonstrating
influence.

In short, recourse to the general idea of

aestheticism that appears in the texts of several discursive
writers offers a means of establishing the aestheticist
slant of Faulkner's major fiction.
Bergson's description of man's experience of time
elucidates the idea of physiological conflict that informs
Faulkner's fiction.

Acknowledging his general agreement
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with Bergson's view of time, Faulkner told Loic Bouvard,
"There is only the present moment, in which I include both
the past and the future, and that is e t e r n i t y . On another
occasion he asserted that "time is a fluid condition which
has no existence except in the momentary avatars of
individual people."®

Faulkner's meaning is not that time

literally is nothing, but that man's experience of time is
necessarily a

matter of the state of his consciousness in a

given moment.

Bergson's analysis of the interpenetration of

memories, perceptions, and tendencies in consciousness
clarifies this idea:
In the depth of my being that which is most uniformly,
most constantly and most enduringly myself [is] a
continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I
have ever seen.

There is a succession of states, each

of which announces that which follows and contains that
which precedes it. . . . Whilst I was experiencing them
they were so solidly organized, so profoundly animated
with a common life, that I could not have said where
any one of them finished or where another commenced.
In reality no one of them begins or ends, but all

^Loic Bouvard, "Interview with Loic Bouvard," in Lion in
the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner, 1926-1962, ed.
James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate (New York:
Random
House, 1962), p. 70.
®Jean Stein, "Interview with Jean Stein Vanden Heuvel,"
in Lion in the Garden, p. 255.
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extend into each other.^
Thus Bergson sees time as a composite of the
constituents of consciousness in a given moment.

A "moment"

of consciousness involves the experience of an anomalous,
ultimately irreducible confluence of forces.

The dynamic

moment "contains," as it were, the ongoing physical process
of consciousness.

This complex instant is fundamentally

creative, in the sense that ever materializing, changing
experience occurs as consciousness, which is itself
paradoxically caught up in the natural process.

The typical

image of this condition in Faulkner emphasizes an active
(dynamic, vital, emergent, "processive," materializing)—
creative— natural world, at the center of which stands
consciousness and its capacity for expressive action.
Aristotle termed this condition dynamis, which Heidegger
defines as "force, the capacity to be gathered within itself
and prepared to work e f f e c t s . T h e

complex of "memories,

perceptions, and tendencies" that comprise one moment of
experience stands in at least a minimal degree of contrast
to that of any other m o m e n t . S t r i f e

inheres in the

operation whereby one dynamic composite vitiates itself in

^Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.
T. E. Hulme (New York; 1922), pp. 9-10.
^^Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche:
Volume I:
The Will to
Power as Art (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 64.
l^Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9.
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the process of giving way to another.

Thus the experience

of consciousness in any given "moment" is necessarily
different from that of any other moment, and precisely this
fluid repetition of difference within consciousness— an
innate empirical corollary of which is perpetually evolving
perspective— constitutes the constant which is the basis of
Faulkner's ontological aestheticism.
Roughly put, the condition is one in which dynamic
constituents yield with extreme reluctance to would-be
constituents.

The key to the paradox rests in the word

"yield," which demonstrates the "open" character of the
condition.

The conflict is expressible as an inherent

dynamic antagonism between forces that currently constitute
a moment of experience and forces vying to comprise it.

The

condition both does and does not admit potential entrants.
This is the operative mechanical dimension of the paradox of
strife that Faulkner images as the fundament of being, an
inherent condition that stands as a situation in which the
only constant factor is the very opposite of what by
definition is constant, namely, the principle of change.
While it is a principle that arguably permeates the entire
universe, in terms of consciousness as imaged by Faulkner it
simply involves the premise that the present exists as a
condition of contingency, open to alteration by external
forces— including future acts of consciousness itself— which
enter the present, as it were, by a process of
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internalization.

The motif suggests the interplay of

consciousness with both phenomena and noumena as the primary
formative relation of human being.

In these images

consciousness does not relate to experience, but
experience, which in this context must be defined as a
process and thus be said to be ultimately indeterminate and
indefinable.

With its unyielding stress on physiology, the

texture of Faulkner's major fiction implicitly indicates his
abjuration of the Cartesian interpretation of existence and
his allegiance to the view that subject and object coexist,
as it were, and therefore make experience inherently
perspectival.

Faulkner's sense of the centrality of this

condition to human being induces him to accentuate the
interrelation of choice and valuation as the operation
whereby man embraces or repudiates moral responsibility.^^

^^The assertion of primacy for the aestheticist
position appears to contradict the assertion that Faulkner's
fiction generally disavows the claim that absolutes are
discernible and expressible, for the concept of primacy
appears to contradict aestheticism as defined above.
If
Faulkner's orchestrating point of view is aestheticist, how
can one assert that it offers a general image of conflict as
the dominant force informing existence? Aestheticism disputes
the concept of absolutism, yet apparently passes off itself as
the one constant characteristic of being. The answer depends
upon the
particularities of this image.
The rhetorical
elements that combine to produce it show conflict to be the
controlling factor in the variableness of experience.
The
image of
the "mechanism" of conflict that inheres in the
relation of consciousness and experience has the constancy of
such post-Enlightenment postulates as Man,
Culture,
or
History.
It differs, though, first, in that it attempts to
describe empirical reality, as opposed to some invisible,
though potent, force, and, second, in that its fundamental
characteristic is its inconstancy. In brief, it is a constant
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Faulkner's generic aestheticist image of consciousness
suggests that experiential conflict is secondary to the
physiological condition of perpetual conflict, from which
the former necessarily derives.

The motif yields only

reluctantly to analysis, yet attempts to describe it ought
to be made since it embodies Faulkner's most definitive
conclusion about human being.

Fundamentally it is an image

of the present of consciousness as a process comprised of
various elements, with varying levels of force, co
operating, as it were.

The perceptual basis of this dynamic

complex, of course, is the human brain and its multifaceted
relationship to the entire organism.

Yet, as a writer, not

a scientist, Faulkner is uninterested in the purely
technical aspects of the complex, though his textual
emphasis on physiological factors indicates his conviction
of its fundamental importance to man's experience.

Rather,

what interest him are the manifest elements of the
operation, which might conveniently be termed "phenomena,"
and the other— "immaterial"— mental elements, which may be
represented by the term "noumena."

Among the first category

are perceptions and feelings, insofar as the latter word

condition of inconstancy.
The interplay of syntax, imagery,
and narrative discourse in Faulkner produces a texture which
suggests that, rather than cancelling out each other, the
apparently contradictory absolutist and aestheticist positions
actually reinforce one another.
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denotes a purely physical experience.

Among the category of

noumena are thoughts, imagery in the "mind's eye," memories,
and emotions.

By no means unimportant are, to use the

Freudian metaphor, subconscious elements that impact on the
"now" that constitutes consciousness.

In any event, the

condition is inherently paradoxical, as consciousness is
both a part of that evolving world and simultaneously
capable of awareness of its own microcosmic relation to the
holistic process.
This general condition makes the realization of human
projects extremely difficult and largely predicated on a
practical understanding of it.

Quentin experiences the

uncanniness of his experience of time at numerous moments on
the last day of his life, the events, moods and mental
phenomena (such as memories and visions) of which he details
in his tormented monologue— which, to be more accurate,
actually an ongoing dialogue with himself.

is

It is the

experience of Harry Wilbourne throughout "Wild Palms," and
of the young Isaac McCaslin, as when, upon entering the
locus of "his novitiate," "the wilderness closed behind his
entrance as it had opened momentarily to accept him, opening
before his advancement as it closed behind his progress, no
fixed path the wagon followed but a channel non-existent ten
yards ahead of it and ceasing to exist ten yards after it
had passed, the wagon progressing not by its own volition
but by attrition of their intact yet fluid circumambience.
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drowsing, earless, almost lightless."^^

Isaac similarly

senses the eeriness of time when he sees the footprint of
the bear appear, then "fill with water until it was level
full and the water began to overflow and the sides of the
print began to dissolve away."

Isaac attentively keeps pace

with the succession of evanescing prints until,

"emerging

suddenly into a little glade," he notices that "the
wilderness coalesced," "rushed, soundless and solidified"
(p. 209, my emphasis).
By accentuating the influence of "man's nature" and
"his environment" on his conscious relation to himself and
others, Faulkner's texts offer images of physiologically
informed conflict as the ground of e x p e r i e n c e . H i s
aestheticism, like that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, is based
on his interpretation of man's physiology, which is the
source of the individual's immediate sense of experience,
the temporal aspect of which Faulkner stresses.

Both

commentary and imagery in the fiction indicate the impact of
physiology on man's perspectival condition.

Simply stated,

man's physiologically-induced mood occurs as the distance
between what an individual immediately feels and what he
desires to feel.

The idea contained in the Greek word

aisthesis, roughly translated as "feeling," elucidates this

^^William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York:
1973), p. 195. The emphasis is mine.

Vintage,

l^Gwynn, p. 118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

conception of man.^^

Experience is constituted by a state,

or feeling, that derives from the relation of man's bodily
self to the phenomenal world in which it exists.

In The

Wild Pa lms, Harry Wilbourne recalls how several times during
his relationship with Charlotte Rittenmeyer he was lulled
into listlessness by the daily ritual of "eating and
evacuation and fornication and sitting in the s u n . T h i s
emphasis on the creaturely aspect of man, which organically
interplays with the individual's mood or sense of time,
involves characters' typically torturous perceptual
encounter with phenomena.

Thus, in The Sound and the Fury,

Quentin is agonized by the smell of honeysuckle, which
elicits painful reminders of his sister's and his own
sexuality.

Harry is similarly tortured by visual and

auditory impressions that evoke memories of Charlotte,
though he eventually makes a conscious choice to seek out
such experiences.

Rosa Coldfield in Absalom, Absalom!

recalls to Quentin her "summer of wisteria," in effect an
elaborate, mnemonically-rooted myth based on her childhood
observation of the romance of Charles Bon and Judith Sutpen,
and on her own frustrated "romance" with the "demon" Sutpen.
According to her recollection, a "sweet conjunction of root

l^Heidegger, Nietzsche;

Volume I , p. 83.

l^William Faulkner, The Wild Palms (New York:
1966), p. 133.

Vintage,
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bloom and urge and hour and weather" fed her experience.
The yearly blooming of wisteria evokes a Proustian renewal
of the m o o d .
Faulkner's emphasis on the relation of physiology to
man's immediate sense of the world underlies his general
concurrence with Nietzsche that perspectivism, the principle
that minds never absolutely converge, governs human
experience.

Because the constituents of consciousness are

never static, but in constant evolution, there can be no
facts, only interpretations.

This correlate of Faulkner's

conflict-informed ontology postulates a condition which
forces the individual to choose, from conflicting
interpretations, which ones he will embrace and what actions
he will therefore undertake.

The capacity for responsive

action on the part of those who have achieved insight into
the conflict that informs natural processes is the central
element of Faulkner's aesthetics.

Conflict, as the inherent

condition that delimits man's relation to the world and
accentuates the importance of choice and valuation for human
existence, is the ground of the ontology that impels
Faulkner to stress physiology as the dominant affective
factor in man's experience, and point of view as the
dominant tangible manifestation of man's faculty for
creation.

Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's

^^William
Faulkner,
Vintage, 1964), p. 144.

Absalom,

Absalom!

(New
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"physiological aesthetics" effectively glosses this
principle in Faulkner;

"My having various states— the ways

I find myself to be with something— participates essentially
in defining how I find the things themselves and everything
I encounter to be."^®
Quentin is Faulkner's first extensive narrative image
of the potent influence of the physical world on individual
consciousness.

A projection of Faulkner's own mythopoeic

response to crisis, Quentin's mythos synecdochally
illuminates the writer's sense of the importance of creative
process to man's capacity for adaptation.

To explain my use

of the term mythopoeia in this context, I rely on Harold
Bloom's chapter "The Mythopoeic Mode" in his Shelley's
Mythmaking.

Like Shelley, interested in the empirical

experience of mind, Faulkner determined that in its
interplay with world, consciousness is a force capable of
creative self-interpolation.

Bloom distinguishes between

two general attitudes which result from the interaction of
mind and nature.

Commonplace experience involves an I-It

relation in which the mind is not "bound up" with the object
as it is in an I-Thou relation.

The second,

"imaginative,"

mode of experience involves a heightened relation to the

^^Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche:

Volume I, p. 83.
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w o r l d . T h e

I-It relation is inclusive, analytical,

intellectual, experiential; the I-Thou relation, exclusive,
synthetic, poetic, relational.

Bloom finds in some of

Shelley's poems evidence of an I-Thou relationship with
natural phenomena that elicits improvisational activity on
the part of the poet.
process.

Quentin undergoes precisely this

The experience of anguish transports him into a

mythopoeic relationship with nature and evokes poetic
responses that eventually assume the substance of an
idiosyncratic mythos.
Anguished memories sustain Quentin in a mode of
mythopoeic perception.

From the beginning of the monologue

it is apparent not only that his experience of the world has
been mythopoeic for some time, but also that he has brought
a highly literary sensibility to the relation.

The first

image he describes is the light-induced "shadow of the
sash," painful to him because it signifies his being "in
time again," the medium of his sister's unacceptable
actions, of his awareness of them, of life i t s e l f . ^0

Once

Quentin sees the shadow, he begins to hear the ticking
watch, which elicits an image of time as a corridor of "long

Martin Buber, I and Th ou, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith
(Edinburgh, Clark, and New York; Scribner's, 1937), quoted in
Harold Bloom, Shelley's Mythmaking (Ithaca:
Cornell Univ.
Press, 1959), pp. 1-2.
^®William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York:
Random House, 1984), p. 86. Further references to this "New,
Corrected Edition" of the novel appear in the text.
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and lonely light rays" down which Jesus walks (p. 76).
Jesus he associates with St. Francis, whom he associates
with Little Sister Death, who painfully reminds him of his
sister, Caddy.

Thus, Quentin masochistically employs the

poetic techniques of symbol and allusion, creating by
verbalization the quality of his experience.

It is the

reader's first evidence of the poetic process that Quentin
believes will eventuate in a satisfactory resolution of his
problem.
Imaged as a voice, itself a natural phenomenon, Quentin
responds to agonizing phenomena which evoke noumena that
ultimately overwhelm him.

His utterances in response to

every momentary flicker or image of light indicate his
enraptured aesthetic state.
numerous others:

A few such images exemplify

He sees Shreve's glasses "glinting rosily"

(p. 77); he sees Gerald Bland's "oars catching the sun in
spaced glints," and immediately thinks "Did you ever have a
sister" (p 92); "the river glinted beyond things in sort of
swooping glints"

(p. Ill); fishing poles looked "like

balanced threads of running fire"

(p. 121); the flight of a

butterfly suggests that "one of the sun-flecks had come
loose"

(p. 140); "dust motes whirled and slanted" (p. 144).

The dominant evanescent images in the monologue involve
twilight, and they occur with increasing frequency as the
monologue progresses along with the day.

To nurse Quentin's

swollen eye, Shreve brings a water basin with "a round blob
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of twilight wobbling in it" (p. 187).

On the streetcar

Quentin "could see the twilight again, that quality of light
as if time really had stopped for a while."

The most

troublesome image, of course, is constituted by twilight and
honeysuckle:

"when it rained the smell began to come into

the house at twilight either it would rain more at twilight
or there was something in the light itself but it always
smelled strongest then."

This double image manifests

Quentin's association of time and light, as it evokes images
from the past:

"looking down a corridor of grey halflight

where . . . all I had done shadows all I had felt suffered
taking visible form antic and perverse mocking without
relevance"

(pp. 194-95).

Quentin's is no ordinary mode of

existence, but reminiscent of Nietzsche's physiological
grounding of the act of creation as "an explosive condition"
involving "the extreme sharpness of certain senses, so they
understand a quite different sign language— and create
one".

Throughout the monologue Quentin comes into

conflict with his environment and reacts poetically.
Engulfed by sensory impressions that evoke anguishing
recollections regarding Caddy, such as the sunlight on
Gerald's wet oars, Quentin utters a poetic description
("spaced glints") of the perception, which reminds him of

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr.
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York:
Random
1967), pp.428-29.
The italics are Nietzsche's.
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twilight, a general image he associates with Caddy ("Did you
ever have a sister?").

To be sure, what happens when

Quentin encounters images of light is unique to himself.

It

is an interpretation, but not, for Quentin, one that he
chooses.

His perspective is fixed, its potentially open

condition vitiated by the particular obsessive orientation
of his consciousness.
Note the similarities in Harry Wilbourne's experience
in the final chapter of The Wild Palms, which details this
character's increasing anguish, confrontation with despair,
and meditation culminating in his resolve to cherish
memories of Charlotte.

Throughout this process Harry exists

in poetic relation to the wind, which symbolizes his
involvement with her.

While she lies dying in a beach

cottage, the wind seems to Harry a living presence "just
interfering for the fun, the hell of i t . . . .

It was

risible, it was almost a chuckling; it did not really want
to come in" (p. 281).

He hears painfully evocative sounds

that Faulkner presents onomatopoeically, usually created by
the interaction of wind with an object— the ambulance
"wailing"

(p. 292), the wheels of the stretcher "making a

sucking sound"

(p. 294), the smocks of the doctors

"flicking," the nurses' skirts "rustling"

(p. 304).

Stepping from the ambulance, Harry hears "the palms rustling
and hissing again as if they were being played upon by a
sand blower"

(p. 295).

In the room where Charlotte's body
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lies, he perceives "not a cool wind blowing into the room
but a hot one being forced out" by an invisible ventilator.
It stirs "a lock of the dark, savagely short hair," and as
he stands in anguished meditation upon the contrast between
her former vivacity and the present lifelessness of her
body, the stretcher team cruelly whisks her away, a button
clicks, and "the hum of the blower" stops (pp. 305-07).
Harry's sustained existence in this state of conflict
informs his mythopoeic resolution at the conclusion of "Wild
Palms."
Faulkner's sense of conflict is not synonymous with the
divinely informed strife that drives Hegel's dialectical
interpretation of existence, though it not infrequently
aspires to be, but is rather more similar to the
revelational strife that informs the images of nature-asprocess that one finds in pre-Socratic texts or, more
recently, in the later works of Heidegger.

The

absolutist/aestheticist tension that dominates Faulkner's
mature fiction perhaps rises to its greatest pitch in the
struggle of Isaac McCaslin in Go Down, Moses to comprehend
God's truth and to act thereon.

At a central point in the

engaging dialogic encounter with his cousin McCaslin Edmonds
in Part Four of "The Bear," Isaac recalls an earlier
encounter between the two when Edmonds, who embodies the
Platonic position that stands in opposition to the
aestheticist Weltanschauung inherent in the texture of the
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novel, utilizes Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn" in attempting
to define "truth" to his young kinsman.

Edmonds' assertion

that "Truth is one," that it is changeless, elicits Isaac's
unspoken contrast between the "truth" ostensibly embodied in
"somebody talking in a book" and the truth embodied in his
failure to fire at Old Ben "long before the fyce covered the
twenty yards to where the bear waited"

(p. 297).

Isaac

privileges the latter— "simpler"— truth, borne out of the
reality of the powerful internal conflict the incident
evoked in him.

In presenting Isaac's retrospective

visualization of this "moment" of experience, Faulkner's
text images truth as aletheia.

In contrast to the Platonic

version of truth as inherent a priori knowledge, and to the
Hebraic conception of prophetically revealed truth, Isaac's
sense of truth, at least in this instance, corresponds to
the general Pre-Socratic conception of truth as perspectival
(experiential) revelation— as Heidegger states it in his
commentary on "The Anaximander Fragment," the experience of
"approach and withdrawal as the basic trait of advent.
It is "processive," anomalous, ontogenetic.

Yet in his

later decision to embrace an idiosyncratic Christian
(Platonic)

interpretation of events, Isaac ignores, or at

least forgets, his own insight.

Martin Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment, in Early
Greek Thinking, trans. David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi
(San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1984), p. 31.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32

The general detachment of the third-person voices of A
Fable offer a view of the world of perpetual process to
which consciousness necessarily relates.

In this novel

Faulkner occasionally depicts the whirl of natural phenomena
in the language of a narrator who speaks as though he were
observing it from an elevated position.

For example, the

detached narrator of the initial chapter, entitled
"Wednesday," tells of an infantry battalion "emerging from
the Place de Ville in close route column, led by a light
tank with its visor closed for action, which, as it advanced
parted the crowd like a snowplow, thrusting the divided
parting back from either curb like the snowplow's jumbled
masses, the infantry deploying into two parallel files
behind the advancing tank, until at last the whole boulevard
from the Place to the old gate was clean and empty again
between the two thin lines of bayonetted rifles."^3

A

similarly detached narrator in the fifth chapter, "Tuesday,
Wednesday," describes an anguished community of citizens
"seeming, as they approached the compound, to increase in
speed as a wave does nearing the sand, on, until it suddenly
crashed against the wire barrier, and hung for an instant
and then burst, split into two lesser waves which flowed in
each direction along the fence until each spent itself"

(p.

William Faulkner, A Fable (New York:
Random House,
1954), p. 6. All further references to this first printing of
the novel appear in the text.
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130).

Both passages stand as metaphors for the world of

perpetual change and motion that Faulkner's protagonists
encounter.
Correspondences in Faulkner to Nietzsche's aesthetic
theory, particularly as this theory has been interpreted and
expanded by Heidegger, offer a means of clarifying
Faulkner's narrative image of man's aesthetic existence.

I

do not mean to suggest that Faulkner read either Nietzsche
or Heidegger carefully or that parts of the fiction stand as
conscious narrative representations of discursive schema.
No one can reasonably doubt, however, given their prominence
in intellectual milieus, that Faulkner encountered ideas of
both thinkers, if only indirectly in discussions that he is
known to have participated in with other writers and
intellectuals.

John Irwin makes a credible case for the

presence of the concept of "eternal return of the same" in
The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!.

Thomas

McHaney sees Thus Spake Zarathustra as a dominant influence
on The Wild Palms. B u t

the issue of provenance aside,

affinities among positions fundamental to both the fiction
and the discourse demonstrate that Faulkner reached
strikingly similar conclusions to those of Nietzsche and
Heidegger about man's capacity for and susceptibility to
art.

The textual correspondences derive from the profound

^^Thomas L. McHaney, William Faulkner's "The Wild Palms"
A Study (Jackson;
Univ. Press of Mississippi, p. xix.
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influence of the Platonic world view on the three writers.
Nietzsche reads the modern crisis of faith in Christianity
as the inevitable conclusion of the nihilism that inheres in
Platonism.

Confidence in the reality of a transcendent,

"ideal," realm, in which Being exists in perfection and
stasis, distracts man from the possibilities that inhere in
attentiveness to "lived" existence in this world.

Faulkner,

like the discoursers, fascinated by but skeptical of the
Platonic postulation, presents in the texture of his fiction
a generic image of existence as the dynamic "now" of
consciousness.

In all three writers, obsessive focus on the

immediacy of experience in this world stands as a reaction
to Platonism.

And in all of them it is the capacity for art

that inheres in the composition of this immediacy that most
fundamentally defines man.
Heidegger's reading and further development of
Nietzsche's view of art as the basic human activity offers
an illuminative approach to Faulkner's view of man's faculty
for creation.

In Heidegger's view the task Nietzsche

consciously undertook entailed setting aside the errors of
traditional metaphysics, lodged in the two poles of Platonic
idealism and Aristotelian positivism.

Nietzsche's

resolution of the error lies in his concept of will to
power, which holds that all occurrence in nature is informed
by an inherent tendency toward heightening or increasing the
power of the acting phenomenon.

His primary objective is to
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develop an effective interpretation of all occurrence, of
which life is "the form . . . most familiar to us."

And of

all the phenomena of life, it is in the artist that, in
Heidegger's words,
and brightly."

"Being lights up for us most immediately

The artist is the person who is most clearly

"able to bring something forth," "to establish in Being
something that does not yet exist."

The activity of the

artist thus epitomizes Nietzsche's conception of the ground
of Being, which he calls "will to power," as the capacity to
bring forward something not yet in e x i s t e n c e . ^5

in terms of

an "expanded concept of artist," Nietzsche defines art in
broad terms as the result of man's use of his innate ability
to add to the quantum of existence.

By the same token,

"art

in the narrower sense is that activity in which creation
emerges for itself and becomes most perspicuous."

It is

"the supreme configuration" of will to power, Nietzsche's
term for man's fundamental b e i n g . T h e

^^Heidegger, Nietzsche;

Volume I ; ,

activity of the

p. 69.

^^Heidegger, Nietzsche, p. 72.
Heidegger clarifies
Nietzsche's concept by seeing it as partaking of aspects of
Aristotle's definitions of dynamis ("force, the capacity to be
gathered in itself and prepared to work effects"), energia ("a
being
empowered,"
"the
being-at-work
of
force"),
and
entelechia (force "as willing out beyond itself, precisely in
that way to come to itself, to find and assert itself in the
circumscribed simplicity of its essence").
Compare Otto
Rank's definition of will as "an autonomous organizing force
in the individual which . . . constitutes the creative
expression of the total personality and distinguishes one
individual from another," in Beyond Psychology (Camden, N.J.;
Haddon Craftsmen, 1941), p. 50.
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artist,

then, provides the clearest possible manifestation

of art and, concomitantly, of will to power.
From this basic view of the correspondence of the
creative faculty and a general capacity to establish in
being something that does not yet exist, Heidegger derives
his own aesthetics, which is fundamentally similar to
Faulkner's general image of the paradox of conflict.

In the

concept of will to power, Nietzsche purports to invert
Plato's emphasis on the transcendent and to ground man's
life in the dynamic immediacy of the present.

Heidegger

supports the Nietzschean project, but asserts that will to
power is, ironically, merely the nihilistic conclusion of
the strain of western discourse that began with Plato.

In

short, will to power stands as a metaphor for the essence of
existence, and as such is no more substantial than Plato's
postulate of an ideal world of which this world is but a
shadow.

What Nietzsche apparently did not see, according to

Heidegger, is that will to power is not a descriptive term
but a general metaphor for occurrences in nature.

Thus, as

George Steiner summarizes Heidegger's assessment of
Nietzsche's aesthetics, "will to power is not a
transcendence of western metaphysics but, on the contrary,
its natural and nihilistic c l i m a x . H e i d e g g e r wants to

^George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (New York;
Penguin,
1980), p. 150. Earlier in his discourse on Heidegger, Steiner
asserts, "for all its lyric magnetism, the Nietzschean Willto-Power is itself only a wildly exalted subjectivity," p. 70.
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approach as near as possible to a literal description of the
principle of dynamic process that underlies natural
occurrences, and while, like Nietzsche, he finds aesthetics
to be the key to the insight he seeks, his solution is not
in terms of an Apollonian-Dionysiac dialectic, but in terms
of a pre-Socratic "primalism" in which the word supposedly
was not metaphoric but immediate to the portion of reality
to which it corresponded.
Heidegger's description, in "The Origin of the Work of
Art," of the strife-driven interplay of "world" and "earth"
as the process through which creation occurs bears strong
resemblance to Faulkner's motif of the paradox of conflict.
I assert the parallels between these two writers' views of
art not because one man influenced the other, a highly
unlikely event despite their being coevals, but because
their conceptions of art mutually reinforce each other.
Several compelling reasons for the occurrence of this
correspondence may be offered, though neither individually
nor as a set are they conclusive.

The root of Faulkner's

agreement with Heidegger's description of the general
process of creation most assuredly arises from the fact that
their ideas derive from intense interest in the major
questions that modernism posed in intellectual circles in
the post-World-War-I western world.

The fiction of the one

and the discourse of the other are driven by these
questions.

Both writers responded to the crisis of values
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that afflicted the consciousness of modern man, Faulkner,
like Nietzsche, through an answer to Schoepenhauer's
pessimism (especially in The Wild Palms), and Heidegger
through an analysis, evaluation, and innovative furtherance
of Nietzsche's project.

That both men developed an

aestheticist response to the question of man's capacity for
instituting an effective interplay of knowledge and action
surely owes something to their similar views on the
significance of death, both as an image and as an event.
The nihilistic crisis of modernity derives from man's
inability to teach himself what Rosa Coldfield in Absalom,
Absalom! refers to as a "boon of death"

(p. 143).

For both

writers man's capacity for effective creative acts depends
upon a practical acceptance of death.

But it is their

common conclusion about the controlling influence of
consciousness, or time, as the medium of man's being that
marks the most basic parallel in their shared aestheticism.
In the "Origin," published seven years after the
appearance of Being and Time, Heidegger transposes his
description of the "thereness" of Dasein as a condition of
"veiled" presence into his sense of the innate relation of
art and truth.

According to Heidegger's reading of the

Greek term for truth, aletheia, truth "happens" as the
result of a conflict between what Heidegger terms "world"
and "earth."

Heidegger invents the verb "to world" to

indicate the strife between world and earth that eventuates
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in truth or art.

Creation involves the "opening up of a

world," by which process "all things gain their lingering
and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope
and limits."28

The world is never objective reality, but

the process whereby reality undergoes evolution.

"The world

worl ds , and is more fully in being than the tangible and
perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at
home"

(p. 44).

In terms of the work of art— in contrast to

"nature creating," so to speak, or to the "made" tool— being
is brought from concealment into the "Open," which is
established "in its structure" by the "setting forth" that
takes place in the strife of world and earth (p. 45).
Earth,

"that which comes forth and shelters,"

corresponds

to what Faulkner images as the realm of contingency within
which consciousness exists and to which it has the capacity
simultaneously to relate (p. 46).

The difference between

the work of art and the "made" work in general, both of
which eventuate from the process of "worlding," is that the
latter "disappears" into the end for which it was made,
whereas what is established in the work of art derives from
its relationship to the ability of consciousness to perceive
what otherwise would have no avenue for coming to be, hence
no being.

"All this comes forth as the work sets itself

^Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in
Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hoftstadter, (New
York: Harper Colophon, 1975), p. 41. All further references
to this work appear in the text.
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back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the
firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster
of metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, and into
the naming power of the word"

(p. 46).

Heidegger speaks of world/earth strife in terms of the
interplay of a "clearing" and "concealing" that constitutes
the "establishing" or "happening"
61).

(aletheia) of truth (p.

That which exists "conceals" that which does not

exist, and that which is in the process of coming to
existence "clears" its way as it relates to that which
exists.

The "concealing" element of the equation resists

the "clearing"— in Heidegger's words, "juts through" the
clearing element— but it nevertheless yields to some extent
(p. 49).
the work.

This extent, or perceptible remainder, constitutes
Paradoxically, as it opens, reveals, or clears

the way to "truth" or aletheia, it simultaneously assumes
the position of concealing element.

However similar this

description may seem to the Hegelian dialectic, it is in
fact fundamentally different.

The process is not

inevitable, nor does it result in a divine revelation.

It

is contingent, letting "ontogenetic" truth happen rather
than ferreting out a priori truths.

The earth, into which

the world worlds, brings the irreducible quantity of
phenomenal difference that causes dissemination of meaning
and potential.
Not so much Faulkner's definitions of time as a "fluid
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condition" existing in individual consciousness or as a
"present moment" including both past and future, but his
images of time, like those above from A Fable, parallel
Heidegger's discussion of the identification of "being" and
time.

In his great discourse of 1927 on existence, entitled

Being and Time, Heidegger, in his self-conscious elaboration
of Nietzsche's views on being, attempts to establish this
identity.

His aim entails the undermining of all western

metaphysics since Plato, who wrote of "Being" as a timeless
realm apart from the flux of human experience.

The primary

characteristic of Dasein (loosely, Heidegger's term for
man's existence) is its "thrownness" into what Heidegger
calls "thereness."

In this sense it is a condition

ultimately beyond the control of the (human) being existing
within it.

This being or Dasein is thus in a position of

perpetual strife between itself and the condition of its
thereness.

Moreover, the fact of this condition "is veiled

in its 'whence' and 'whither,' yet [paradoxically]
disclosed in itself the more unveiledly.

is

Analogously,

Faulkner's "present moment" of consciousness contains its
"whence" (past) and its "whither" (future), and aspects of
these temporalities are present despite the essential
absence of these "dimensions" of time.

To exemplify from

one of Faulkner's texts, consider the moment during his

^^Quoted from Steiner, Martin Heidegger, p. 87.
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involvement with Julio's sister when Quentin sees her
"black, secret, friendly gaze, the half-naked loaf clutched
to her breast."

The image recalls to Quentin a painful

earlier moment with Caddy when, attempting to affect her
thinking and thus her behavior by evoking jealousy, he tells
her that he was "hugging" Natalie.

Instead of successfully

controlling her consciousness, however, Quentin is, as it
were, hoist by his own perspectival petard, as his mind
focuses on "the mud flatting her bodice through her dress it
smelled horrible" (pp. 137-38).

Loaf, mud, and the breasts

of the two girls become associated in his mind, as the
present moment with the little girl paradoxically holds what
it does not hold, aspects of Quentin's past as well as his
future.

In Steiner's gloss of this idea in Heidegger, man

does not live "'in time,' as if the latter were some
independent, abstract flow external to our being"; rather,
man "lives" time.^O
As the image of Quentin's "moment" with Julio's sister
demonstrates, Faulkner's texture images Heidegger's
statement that in relation to the work projected by
consciousness, surrounding phenomena "first enter into their
distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they
are."

What they appear to be as a consequence of context is

"what they are.

The Greeks early called this emerging and

30gteiner, Martin Heidegger, p. 78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

rising in itself and in all things physis.

It illuminates

also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling.
call this ground the earth."

We

By earth, Heidegger does not

mean mere matter, but "that whence the arising brings back
and shelters everything that arises as such.

In the things

that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering
agent"

("The Origin," p. 42).

In the monologue of Quentin, in all of the voices of
Absalom, Absalom!, and in most of the voices of The Wild
Palms, Go Down, Moses and A Fable Faulkner similarly
accentuates, through the peculiar combination of syntax,
image, diction and content, the interplay of consciousness
and an emerging world.

Consider, for instance, the

inception of Absalom,Absalom!, which is comprised of an
extended moment ("From a little after two o'clock until
almost sundown") in which Quentin, in a physiologically
evocative setting ("a dim hot airless room . . . latticed
with yellow slashes full of dust," shaded by a burgeoning
wisteria vine and disquieted by "random gusts" of sparrows),
experiences the rise of Colonel Sutpen ("out of quiet
thunderclap he would abrupt") and "his band of wild niggers"
as they "overrun suddenly . . . the tranquil and astonished
earth and drag house and formal gardens violently out of the
soundless Nothing and clap them down like cards upon a
table"

(pp. 7-8).

Although in this case it occurs

noumenally, in the vision of a particular character,

this is
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Faulkner's imagery of emergence, a narrative metaphor for
the aesthetic condition of man's existence.

The perspective

here is Quentin's, induced both by a narrative tone (Rosa's)
intended to convey the speaker's sense of an outrage
perpetrated against her and by Quentin's own obsession
regarding the nature of time.

The oxymoronic image of

Sutpen's emergence underscores the uncanniness of the
experience for both of them, inasmuch as they are powerless
in relation to it.

To further accentuate the enfeebling

effect of the occurrence, Faulkner substitutes for a verb an
adjective ("he would abrupt") that is far more descriptive
than any of the synonymous verbs he might have used (i.e.,
"appear," "emerge," "surface," even "materialize").
This image at the beginning of Absalom underlines
Faulkner's awareness of the essential role language plays in
the aesthetic relation of consciousness to the realm of
contingency of which it is a part.

Referring to the process

whereby the mind grasps the classification of a plurality of
specific things under one general concept (eidos), Heidegger
writes that "the essential directive in the procedure is
granted by language, through which man comports himself
toward beings in g e n e r a l . " A b r u p t , "

for instance, rather

than "emerge," as the verb for the action Quentin visualizes
indicates the particular quality of his comportment toward

^^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 172.
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the story Rosa tells.

Indeed, in his characterization of

Quentin in this initial segment of the novel, Faulkner
suggests not only the essentiality of language to experience
but also the manner in which language may split
consciousness and thus create multiple selves or sub-selves,
as it were.

This aspect of the process is manifest in the

narrator's reference to the "two" voices of Quentin
listening to Miss Rosa Coldfield tell her story of "the
demon" Sutpen.

He "would seem to listen to two separate

Quentins now," one "having to listen, to one of the ghosts
which had refused to lie still even longer than most had,
telling him about the old ghost times," and one "too young
to deserve yet to be a ghost"— "the two separate Quentins
now talking to one another in the long silence of notpeople,
in notlanguage"

(p. 9).

The passage debunks the concept of

the unified subject, as Quentin hears two powerful,
contradictory voices.

But rather than hearing the voice of

Miss Rosa, the person doing the talking, he hears two voices
that are constituents of his consciousness, one of which,
moreover, is that of "the ghost which had refused to lie
still," implicitly that of Colonel Sutpen, the protagonist
of Miss Rosa's story and thus knowable to Quentin only
through the medium of her voice.

The most interesting

epistemological implication appears in the reference to the
"silence of notpeople," which reverberates in "notlanguage."
Here, besides the obvious indication that language is the
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resonant medium of existence of that which neither does
exist nor can exist— in this case, the voice of a man now
dead— an equally rich suggestion postulates the unconscious,
non-linguistic "talking" of the "two separate Quentins" to
each other.
An easy resolution of these paradoxes would follow from
a critique that reads Faulkner's use of speech as a metaphor
for Quentin's internal strife regarding the terrible story
of the Sutpens.

Accordingly, Quentin is torn by the

conflict of his innocence with unknown, unavoidable
elemental forces.

This interpretation is by no means

altogether invalid, but Faulkner appears to be positing a
more fundamental relation of language and consciousness.
The clash of forces that constitute the experience of
Quentin is not exclusively linguistic, but it is knowable
only through his capacity for language.

This medium enables

both Quentin and the reader to see Sutpen and "his band of
wild niggers . . . drag house and formal gardens violently
out of the soundless Nothing" (p. 8).

Conveying this image

in a third-person voice, rather than that of Miss Rosa,
enables Faulkner to suggest that what she literally says and
what Quentin consequently experiences are not the same.
What he experiences is "notpeople" and "notlanguage," though
the basis for these images is linguistic.
Faulkner's texts make clear that consciousness need not
necessarily be thus overwhelmed by its innate propensity for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

painful mythopoeic response to experience.

Eric Voegelin's

interpretation of Plato's concept of the "in-between" that
characterizes the existence of individual man illuminates
this aspect of Faulkner's aesthetics.

According to

Voegelin, man's existence "has the structure of the InBetween of the Platonic metaxy, and if anything is constant
in this history of mankind it is the language of tension
between life and death, immortality and mortality,
perfection and imperfection, time and timelessness."

Man

has the potential to be "conscious of reality as a process"
and of his own consciousness "as a mode of participation" in
this process.

Further, as a conscious participant man has

the ability "to engender symbols which express his
experience of reality."

Faulkner's texts indicate his

agrément with Voegelin that man can recognize the symbols he
engenders "to be part of the reality they symbolize," though
the fiction demonstrates his doubt that many people ever
achieve this level of consciousness regarding the process.
Besides Quentin, especially in The Sound and the F u r y ,
Faulkner considers in Rosa Coldfield, Harry Wilbourne in The
Wild Palms (1939), and Isaac McCaslin in Go Down, Moses
(1942), a series of highly intellectual individuals in whom

^^Eric
Voegelin,
"Equivalences
of
Experience
and
Symbolization in History," quoted in Dante Germino, "Eric
Voeglin:
The In-Between of Human Life," in Anthony de
Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue, eds.. Contemporary Political
Philosophers (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1975), p. 103.
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the impulse to mythopoeic utterance is a powerful force.
Each character's highly idiosyncratic, "creative"
interpretation of Christian mythos and subsequent
application of it to his life results in either death or
emotional debilitation.

Clearly the impulse to create art,

so powerful a force in Faulkner himself as to command almost
complete dedication to it, also evoked in him grave
reservations about its ultimate value.

These reservations

derive not from Faulkner's sense of art as an accessory to
life, to be taken or ignored, but from his conviction of a
basic relation of art and life.

Not until he was well into

his work on A Fable (1954) was he able to resolve these
misgivings and confidently ascribe to art the high valuation
he had always unconsciously given it.
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Chapter II
Remythology and Spoliation:
The Mythopoeia of Faulkner's Failed Artist-Figures

Faulkner shares with Nietzsche and Heidegger the view that
the neurosis of modernity is attributable to man's largely
unconscious questioning of the value of existence.

This

pervasive skepticism largely derives from an unsettled
relation to Christian values that have been the predominant
influence on western culture for nearly two millennia.

In

accordance with this diagnosis, both writers inquire
earnestly into the ultimate human value of this mythos.
Nietzsche regards Christianity as a historical consequence
of "Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as
such."

And while in The Genealogy of Morals (1887) he rails

against its deleterious effects on the moral strength of
western man, calling it variously "the slave revolt in
morals,"1 "a truly brilliant politics of vengeance," an
"unspeakably cruel mystery" with "debilitating narcotic
p o w e r , "2 in the companion text published a year earlier.

Beyond Good and Evil, he asserts the existence of a positive

Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Genealogy of Morals," in The
Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis
Golffing, (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1956), p. 168.
^Nietzsche, The Genealogy, in The Birth of Tragedy and
The Genealogy of Morals, p. 169.
49
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dialectical "tension of the spirit"— manifest in "need and
distress"— that is being experienced by "good Europeans" who
ineluctably

respond to Christianity and therefore

potentially

sense "the arrow,the task,

g o al .

and— who knows? the

Faulkner's similarly ambivalent feelings about

Christianity are manifest in informal statements and in the
fiction. In conversation he tried to downplay the thematic
significance of Christian allusion in his work, saying that
"the Christian legend is part of any Christian's background,
especially the background of a . . . Southern country boy,"
that he "assimilated that . . . without even knowing it,"
and that its presence in his work "has nothing to do with
how much of it I might believe or disbelieve— it's just
there."4

The apparent contradiction in these remarks (i.e.,

his oblique reference to himself as a Christian while
disclaiming

the importance of

belief to

interesting

but not likely to

simplify comprehension of

Faulkner's views.

the fiction) is

There is much in the fiction, however, to

demonstrate Faulkner's sense that the cultural impact of
Christianity is terribly problematic, in particular the
major artist-figures who wreak extreme suffering on either
themselves or others (or both), arguably as a result of

^Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 3-4.
^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds.,
Faulkner in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p.

86 .
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their compulsive relation to Christian mythos.
This is not to suggest that Faulkner regarded
Christianity as an inherent evil to be extricated from the
western world.

On the contrary, like Shakespeare,

Faulkner's moral education was fundamentally Christian, and
he instinctively tried to embrace the tenor of this mythos
in his personal life and to image in his fiction the ironies
of its unrealized standards in both individual experience
and cultural history.

Yet like Nietzsche he ascribed the

cause of the general condition of neurosis in modernity to a
crisis of confidence in the religious mythos which was the
emotional mainstay of western man for nearly two millennia,
its eminence as the embodiment of timeless perfection having
waned considerably by the early twentieth century.

As

Quentin Compson's father puts the matter, Christ "was worn
away by a minute clicking of little w h e e l s . Faulkner
shares with Nietzsche the compulsion to articulate a
credible theodicy that would replace the ineffectual
Christian one.

Yet while Nietzsche asserts the possibility

of a wholesale "transvaluation" within western culture,
predicated on man's inherent capacity for art, the
relatively large number of characters in Faulkner's fiction
who create deleterious theodicies suggests that he, despite

^William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York;
Random House, 1984), p. 77.
All further references to this
"New, Corrected Edition" appear in the text.
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his many parallels with Nietzsche's thought, including the
ontological privileging of this capacity, remains
fundamentally pessimistic about the likelihood of man's ever
making widespread effective use of it.
The old general of A Fable is the logical continuation,
indeed the fulfillment, of the pattern of metaphysical
problems Faulkner concerned himself with in the early works.
Quentin, through whom Faulkner considered the crisis of an
individual whose compulsive religio-cultural perspective
forces from him an aesthetic reaction to family occurrences
that clash with this perspective, is Faulkner's first mature
narrative image of the impact of the problem on humanity.
This character's inability to resolve his conflict of values
in an actual sense eventuates in his projection of an
imaginary (suicidal) settlement predicated on his visionary
re-interpretation of the Christian mythos.

In The Sound and

the Fury, Faulkner asserts the ontological impossibility of
a reversal of temporal event, presenting dialogue in which
both Quentin and his father express this constant of man's
condition.

Yet despite his overt acknowledgement of this

condition, Quentin chooses imaginatively to empiricize, as
it were, a visionary restructuring of Christian mythos that
overrides it.

Through her myth of the relation of time,

being, and the difficulty of effective creation, Rosa
Coldfield derides the promises of this mythos.

In Harry

Wilbourne, an obvious reconsideration of Quentin, Faulkner
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images consciousness choosing to acknowledge the
irreversibility of events and to reject a Platonic
interpretation of being, opting rather to embrace a
conception of possibility founded in the material world,
albeit one that eventuates in a nihilism comparable to the
Hebraic paradigm Harry repudiates.

Having considered these

various responses to the Christian mythos of his culture,
Faulkner moved to a consideration of the general effects of
this mythos in Go Down, M o ses .

Yet the focus is still

characterological, as Isaac McCaslin's application of
Christian principles to the history of his family supplies
the writer with a vehicle for the consideration of a more
general influence of the mythos than the problems of
Quentin, Rosa, and Harry provided.

Thus the conflict imaged

in A Fable, when the corporal, a proponent of the
perfectibility of man, manages to bring to a halt a dispute
of international proportions, constitutes a further
broadening of Faulkner's consideration of the influence of
Christian mythos on western man.
As Faulkner's first mature image of an inherent
interrelation among impulses to art and truth in man,
Quentin became the paradigm for Rosa Coldfield,
McCaslin and, most especially, Harry Wilbourne.

Isaac
Although it

has largely gone unremarked, the parallel between Quentin
and Harry was implied in a 1946 letter from Faulkner to
Robert Linscott, senior editor at Random House, in which the
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author suggested that "TSAF and THE WILD PALMS section from
that book" be published in a single Modern Library volume.®
Moreover, his French translator, Maurice Coindreau, recalls
that in the summer of 1937, when the invention of The Wild
Palms was already underway, Faulkner "seemed to know The
Sound and the Fury by heart, referring me to such-and-such a
paragraph, to such-and-such a page, to find the key to some
highly enigmatic o b s c u r i t y . T h e

critical events in

Faulkner's life in 1937, similar to those in 1928 when he
was writing The Sound and the Fury, suggest his impulse to
objectify a narrative resolution to personal crisis.

In

response to crises similar to Faulkner's, Quentin and Harry
create mythopoeia designed to alleviate and account for
their anguish, thus constituting synecdoches of Faulkner's
quest through narrative to justify the inevitability of
anguish.

Yet despite their similar backgrounds and

attitudes profoundly influenced by Judaeo-Christian ethos.

Joseph L. Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 228. Faulkner's
suggestion follows his penchant for publishing in the same
book stories with unconnected plots but with thematic
parallels and contrasts, as in The Wild Palms (1939), the two
stories of which are "Wild Palms" and "Old Man." He also had
used this technique in the three other novels he published
prior to the letter of 1946 to Linscott:
The Unvanquished
(1938), The Hamlet (1940), and Go Down, Moses (1942).
John
Irwin makes an excellent case, moreover,
for conscious
authorial parallels between The Sound and the Fury and
Absalom, Absalom!
See Doubling and Incest, Repetition and
Revenge (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978).
^Blotner, Faulkner:
House, 1974), II, 960.

A

Biography

(New

York:
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each protagonist creates mythopoeia founded on a theory of
aesthetics that stands in inverse relation to that of the
ot her .
Severe personal disappointment conjoined with exposure
to the intellectual climate of the 1920s to influence the
shape of The Sound and the Fury (1929), in which Quentin
stands as the ironic resolution of Faulkner's earliest
severe conflict between the world and a particular image of
it that he valued.

The loss of his childhood sweetheart,

Estelle Oldham, when she married Cornell Franklin in 1918,
initiated this pattern, which recurred in 1926 and 1937.
His response to the first crisis was to join the Canadian
RFC, thereby removing himself from Oxford, where the failed
courtship and dreaded marriage occurred.

He objectified

subsequent misfortunes, however, by transforming his tension
into literary products.

For Helen Baird, whom Faulkner

courted in New Orleans and Pascagoula, Mississippi, in 1927,
he hand-made two gift-books:

Mayday, an Arthurian allegory

depicting a frustrated romance that brings the protagonist
face-to-face with death— thus anticipating Faulkner's
treatment of this theme in The Sound and the Fury and The
Wild P a lm s; and Helen;

A Courtship, a sequence of love

sonnets of the theme of romantic love and immortality.
Baird's wedding a rival suitor in 1927 agonized him.

Early

in that year Faulkner and Estelle resumed their courtship
when she returned to Oxford after divorcing Franklin.
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renewal of romance was surely complicated by Faulkner's
involvement with a thus-far unidentified woman about whom he
wrote to his Aunt 'Bama in early 1928.®

Years later he told

Maurice Coindreau that he had written The Sound and the Fury
at a time "when personal problems had placed him under a
severe strain."

According to Coindreau, he "was grappling

with problems of an intimate n a t u r e . These problems quite
likely involved a conflict between his well-seasoned love
for Estelle and his desire for fulfillment with the woman he
mentioned to his aunt.

Whatever their specific nature, the

problems influenced his characterization of Quentin, much as
the portrait of Harry some ten years later resulted to a
large extent from Faulkner's repetition of the familiar
cycle of desire and anguish when he met, loved, and lost
Meta Carpenter in Hollywood during the late 1930s.

Like

Estelle and Helen, Meta married while still the object of
Faulkner's intense romantic fixation.
The early works Mississippi Poems, Helen;

A Courtship,

and Mayday figured prominently in Faulkner's development of
themes that would inform his most important texts up to and
beyond A Fable.

The theme of man's apparent lack of

David Minter points out that the reference cannot have
been to Estelle, whom Aunt 'Bama had known for some time. See
his William Faulkner:
His Life and Work (Baltimore:
Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1980), p. 92.
^Maurice Coindreau, The Time of William Faulkner:
A
French View of American Fiction, trans. George M. Reeves
(Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1971), p. 52.
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immortality and its significant offshoots— the insatiable
desire for romantic fulfillment, the transience of events,
the importance of physical perception to man's experience of
time and memory— recur throughout these early works.

In

terms of style and technique as well as subject matter these
works anticipate the mature fiction that began to appear in
the late nineteen twenties.
Late in December, 1924, Faulkner gave to his childhood
friend and schoolmate Myrtle Ramey a volume of twelve poems
on onionskin sheets.

Entitled Mississippi Poems, the

collection featured eight poems that he would publish in the
1933 collection A Green Bough.

Poem I begins with the

speaker's inquiry about the endurance of memory:

"Shall I

recall this tree, when I am old,/ This hill, or how this
valley fills with sun?"^®

The speaker answers himself

emphatically:

no; memory, like all other natural processes,

is ephemeral.

But the intensity of the poet's desire to

retain forever his memory of important feelings compels him
to describe an eternal form of awareness whereby "The hushed
wings of wind," which "shape the tree tops," shake also his
"heart with hill and vale for aye/ When hill and vale itself
no longer live."

Among the Mississippi Poems, the poet's

most profound assertion of his immortality occurs in poem

Quotations from Mississippi Poems
Courtship are from William Faulkner, Helen:
Mississippi
Poems,
ed.
Carvel
Collins
Yoknapatawpha Press, 1981).

and Helen:
A
A Courtship and
(New
Orleans:
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VII,

"Mississippi Hills:

My Epitaph."

"Return I will," he

reasons, for "there's still spring to shake and break my
sleep"; and "Though I be dead,/ This soil that holds me fast
will find me breath."

These attempts to verbalize assurance

of eternal being foreshadow the elaborate mythos Quentin
develops in response to the irreversibility of time.
Parallels in the characterizations of Quentin and Harry
reflect Faulkner's need to account for the periodic
irruption of extreme suffering, which, as a consequence of
his successive romantic misfortunes, had taken on the
character of an inevitable condition of human existence.
Although the ten-year period between his loss of Estelle and
the writing of The Sound and the Fury in 1928 provided him
with the hindsight that accompanies detachment, her return
to him during the period of his unfulfillment with the woman
mentioned in the letter to Aunt 'Bama intensified his sense
of loss and probably significantly influenced theme and
character in the novel.

To be sure, Quentin's desire to

overturn the basic conditions of temporality so that Caddy's
virginity can be restored reflects Faulkner's feelings about
his early loss of Estelle.

Similarly, Meta's marriage to

Wolfgang Rebner in 1937, shortly after Faulkner had made the
anguishing decision not to divorce Estelle so that he could
marry Meta, informed the frustrated romance of Harry and
Charlotte in The Wild Palms.

In both novels the

protagonists' mythopoeic inventions parallel Faulkner's
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narrative pursuit of a satisfactory theodicy.
Both characters' extreme sensitivity results in their
preoccupation with fluid images that reflect the
devastatingly swift passage of time.

Visual, auditory, and

olfactory images repeatedly irritate Quentin:

the Harvard

students "running for chapel," their "flapping collars
flushing past like debris on a flood" (p. 88); a ringing
bell that "stayed in the air, more felt than heard, for a
long time"

(p. 90); the honeysuckle "coming and coming

especially in the dusk when it rained" (p. 153).

While

Harry speaks to McCord of "the current of time that runs
through remembering," his experience of a succession of
evanescent impressions supports the theory he is uttering
(p. 137).
vanish."

He sees Charlotte "enter the vestibule and
Of the waiter who serves them in the station bar,

Harry sees "the same white sleeve, the anonymous feature
less waiter-face you never actually see" (p. 130).

A few

moments later, "the waiter's hand set the refilled glass on
the table and withdrew" (p. 136).

Still later, three

discrete perceptions blend into a single image:

"The

loudspeaker spoke again; they made to rise at the same time;
at the same moment the waiter materialized and McCord paid
him"

(p. 139).

Acutely aware of time as an enigmatic, fluid

medium of irreversible occurrences, Quentin and Harry, like
the author who invented them, attempt to capture its essence
in words.
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The similar descriptions of time expressed by Quentin
and Harry provide the basis for the mythopoeia they develop
in response to disheartening events.

Quentin remembers his

father's statement— "time is your misfortune . . . .

A gull

on an invisible wire attached through space dragged"

(p.

104).

Similarly, Harry describes consciousness as a

condition of being "attached to [time], supported by [time]
in space"

(p. 137).

These intransigent poetic ontologies

reluctantly disclose meaning. "Space" in both descriptions
simply means the set of impressions received.

As Coleridge

wrote, any mode of mental experience "must receive all its
materials ready made from the law of association."^^

In

short, both characters describe consciousness as a condition
of attachment to time through perception of space.
This basic similarity notwithstanding, Quentin and
Harry have substantially different feelings about the
constituents of consciousness.

Furthermore, this difference

results in the contrasting theories of aesthetics with which
they confront the dread of nihilism.

A longer quotation

from the passage in which Harry's description appears will
help to clarify the contrast.

In dialogue with McCord at

the Chicago train station, Harry describes himself during
most of his relationship with Charlotte as having been
"outside of time," though
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "On Poesy or Art," in English
Romantic Writers, ed. David Perkins (New York;
Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1967), pp. 491-92.
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still attached to it, supported by it in space . . .
supported by it, but that's all, just on it, nonconductive, like the sparrow insulated by its own hard
non-conductive dead feet from the high tension line,
the current of time that runs through remembering, that
exists only in relation to what little of reality . . .
we know, else there is no such thing as time.

(p. 137)

The descriptions of both characters express their sense of
entrapment.

Quentin sees himself as a "gull" passively

"dragged" by the "invisible wire" of time since his mind is
powerless to control the perceptions and painful memories he
experiences through the process of association.

At the

point of his utterance, Harry has also been a passive
receptor, "attached to" time through crass images of the
commercial modern world.
nonetheless.

The difference is marked,

Quentin's view is static.

Having accepted his

father's idea that experience is essentially accidental,
beyond individual c o n t r o l , Q u e n t i n values being "outside
of time," inasmuch as he indicates his agony over waking to
be "in time again" because "in time" he is in the world of
perception and memory (p. 86).
By contrast, Harry's description confirms that the

l^He remembers his father's speaking of "man who is
conceived by accident and whose every breath is a fresh cast
with dice already loaded against him"
(p. 177).
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condition of any given moment of consciousness need not be
sustained.

His expression is not reified but figurative.

As such, despite its contorted, periphrastic character, it
provides a theoretical basis for amelioration.

Harry's

phrase "outside of time" is a metaphor for his previous
insensitivity to the fundamental value of his relationship
with Charlotte.

His mind had been "non-conductive" of "the

high tension line"— the line of "remembering" its value and
thereby retaining it.

My reading of this passage differs

from that of Cleanth Brooks, who fails to discern Harry's
various levels of meaning for "time."
Harry's expression accordingly:

Brooks interprets

"time is felt as a

'current' that 'runs through remembering.'

It flows out of

the past through the present and toward the future.
However, this view makes "remembering" the present moment of
consciousness and thus the base of all conscious experience.
Consequently, Harry's syntax would situate him beyond all
currents of time.

Yet Harry's language shows that he is

still "supported by" time through his sensory perceptions
(space); thus, his syntax indicates that the sparrow is
"insulated" only "from the high-tension line, the current of
time that runs through remembering," and that Harry wants to
be on this line.

"Remembering" in this context is parallel

to what Harry means by "inside of time"— again, aware of the

l^cieanth Brooks, Toward Yoknapatawpha and Beyond (New
Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1978), p. 253.
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real value of their relationship.

This line of remembering,

like all others, necessarily exists "in relation to" the
"little of reality"— that is, the reality constituted by
impressions— we may know in a moment of consciousness.
While Quentin's poetry leaves him unalterably stuck on a
"dragged" invisible wire, Harry's expression acknowledges
multiple currents that the mind may experience, thus
foreshadowing the this-worldly, future-oriented mythopoeia
he will later create.
The precise point at which verbalizations cease being
merely abstract and become mythopoeic may be too subtle to
fix.

Coleridge has said that art commences "as soon as the

human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image
exclusively of articulate s p e e c h . I n

any case, by

describing consciousness as a gull or as being "like" a
sparrow, a character has begun to invent personal myth
designed to mediate his experience.

The connotations of

gull need no delineation, but sparrow is a far richer word,
with a literary history relevant to both Quentin and Harry—
indeed, central to their self-devised myths.

Following

classical associations of the bird with lecherousness,
Chaucer called the sparrow "Venus' sone" in The Parliament
of Fowls and portrayed the Summoner of The Canterbury Tales

^^See "On Poesy or Art," in Perkins, p. 492.
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as "hoot" and "lecherous as a sparwe."^^
lore the bird symbolizes worthlessness.

In Old Testament
Psalm 84 praises

the temple of the Lord as a place where even "the sparrow
hath found a house."

In Psalm 102 the Psalmist likens

himself to "a sparrow alone on the housetop," helpless
because a wrathful God has "cast me down."

Quentin's and

Harry's relation to the image certainly fits attributes of
lechery, worthlessness, and helplessness each ascribes to
himself.

But inasmuch as it appears at a point when the

character is developing his meditation on sex and death into
an abstraction designed either to counter (Quentin) or to
understand (Harry) the nature of time and conscious
experience, the image— an obvious allusion to Jesus' well
known use of the sparrow in the Gospel of Matthew— serves as
a myth-inspiring memento mori.
The mythopoeic confrontation between Quentin's
consciousness and the sparrow that pitches on his window
ledge occurs just four pages into the monologue (i.e.
several minutes after he awakes).
A sparrow slanted across the sunlight, onto the window
ledge, and cocked his head at me.
and bright.

His eye was round

First, he'd watch me with one eye, then

flick! and it would be the other one, his throat

^^Geoffrey Chaucer, in The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer,
ed. F. N. Robinson (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 314,
23.
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pumping faster than any pulse.
strike.

The hour began to

The sparrow quit swapping eyes and watched me

steadily with the same one until the chimes ceased, as
if he were listening too.
ledge and was gone.

Then he flicked off the

(p. 79)

The carefully crafted monologue shows that before Quentin
encounters this highly mythopoeic perception, he had been
experiencing an associational chain of thoughts that began
when he accidentally perceived his friend Spoade walking to
class.

The perception had interrupted Quentin's

recollection of a conversation with his father about loss,
time, virginity, and death, and the sparrow's slanting
across the light restores Quentin's pondering of these
matters.

Whereas the image begins with an annoying change

in light and also involves a sharp, fading sound, it reminds
Quentin of the pain associated with his existence in time.
Moreover, Quentin's biblical knowledge intensifies the
moment, as the sparrow reminds him of Christ's emphasis on
the eternal existence of the soul.
And fear not them which kill the body, but are not
able to kill the soul:

but rather fear him which is

able to destroy both soul and body in hell.
Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of
them shall not fall on the ground without your Father.
But the very hairs on your head are numbered.
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Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than
many sparrows.

(Matt. 10;

28-31)

The image of the sparrow having expired as "the last
stroke ceased vibrating," Quentin's imagination immediately
endows it with symbolic significance.

In effect, he

accentuates his feelings about Caddy by valuing them above
any concern about the consignment of "both soul and body
[to] hell":
all of it.

"Because if it were just to hell; if that were
Finished.

If things just finished themselves.

Nobody else there but her and me.

If we could just have

done something so dreadful they would have fled hell except
us.

I have committed incest I said" (p. 79).

As the image

fades, Quentin moves from mythopoeic perception to the
creation of a mythopoeic abstraction.

At the thought of his

need to commit a "dreadful," damning sin, incest comes
impulsively to mind, and he will soon use this imagined sin
as a pretext for his being cast with Caddy into "a hell"
where they will be "more than dead . . . the two of us amid
the pointing and the horror beyond the clean flame" (p.
116).
Quentin perceives the sparrow while trying to
understand the anguishing irreversible losses he has
suffered.

Caddy's loss of her virginity becomes his psychic

loss, as the recalled conversation with his father
indicates:

"Father said it was men invented virginity not
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women.

Father said it's like death;

Only a state in which

the others are left . . . and I said. Why couldn't it have
been me and not her who is unvirgin." (p. 78).

To Quentin,

Caddy's "unvirgin" condition and the decline of the Compson
family exist as synecdoches of the loss of self-awareness
that will ineluctably occur over the passage of time.

Mr.

Compson starkly poses the problem when he tells Quentin "you
cannot bear to think that someday it will no longer hurt you
like this." (p. 177).

Christ's association of the sparrow

with the fate of the soul after death symbolizes Quentin's
search for an appropriate response to the ravages of time.
We recall that he begins the monologue irritated about
waking into "time again" (p. 75), thereby indicating his
preference for being "outside of time"— a condition he
associates with sleep, death, and Caddy's virginity.

His

father's analogy between death and virginity suggests the
synonymity of these conditions, and Faulkner's
retrospectively written "Appendix" (1945) to The Sound and
the Fury shows that Quentin's reification of this figure of
speech becomes the sine qua non of the desired vision he
believes will be realized and fixed for eternity once he
takes his life:

Quentin "loved not the idea of the incest

which he would not commit, but some presbyterian concept of
its eternal punishment."

This "concept" entails a

consciousness-in-death, a "hell where he could guard Caddy
forever and keep her forevermore intact amid the eternal
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fi r e s ."IG
Hopelessly psychotic, Quentin attempts to reverse the
temporal order through an illusory scheme of rationalized
illogic.

He had reasoned that if he could persuade his

father that he and Caddy committed incest, then her other
lapses from virtue "wouldn't be so and then the world would
roar away."

But Quentin cannot turn this myth into reality

merely by verbalizing it.

Unable to reverse merely by

utterance of a falsehood "the sequence of natural events and
their causes which shadows every mans brow," he seizes upon
death as his only recourse to effect "an apotheosis in which
a temporary state of mind will become symmetrical above the
flesh and aware both of itself and of the flesh it will not
quite discard" (p.

177

)

.

in brief, he believes the only

willed response to the exacerbating temporal order is the
ultimate one that ends it altogether.
Harry's allusion to Jesus' image of the sparrow appears
when he is seeking to contend with his temporal experiences.
Like Quentin, he senses a relationship among loss, time,
virginity, and death, so the biblical association of the
sparrow with life after death aptly fits his immediate

^^William Faulkner, "Appendix," in The Sound and the Fury
(New York: Vintage, 1956), p. 411.
^^Andre Bleikasten describes Quentin's apotheosis as "not
at all a state of not-being but rather an ek-stasis, that is,
literally, a standing outside and beyond his self— without any
self-loss," in The Most Splendid Failure (Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1976), p. 140.
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situation.^®

As indicated above, Harry's use of the image

in a simile shows that he is consciously creating poetry.
Unlike Quentin, he is aware of the difference between
language intended to mediate experience and immediate
experience itself.

Like many of Faulkner's narrators and

characters, he has a penchant for using the indefinite
pronoun "it."

The word appears several times in the

metaphorical contrast between "inside of time" and "outside
of time" he presents to McCord;
You know:

I was not.

Then I am, and time begins,

retroactive, is was and will be.
am not and so time never existed.

Then I was and so I
It was like the

instant of virginity, it was the instant of virginity:
that condition, fact, that does not actually exist
except during the instant that you know you are losing
it.

(p. 137)

l^At Charlottesville, Faulkner noted "that some people
get a certain amount of pleasure in hunting around in a
writer's work for reasons, for symbols, for similarities, and
of course they are very likely all there." Further, a "writer
would use a symbol at the drop of a hat if that was the
simplest way to throw the light on the particular incident
he's telling about, and it's perfectly valid, I think, for
anyone to seek for those symbols"; see Frederick L. Gwynn and
Joseph Blotner, eds., Faulkner in the University: Class
Conference
at
The
University
of
V ir ginia,
1958-1959
(Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1959), p. 121. The
position of the sparrow in both works offers further evidence
that they ought to be cross-referenced.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

The indefinite pronoun enables Harry to relate several
forms of physical experience that figuratively parallel the
period of time when he has been aware of the value of his
relationship with Charlotte.

He initially compares this

period of heightened awareness to the span of life itself—
"inside of time."

This initial antecedent then becomes "the

instant of virginity," an intensive moment in contrast to
Harry's previously blunted sensitivity.

The "condition" of

virginity exists only when "you know you are losing it."
This "instant" suggests Harry's current situation "inside of
time," aware that the fluid condition of time necessarily
foredooms him to lose Charlotte.

Toward the end of his

profuse expatiation on time, through a blending of images
that correspond to the indefinite pronoun, the "instant of
virginity" becomes the orgasmic moment that suggests the
termination of life and time.

Harry's self-comparison to a

"sparrow insulated by its own non-conductive dead feet from
the high-tension line" therefore implies an equation of his
previous death-in-life condition of unawareness to the state
of complete unawareness that is death.

His allusion to the

sparrow as well as his metaphoric use of a painfully real
event— his loss of virginity— discloses a capacity for
poetic distancing that Quentin's blending of mythopoeic
perception and reified mythopoeic abstraction precludes.
Even before the onset of the misfortunes that will take
Charlotte's life, Harry has used his poetic faculty to
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develop insights into the nature of time that will enable
him to construct a myth of memory in accordance with his
considered priority of "remembering" her.

Harry's

synecdochal images of loss foreshadow the kaleidoscopic flow
of events he experiences prior to Charlotte's death in the
final chapter of The Wild Palms.

In jail, awaiting trial

for manslaughter, he clings to his ability to think, waiting
determinedly for a satisfactory explanation of the meaning
of his experience.

The explanation depends upon Harry's

capacity to verbalize it, which he comes close to doing
after Rittenmeyer's first visit to the jail:
touched it.

But not yet.

...

"he almost

it would return; he would

find it, hold it, when the time was ready" (p. 312).
the ubiquitous indefinite pronoun appears.

Again

Here the word

represents some explanatory combination of "what" and
"how"— "what meaning can I find in my experiences" and "how
can I ensure the continuing existence and development of
that meaning?"— though Harry can presently express only the
former of these questions.
The "second time he almost got it" occurs between
Rittenmeyer's visits (p. 316).

When the tail of a hurricane

strikes "somewhere in the Gulf," Harry's consciousness
fixates on the wind and develops a series of evocative
images that almost leads to the answer he seeks.
It would be even quieter inland . . . upon the clipped
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sward . . .

it would be clipped and green and quiet,

the body, the shape of it under the drawn sheet . . .
Only that can't be all of it, he thought. The waste.
Not of meat . . . But memory.
independent of the flesh.
it was memory, he thought.

Surely memory exists

But . . . it wouldn't know
(pp. 315-16)

The indefinite pronoun enables Harry to blend one image
into another until he reaches the threshold of his
apotheosis of memory.

The wind becomes the sward, which

then becomes Charlotte's body, which becomes the "all of it"
or the meaning of their relationship.
antecedent,

The penultimate

the reality of her rotting body, he must bravely

confront before he can discover this meaning.

But he must

learn something new of her during Rittenmeyer's second visit
before he realizes that the meaning he desires lies in the
very mythopoeic power he has already used so effectively in
the search to find it.
Harry achieves his answer when Rittenmeyer's anger
reveals that Charlotte's love for Harry had compelled her to
exact from her husband a promise that he will help Harry—
the very man who had taken her away from him!

This

recognition sets in motion once again the mythopoeic process
that Harry eventually vows to nurture for the rest of his
life:
it was just a simple falling of a jumbled pattern
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. . . and so there was just memory, forever and
inescapable, as long as there was flesh to titillate.
And now he was about to get it, think it into words . .
. It was there, waiting, it was all right, it would
stand to his hand when the moment came.

(p. 323)

In this passage, which confirms Harry's facility with the
poetic process, he reconciles himself to nature by thinking
the "jumbled pattern" of underlying meaning "into words."
His discovery of Charlotte's selfless pleas on his behalf
evokes a powerful feeling about her, enabling him to
recognize the possibility for future experiences of this
kind.

His understanding that he must stay alive to prolong

their love is reaffirmed moreover when he connects his
intense feelings for her to some sensory perceptions that
evoke her memory.

He sees the "light on the concrete hulk"

of the abandoned warship, "as if he lived there"; he hears
"a preliminary murmur in the palm" that signals the
beginning of "the light offshore breeze"; he inhales "the
smell of swamps and wild jasmine"; and he sees "the dying
west and the bright star"

(p. 324).

These perceptions

elicit strong feelings about Charlotte, causing him to
recognize that "memory was just half of it, it wasn't
enough."

The meaning of his relationship ("it") depends

upon his ability to store memories of her as well as to
experience fluid "avatars" informed by sensory perceptions.
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Harry's myth is thus a belief in the mind's mythopoeic
capacity for "humanizing nature" by combining perceptions
into unified expressions of "thoughts and passions."

It is

a this-worldly myth that deifies man's faculty for shaping
his experience of organic nature.

Faulkner exemplified the

faculty through the writing of The Wild P a l m s , reconciling
himself thereby to a present painfully colored by the past.
His medium was poetry, the dynamic experience of discovering
insights into experience.

In developing Harry's story, he

confirmed his belief in the power of consciousness to
understand its ontological reality and to construct
thereupon an essentially rational, but flexible, structure
of belief that allows for adjustment to the unpredictable
flux of events while sustaining the individual in his
progress toward meaning.

He showed in Harry Wilbourne that

this meaning never materializes absolutely, but develops
incrementally within the mind committed to its revelation.
Harry can make himself an active receptor of feelings that
relational perceptions may evoke in the future, or he can
create mythopoeic theodicy, such as his ironic use of Jesus'
sparrow to convey the gravity of his former death-in-life
condition of unawareness.

Through his characterization

of Quentin and Harry, Faulkner effectually worked out the
conflict between his desire for eternal consciousness and
his recognition that death terminates consciousness.

In

other words, he balanced the religious perspective of his
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culture against the realistic scientism of modernity.

The

contrasting myths of these characters represent two of the
prominent modern responses to death, the one of Christian
mysticism, the other of existential resolution.

In a single

Modern Library volume, the stark contrast they make would
have underscored Faulkner's interest in the ambiguous
potential of the mind's capacity for mythmaking.
The prophetic words of Hamlet just prior to his
entrance into the banquet hall that will be the scene of his
death ironically emphasize the confrontation with death that
Quentin and Harry experience:

"we defy augury.

special providence in the fall of a sparrow.

There is

If it be now,

'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if
it be not now yet it will come— the readiness is all" (V.
ii.

2 1 9 -2 3

).19

The sparrow augurs Quentin's imminent death,

but the "special providence" he believes will be realized in
death differs from the orthodox implications of the term.
Like Hamlet, desperate for a solution to his dilemma, he has
no doubt of the divine order that, according to Christian
orthodoxy, underlies creation.

But his paradoxical feelings

about Caddy compel him to adapt the Christian tenet of
consciousness-in-death to his own mythopoeic vision.

Thus,

his reified myth of memory makes of hell a heaven, as his
paradoxical reward of eternal damnation in a condition

l^wiiiiam Shakespeare, The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G.
Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 1183.
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"aware both of itself and of the flesh it will not quite
discard" sustains his illicit feelings (p. 220).

That is,

Quentin takes his verbalized abstractions for concrete
reality.

Harry, by contrast, is awed by his enigmatic

sexual feelings, yet uses his experience of them consciously
to construct metaphors intended to dispel his confusion.
His conclusion that "if memory exists outside of the flesh
it wont be memory because it wont know what it remembers"
convinces him that only by retaining the fluid condition of
consciousness will he be susceptible to experiences that
will evoke and intensify his recollections.

Thus, from his

memory of past realities, he knowingly develops abstractions
designed to enhance the likelihood of such experiences in
the future.

Harry is aware that perceived phenomena, the

inseparable nexus between man's physical being and his
spiritual one, provide the basis of his valued ongoing
mythopoeia.

In contrast to Quentin and according to a

metaphysics significantly different from Hamlet's, Harry
knows that "the readiness is all."

Yet, instead of applying

this superior knowledge to the end of creating a new,
dynamic life for himself— as Charlotte had suggested he do—
he embraces rather a life of intense introspection, choosing
to apply it solely to the production of intense memories of
her.

Harry, then, is yet another artist-figure whose

utilization of mythopoeia undermines the high valuation of
life the novel espouses.
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Not unlike Quentin and Harry, nor in this regard
different from the author who created her, Rosa Coldfield
seeks a theodicy to account for what she deems to be her
terribly gratuitous experiences.

Having been frustrated,

despite her insistence that reality deliver up experiences
commensurate with her sense of what ought to be, she is left
with language as the resource for the vindication she
desires.

Her expressed theodicy, which is developed for the

most part in Chapter V of Absalom, involves her perspective
on the relation of time, being, and creation.

It is a myth

of time as certain heightened "instants" isolated in her
consciousness as a result of the stark experiences that
filled them.

These instants evoke postulations of being

that obsess her and provide the basis of her mythopoeic
interpretation of man's fundamental condition, eliciting
questions and presenting implications about man's capacity
for creation.

Like that of the typical artist-figure in

Faulkner's fiction, she requires a healthy process of de
mythology if she is to have any opportunity to achieve
awareness of the implications of man's place in a contingent
world and the concomitant potential for acceptance and
growth it carries.

No less an outraged prophet than her

characterological predecessor Quentin, or her descendant
Isaac McCaslin, Rosa finds a shocking discrepancy between
her view of what the morality of her culture ought to be and
what it in fact has shown itself to be.

This morality is
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embodied in her image of Thomas Sutpen, innate cultural hero
by virtue of his position in the Confederate army and as
patriarch of what remains of her family.

It is also

embodied in the orthodox Christian religiosity and the
racial hierarchy of her upbringing.

In sum, Rosa's

expectations are incarnate in a general image of cultural
values with which the facts and events of her life conflict.
Rosa's primary symbols are not specifically Christian,
like the sparrow of Quentin and Harry, but rather more Greek
and discursive.

Yet the informing mythos of her own

idiosyncratic mythopoeic utterance is Judaeo-Christian,
specifically with regard to her demand for justice and her
self-perception as sacrificial lamb.

This half of the

internal dialectic voiced in her "summer of wisteria"
monologue vies with her propensity for Greek discourse that
will penetrate the empirical dimensions of being.

If

essentially undeluded about the impossibility of recovering
from oblivion the "might-have-been," she is nonetheless
outraged at the ontological conditions that forbid
fulfillment as she envisions it.

Hers is a conflict not

between "what was, what used to be" and "what should, what
might have b e e n ," but between what never was, except in the
noumena of her mind, and what never could have temporal or
phenomenal existence.

Her past, present, and future consist

therefore of "one constant and perpetual instant" of
"surrender" to "that might have been w h i c h ," according to
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her mythos, "is the single rock we cling to above the
maelstrom of unbearable reality."

Yet despite her

indictment of "high heaven's very self" for allowing her to
exist in a world whose chief characteristic is process, she
retains a culturally-conditioned religious conviction which
assures her of the reality of "that justice" which, despite
its unwillingness to distinguish between "gristle bone and
tender flesh," will nevertheless sustain its paradoxical
ruthlessness "for appointed right and truth."
Rosa's tragedy parallels Harry's in that she apparently
glimpses the aestheticist ontology an understanding of which
might enable her to overcome her misplaced Platonism, yet
cannot effectively utilize this knowledge.

Nowhere is

Faulkner more textually insistent on the relation of being
and man's capacity for creation than in Rosa's analogy of
the activity of the artist with that of the individual's
attempts to mold the course of events.

Her negative view of

man's capacity for creation notwithstanding, she effectively
images Faulkner's concept of the open— potential— temporal
character of man's relation to the world.

For her,

living is one constant and perpetual instant when the
arras-veil before what-is-to-be hangs docile and even
glad to the lightest naked thrust if we had dared, were
brave enough (not wise enough; no wisdom needed here)
to make the rending gash.

. . . not cowardice which
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will not face that sickness somewhere at the prime
foundation of this factual scheme from which the
prisoner soul, miasmal-distillant, wroils ever upward
sunward, tugs its tenuous prisoner arteries and veins
and poisoning in its turn that spark, that dream which,
as the globy and complete instant of its freedom
mirrors and repeats (repeats? creates, reduces to a
fragile evanescent iridescent sphere) all of space and
time and massy earth,

. . . which in all the years of

time has taught itself . . . only how to re-create,
renew; and dies, is gone, vanished: nothing.

(pp. 142-

43)
Despite its being the language of a terribly frustrated
character, Rosa's expressive mix of literal description with
metaphor conveys an idea of the primary formative principle
of man's existence which Faulkner's mature fiction
repeatedly images.

Individual experience is fundamentally

constituted by the relation of man's innate creative faculty
to the spatio-temporal components of immediate
consciousness.

The significance here is not so much Rosa's

strained use of poetry to assert a philosophical attitude,
but the suggestion that man's relation to the world is
basically poetic, or aesthetic, insofar as these terms
indicate the necessity for perspectival actualization as the
generic form of response to both phenomenal and noumenal
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data.

The double accent falls on the oxymoronic Bergsonian

view of time as "one constant and perpetual instant" of
potential, in Faulkner a complex constituted by the
immediate contents of consciousness and by man's capacity to
make an effective "rending gash" into the "arras-veil" of
the instant.

It is an instant which, in its openness to

man's input, offers him a quantity of "freedom," though Rosa
feels that man neglects to take advantage of this potential.
Instead, he engages in futile creation that merely "mirrors
and repeats" all foregoing instants.

Man therefore fails

effectively to utilize his inherent "spark" of potentiality.
"Living" is thus seen as an instant in which man's
unrealized capacity to act comes into conflict with the
perpetually potential or "open" character of his existence.
Rosa's disappointment thus results from her awareness of the
conflict between the typical individual's (including her
own) genuine potential and his general inability to fulfill
it.

But man's lack of wisdom and bravery notwithstanding,

the basic ("constant and perpetual") characteristic of
"living," namely its docility in relation to man's capacity
"to make" and its receptivity ("even glad to the lightest
naked thrust") to his acts, holds open the possibility for
effecting some change in the course of events.

Rosa's

anger, however, at the discrepancy between ought and is
blinds her to the possibility that inheres in her own
language.
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In Go Down, Moses, Isaac McCaslin's similarly
unrealistic expectation of Judaeo-Christian mythos to
realize itself undermines his attempt to positively
influence the lives of his slave-descended relatives.

"The

Bear, Part 4" discloses Isaac's discovery of the horrible
crimes perpetrated by Carothers McCaslin, Isaac's
grandfather, on his slaves.

The unit is structured around a

lengthy and involved, almost formal argument between Isaac
and his surrogate-father-cousin McCaslin Edmonds, about
Isaac's decision to forego his inheritance in an attempt to
expiate the sins of his family.

Isaac's position, an

inherently semantic one, is that he cannot "repudiate" his
inheritance since the "earth" belongs not to individual men,
but to "the communal anonymity of brotherhood."^®

In

contrast to this position, McCaslin argues that their
grandfather nevertheless "did own it, . . . else why do you
stand here relinquishing and repudiating?"

(p. 258).

Isaac's moral perspective, based on a particular value which
denies man's right to own anything pertaining to "earth,"
opposes McCaslin's adherence to the de facto situation.
Although Isaac, like his cousin, employs principles of logic
to support his position at various points throughout their
convoluted debate, his fundamental argument is an appeal to

®William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York:
Vintage,
1973), p. 257. All further references to this work appear in
the text.
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an emotionally informed moral conception.

In Go Down,

Moses, a novel published about one year before evidence of
the idealistic original conception of the project that
became A Fable surfaced, the ironic results of Isaac's
attempts to expiate ancestral sins undermine his idealism.
The deceptive tone of the narrative voice that frames
the debate, however, suggests that Isaac represents the
ideological center of the novel.

While a close reading

shows that this voice conveys the limited, skewed
perspective of Isaac, a less detached encounter of the text
may lull the reader into compliance, if not out-and-out
identification, with him.

For example, the reader is likely

to be won over by the voice's assertion that old Carothers,
despite "knowing better," could attempt to foster in his
heirs the belief that he actually owned the land and
therefore could bequeath it.

Such rhetoric subtly begs the

question, and when it is immediately followed by a
characterization of "the strong and ruthless man"— of which
category the patriarch is purportedly one— as a person who
"has a cynical foreknowledge of his own vanity and pride and
strength and a contempt for all his get," the unquestioning
reader is likely unthinkingly to embrace Isaac's position
(pp. 254-55).

After all, what sort of reader can easily

identify with the vain, "ruthless," contemptuous cynic?
what is absent from this language, and what a holistic
consideration of Part 4 ought to reveal, is the severe
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limitations of Isaac's perspective, which is warped by his
terrible anger toward his ancestor.

His perspective is

reductive in the extreme, and Faulkner's dispassionate
orchestration of the entire section, especially the
dialogue, effectually discloses the compelling unspoken
potential this perspective ignores.
When the narrator asserts Isaac's sense of "the reason"
that Carothers "believed he had tamed and ordered" the land,
the assertion is not a fact, but a speculation that the
patriarch justified his claim of land ownership by virtue of
the fact that he had forced his slaves to remove "the forest
from it . . .

in order to grow something out of it" for the

purpose of turning a profit (p. 254).

All of this is

Isaac's emotion-driven point of view regarding his
grandfather, one projection among an infinity of other
possibilities.

Isaac's passionate clinging to it as truth

underscores Faulkner's thematic treatment of the question of
exactly what constitutes truth and how one gets at it.

The

text's disclosure of Isaac's severely restricted methodology
for determining truth exemplifies Faulkner's general theme
of the relativity of truth and of the consequential
centrality of valuation to human being.
Isaac values what he describes as the "communal
anonymity of brotherhood"

(p. 257).

He weaves an elaborate

myth in support of this ideology, drawing on his
interpretations of both Old and New Testament texts and on
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highly personalized readings of world and American history.
Like Quentin and Rosa, he stands sorely in need of a process
of de-mythology, and before being offered it through his
cousin's deconstructive reading of Isaac's mythos, he has
the opportunity to derive it for himself through an
experiential encounter with Ponsiba, a grandchild of the
patriarch and his slave-daughter Tomasina.

This relative

has left the McCaslin plantation to marry a young black man
who has applied the myth of Canaan to his new circumstances,
predicated on a federal land grant "for military service."
Observing the man "sitting there in the only chair in the
house," "before that miserable fire," in "ministerial
clothing," and wearing "a pair of gold-framed," lenseless
spectacles— "reading a book" rather than attempting to work
the farm— Isaac discloses his capacity for myth-debunking by
asking the rhetorical question, "What corner of Canaan is
this?"

(pp. 275-79).

Even so, to justify his repudiation of the McCaslin
inheritance, which, as the concluding stories of the novel
"Delta Autumn" and "Go Down, Moses" manifest, constitutes a
repudiation of responsibility comparable to that of
Ponsiba's husband, Isaac similarly relies on a highly
idiosyncratic reading of Judaeo-Christian mythos, with
himself as sacrificial Christ-figure of the family.
According to this reading, Isaac has been "chosen" by God to
rectify— at least in terms of the McCaslin family— the
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terrible divergence of His creatures from what was intended
when "He created the earth, made it and looked at it and
said it was all right, and then He made man"

(p. 257).

This

divergence involved the practice of chattel slavery that
Isaac's "grandfather and his kind, his fathers, had brought
into the new land which He had vouchsafed them," thus
violating the demand that they vouchsafe God in return "pity
and humility and sufferance and endurance"

(p. 259).

Isaac

can fulfill this demand, he believes, by repudiating his
right to inherit the "tainted" McCaslin property.

The basis

of his argument is a Platonic view of truth, which,
ironically, he arrived at experientially in the episode
involving the fyce and Old Ben.
In a reverie strategically located toward the end of
the dialogue with McCaslin, Isaac recalls an earlier
discussion of the two kinsmen in which his cousin had
presented an interpretation of Keats'

"Ode on a Grecian Urn"

designed to gloss the boy's experience.

In this dialogue,

McCaslin asserts the Platonic view of truth:
It doesn't change.

"Truth is one.

It covers all things which touch the

heart— honor and pride and justice and courage and love.
you see now?"

Do

But for Isaac, at least at this point in his

personal development,

"truth" is not abstract, merely

"somebody talking in a book," but wholly experiential.

He

had experienced the paradox of hunting the famed bear "four
years and at last met it with a gun in his hands and he
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didn't shoot."

Why?

As Faulkner's text manifests, Isaac is

paralyzed by his own reading of the fyce's courage.

He has

experienced the Pre-Socratic, Heideggerian interplay of
world and earth, an eventually disclosed truth; and his
cousin's assertion that "what the heart holds to becomes
truth, as far as we know truth" rings on ears deafened by
his internalized re-collection of the experience (p. 297).
The reader should recall, though, that earlier in "Part 4"
Isaac, in defining his view of truth, uses his cousin's
rhetoric from the

earlier dialogue.

Proleptically

countering McCaslin's sarcastic query that the "men who
transcribed His Book for Him were sometime liars," Isaac
asserts that the apparent relativity of truth is an
illusion, since "there is only one truth and it covers all
things that touch the heart" (p. 260).

As McCaslin remarks

early in the main dialogue, Isaac has the interpreter's
propensity of "proving your points and disproving mine by
the same text" (p. 261).
To undermine Isaac's biblical and historical
reifications, McCaslin not only points out to his cousin the
contradictions in the letter's referential authorities, but
also demonstrates the force of the principle of
perspectivism by offering his own readings of these sources.
For example, to Isaac's fundamental argument that justice
eventually must be done and that it is incumbent upon him to
act out his role in it, McCaslin asserts "there was still

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

1865" (p. 282).

In this assertion McCaslin is not claiming,

as Rosa does, that God definitely is using one terrible
event to retire another one, but that the defeat of the
South certainly constitutes this possibility.

McCaslin also

asserts the "sons of Ham" argument to deflate Isaac's
literalist reading of the B i b l e . H e

cogently postulates

the apparent limitations of Isaac's creator God, to whom
McCaslin irreverently refers as "this Arbiter,

this

Architect, this Umpire."

Did He condone what he saw, and

thus implicate Himself?

Did he choose not to act, despite

having the capacity?

Did he even "see"?

According to this

linguistic framework, which, as such, can be no more or less
convincing than Isaac's own logic-based interpretations, one
must deduce that the creator is "perverse, impotent, or
blind:

which?"

(p. 258).

At the end of the dialogue, Faulkner discloses to the
reader the subjective teleological dimension of Isaac's
application of Judaeo-Christian mythos to his present family
circumstances.

It is an apocalypse of personal freedom from

the sociocultural guilt of his forbearer.

Yet Isaac's is

no less a purely visual, noumenal apocalypse than that of
Quentin, as the rhetoric of the detached moderating voice of

^^McCaslin implies, that is, that if Isaac chooses to
read part of the Bible literally, then, to uphold the
principle of consistency, he must apply a literal reading to
all of it— in which case, as the antebellum argument from
Southern apologists for slavery held, God condemned the
descendants of Ham to servitude.
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the dialogue indicates.

For the historical circumstances of

the "two threads" of labor and sustenance referred to early
in the dialogue created "the frail and iron thread strong as
truth and impervious as evil and longer than life itself and
reaching beyond record and patrimony both to join him with .
. . bones whose names while still fleshed and capable even
old Carothers grandfather had never heard"

(p. 299).

This

is the thread that, according to the implicit Weltanschauung
of Go Down, Moses, morally binds Isaac to the flux of
history, both local and universal.

His grand mythopoeic

artifice fails to accommodate this assertion of "earth"
within its created boundaries, with the result that both he
and the McCaslin descendants that follow him suffer what
otherwise might have been gratuitous experiences.
In each of the four major artist-figures considered in
detail here, Faulkner images the highly deleterious
potential of man's predilection for mythopoeic utterance
when confronted by terrible experiences that evoke
metaphysical uncertainty.

Quentin, Rosa, Harry, and Isaac

all project elaborate cosmologically based mythoi, with
themselves as the structural centerpiece.

Faulkner spares

no opportunity to show us the influence of pronounced
physiological states on these characters' idiosyncratic
visions of the world and the too specific place they would
take in it.

What ought not to be lost on the reader,

however, is the positive aestheticist force of each of these
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projects.

Whereas each character voiced an image of himself

in an attempt to manage his personal crisis, so, too, did
Faulkner, in creating them, confront the problem of
imperfectibility, his own as well as the world's.

The

difference, of course, between his and theirs, is the
difference between an aestheticist and a nihilist view of
the paradox of conflict that informs being.

It is, finally,

a difference of valuation, specifically, whether or not to
value life itself, as the long and agonizing process of
completing A F a b l e , his grandest aesthetic undertaking,
amply confirmed for Faulkner.
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Chapter III

Strife, Structure, the Dissemination of Voices,
and the Destruction of Truth in A Fable

It is at best a highly questionable practice to make
Faulkner's commentary on his texts the centerpiece of a
critical interpretation.

He often spoke of them in somewhat

cryptic metaphorical terms, forgot or confused precise
details in attempts to recall parts of texts, and
occasionally appears to contradict himself in separate
references to a particular item in his fiction.

Still,

Faulkner's remarks about A Fable provide approaches to the
novel that must be considered in any serious undertaking to
interpret it.

One cannot disregard his eagerness to explain

to his friends and family, with increasing frequency as the
process of composition wound to its conclusion, the meaning
of the book.

Nor should one forget, however, that

Faulkner's conviction regarding his intentions was no less
secure during the early stages of composition than it was in
its last stages, though these relative perspectives stood in
almost complete contrast to each other.^

Completely to

ignore either Faulkner's remarks about the project or the
significant amount of physical evidence of his struggle to

^Joseph L. Blotner, Faulkner;
Random House, 1969), p. 1465 ff.

A Biography

(New York:
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compose it, therefore, would be to ignore an important
avenue of insight into how and, to some extent, why the
novel assumed its final dimensions.

Yet as Faulkner himself

not infrequently insisted, the texts ought finally to be
allowed to speak for themselves.

In terms of both structure

and content, and in the relation thereof, A Fable upholds
the principle of aestheticism suggested by some of his
earlier texts as the fundamental characteristic of
existence.

The interrelation of man's physiology, of his

perspectival experience of time, and of his propensity for
myth is imaged in the involved relation of structure,
texture, character, and voice that comprises the novel.
A Fable consists of a major line of narrative into
which a secondary line offering parallels, contrasts, and
even actual connections is woven.

Intersecting these two

lines are a multitude of related narratives of various
lengths.

The main plot, which patently corresponds to

elements of the Passion Week and other aspects of the Jesus
story, involves a first-world war conflict between a French
corporal and the generalissimo of the entire French army,
who also happens to be the biological father of the
corporal.

The corporal has led a mutiny of the enlisted men

of both the Allied and the German forces, for the purpose of
bringing an end to the war.

The corporal and his twelve

"disciples" have been arrested, and the generalissimo offers
to rescind the order for their execution if the corporal
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will acknowledge the danger of his actions and publicly
renounce them.

The secondary plot presents a stolen

three-legged racehorse and an English groom who, accompanied
by an old negro preacher and his grandson as jockey,
traverse the south and midwest winning races and thereby
creating a renown of legendary proportions.
The initial chapter of the novel starkly introduces the
main characters and themes that the secondary characters,
themes and fables will provide implicit commentary on.
There are two main characters, the Supreme General in
command of the entire Allied forces in World War I and his
son, the French corporal, though the latter figure is truly
prominent only in terms of his place in the allegory
suggested by the main plot or fable.

In terms of action his

presence is negligible, even though ideologically he
represents one of the principal elements of conflict in the
novel.

Of the several levels of conflict disclosed in this

short chapter, the one that involves the large questions
about the nature of man with which Faulkner is concerned is
the most significant.

The major question the novel poses

might be simply stated as follows:

Is conflict,

particularly on a world-social level, an inevitable
characteristic of human being?
practicable way to manage it?

If so, what is the most
If not, how can man determine

and extenuate the sources or causes of the human acts that
eventuate in it?

Another aspect of the same problem
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involves man's capacity, not necessarily to sustain his
existence, but rather to improve the quality of it.
human nature constant?

Is

Is nothing under the sun new, or

does man contain an inner capacity to improve himself?
These are the questions Faulkner poses not only in A Fable,
but at least implicitly in all of his writings.
Toward the end of 1943 when Faulkner began to consider
the project that would be published much later as A Fable,
he apparently thought of it in simple terms.

He intended it

to be "a thing," he wrote literary agent Harold Ober in late
October, of "about 10-15 thousand words," "an indictment of
war p e r h a p s . "2

The word "perhaps" offers a clue to the

significant qualification in his initial intentions
regarding the project,

for it discloses his reservations,

probably for the most part unconscious at this point, about
his ability to write an unconditionally pacifistic narrative
polemic.

Before he would submit the final draft for

publication in late 1954, the "10-15 thousand words" were to
become more than 100 thousand, and the delicate tension that
is evident in his expressed intention would expand into the
wholesale strife that informs this novel as well as his
earlier masterpieces.

Indeed, the same basic conflict had

driven the development in 1928 of his most significant
character, Quentin Compson, and influenced some of his most

^Joseph Blotner,
ed..
Selected Letters of
Faulkner (New York:
Random House, 1977), p. 178.

William
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impressive novels and characterizations during the fifteen
intervening years.

This strife was largely born of the

contradiction between the promise of moral perfection
embodied in the influential Christian ethos of his culture,
with its implicit promise of earthly justice and happiness,
and Faulkner's failure to obtain these ends in his personal
life or to find them manifest in the world of his
observation.

A F a b l e , to no less an extent than The Sound

and the Fury and Go Down, Moses, is the result of the
author's pursuit of a satisfactory theodicy.
From Faulkner's correspondence with his associates at
Random House, one learns of how he encountered the initial
idea for the book.

A Hollywood director "told it in casual

after-dinner talk to a producer" who knew and liked
Faulkner's work.

The three agreed that Faulkner "should

write the story, the other two put up the money,

[and they]

would make the picture independently and own it between
[them], share and share alike."

Further, Faulkner was free

to "write the story in any from [he] liked," the proceeds
from any play or novel to be his "exclusively."

Having sent

the first half of the story along with the letter to Ober,
he proceeded to outline its concluding half:

"It continues

on, through the Three Temptations, the Crucifixion, the
Resurrection.

The Epilogue is an Armistice Day ceremony at

the tomb of the Unknown Soldier."

This letter of November

1943 indicates that money, not literary substance, was
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uppermost in his mind.

Faulkner intended "to rewrite it as

a magazine story to be printed later by Bennett and Bob [his
O

*

editors at Random House], and as a p l a y . N e a r l y

two

months later he wrote Ober that "the first draft of the
fable" was complete and that he had "started rewriting
it.

The next epistolary reference, which occurred one

week later in a letter to Robert Haas, demonstrates that
during the process of writing the first draft of the story
Faulkner's view of the project had changed from a merely
pecuniary to an altogether serious one. Still referring to
it as "the fable," he outlined its basic allegory:
The argument is (in the fable) in the middle of that
war Christ (some movement in mankind which wished to
stop war forever) reappeared and was crucified again.
We are repeating, we are in the midst of war again.
Suppose Christ gives us one more chance, will we
crucify him again, perhaps for the last time?
That's crudely put; I am not trying to preach at
all.

But that is the argument:

We did this in 1918;

in 1944 it not only MUST NOT happen again, it SHALL NOT
HAPPEN again, i.e. ARE WE GOING TO LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN?
now that we are in another war, where the third and

2 "To Harold Ober," 17 Nov. 1943, Blotner, pp. 178-79.
4"To Harold Ober, Saturday,
Selected Letters, p. 179.

8 Jan.

1944,"

in Blotner,
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final chance might be offered to save him.^
These remarks, constituted by a mix of philosophical,
poetic, and grammatical problems, suggest Faulkner's
inconclusiveness regarding even the precise question he
meant to answer.

For instance, the rhetorical question

(Will we crucify Christ for the last time?) corresponds to
no definite referent.

Is it a follow up to the announced

allegory of Christ as "some movement in mankind," or, as it
seems to be, a theological acknowledgement of the mystical
power of a judgmental Christ who may be offering mankind a
"last" chance?

If logic is applied to the remarks, then a

mixture of the mystical and the empirical occurs, as the
curious question is evoked of how a "movement in mankind"
can be said to be offering mankind a "last chance."
Moreover, if the mystical interpretation holds, what is
Faulkner implying about the consequences of yet another
"crucifixion" of Christ?
Grammatically the statement is also troublesome.

Not

only is the antecedent of "that" unclear, but the "this" of
the sentence which follows it points to no definite term.
"We" did what in 1918?

Is Faulkner referring to the French

military's squelching of the mutiny among the ranks— the
historical paradigm for Faulkner's "movement in mankind

5 "To Robert K. Haas, Saturday, 15 Jan. 1944," in Blotner,
Selected Letters, p. 180.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

which wished to stop war forever"— or is the implication far
broader, referring perhaps to the slaughter of hundreds of
thousands of people, resulting not in peace but in the
recrudescence of conflict on an even greater scale in 1939?
Moreover, if "it" must not happen again, what possible
courses of action might prevent it?

And is Faulkner's

apocalyptic reference to a "third and final chance" being
"offered" to be taken literally?
This first authorial indication of utter seriousness
regarding the work "crudely" suggests Faulkner's theme.
Although he gainsays any charge that he is proselytizing,
the tone of the remarks is patently pacifistic.

The blunt

appeal to biblical authority sets up an apparently
straightforward allegorical reading.

Man must somehow find

a way to reverse his historical tendency towards
international conflict.

Implicit in the allegory is the

interpretation that men en masse will behave according to a
wholly predictable pattern of conflict that carries the
potential for self-annihilation, this despite his awareness
of models (i.e., Christianity) that seem to offer him an
alternative.

Yet the apocalyptic linkage of the

crucifixion, the devastation of Europe during World War I,
and the ongoing world crisis evokes Faulkner's impulse to
believe that mankind has the potential somehow to avoid in
its resolution of the current problem the terrible
consequences of the first two events.

With development of

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

the appropriate attitude and accompanying political
strategy, man can eliminate the sort of perspective that
erupts in world conflagration.

Thus, the Utopian impulse

that informed Faulkner's initial thinking about A Fable
ignored his earlier conclusions, imaged most sharply in
Quentin Compson and Isaac McCaslin, about the inherent
limitations of the human condition.

Presumably, the hero of

this work would be a Christ-figure who, in contrast to his
biblical paradigm, elicits from the masses complete
adoration and a concomitant perfection of behavior that
eliminates conflict from the world.

The finished work would

be an epic depiction of this hero's entrance onto a scene of
world conflagration and his apotheosis as the savior
thereof.
It seems reasonable to conjecture from Faulkner's
remarks that the title of the short story as originally
conceived, "Who?", points to the proponent of pacifism, who
is buried in the tomb of the unknown soldier at the end of
the story, as the figurative embodiment of the authorial
point of view.

That Faulkner struggled with the simplicity

of this perspective is suggested by statements in letters to
his correspondents at Random House during the following
years.

In a letter of April, 1946, he indicated to Ober

that the title of the work was no longer to be "Who?" and
that, generically, not only was it not a fable, but
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"something new for me, really not a novel."®

Yet, nearly a

year later, he hoped the book "can be accepted as a fable,
which it is to m e . T w o
wrote;

months later, in June, 1947, he

"It's getting right now.

It was a tragedy of ideas,

morals, before; now it's getting to be a tragedy of
people."®

By this time the ideological focus of the project

had shifted from the Christ-f igure to a far more complex
perspective.
Faulkner himself spoke to

the process that probably

underlay the shifting theme of

the project that became A

Fable.

had in mind a "specific

Assuming that Faulkner

historical pattern" in its composition, an inquirer at the
University of Virginia asked him if this framework
"circumscribed" his imagination in a manner different "from
the way in which it ordinarily w o r k s . I m p l i c i t

in the

question is the assumption that in the writing of this novel
Faulkner began with and persisted in a clear idea of what he
intended to convey, while in his "ordinary" method of
writing, presumably the one he employed in writing The Sound

®"To Harold Ober, received 18 April 1946,"
Selected Letters, pp. 232-33.
^"To Robert Haas, Monday, March 24,
Selected Letters, p. 247.

1947,"

in Blotner,
in Blotner

®"To Harold Ober, received on June 9, 1947," in Blotner,
Selected Letters, p. 250.
^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner,
e d s .,
Faulkner in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 50.
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and the Fury or Light in August, the text took its form on
the basis of the free play of his imagination.

In his reply

to the question, Faulkner suggested a dialectic of "pattern"
and "imagination" as the dynamic of his creative process.
"I think that whenever my imagination and the bounds of that
pattern conflicted, it was the pattern that bulged," he
asserted.

Then, speculating that "the reason that a man has

to rewrite and rewrite" is "to reconcile imagination and
pattern," he went on to offer one of his best descriptions
of the general process of art.

Given its relevance to A

Fable, it bears repeating in its entirety here:
Of course, any work of art in its conception, when it
reaches a point where the man can begin to work, has
got to have some shape, and the problem then is to make
imagination and the pattern conform, meet, be amicable,
we'll say.

And when one has to give, I believe its

always the pattern that has to give.

And so he's got

to rewrite, to create a new pattern with a bulge that
will take this bulge of the imagination which insists
that it's true, it must be.^®
Having begun the projected story with the specific
intent to utilize the Christ myth as an allegory of
modernity's potential to eliminate conflict from its world.

^^Gwynn, Faulkner in the University, pp. 51-52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

Faulkner soon relinquished this embrace of utopianism to his
fertile imagination's far broader conception of man's
inherent inability to purge the world of strife.

Soon into

the project originally designed to show that man "MUST NOT"
fail "again" in his effort to avoid another figurative
crucifixion of Christ, Faulkner, remembering what his
characterization of Quentin Compson disclosed to him about
man's physiologically-based perspectival condition,
recognized the futility of all human subscriptions to the
concept of millennialism.

The text of A Fable bears witness

to this recognition, as the shift of the ideological focus
of the novel from the corporal, the Christ-figure, to his
supposed antipode, the Satanic marshal or "old general,"
indicates Faulkner's tribute to the "new pattern" created by
the "bulge" of his imagination as his work progressed.
The passionate assertiveness of Faulkner's description
of the Christ analogy notwithstanding, it is, like the core
of his writing, essentially interrogatory.

As a descendant

only two generations removed from an ancestral community
that suffered some of the worst effects of the Civil War,
and as one who experienced both the excitement and the
horror of the Great War during his highly impressionable
late teens, Faulkner had first-hand knowledge of the
terrible ambiguities of armed conflict.

And while the

holocaustic tenor of the allegorical remarks may well have
reflected, at the time they were expressed, a genuine
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concern for the preservation of western civilization as the
theme of the project, at some point the old question of the
significance of man's capacity for artistic creation and
reception came to be the dominant one.

Try as he might in

his inception and development of A Fable to convince himself
of an innate, but untapped, human capacity to overcome
imperfection, he could not repudiate his earlier conclusion,
imaged most starkly in Quentin in The Sound and the Fury,
that man's manifest capacity for invention was by no means
without disastrous potential.

By the date of publication of

A Fable some ten years after its inception, the emphasis was
no longer on the search for a conviction-informed way to
eliminate conflict, but rather a resigned acceptance of its
inevitability.

Indeed, in a preface that Faulkner wrote

after finishing the book, but decided against including, he
not only disavows pacifism as his theme, but also asserts
that in order "to put an end to war," "the men who do not
want war may have to arm themselves as for war and defeat by
methods of war" those who believe in "the validity of
war.

Whereas in The Sound and the Fury the primary

crisis is individual, here it is western culture itself at
the crossroads of despair and tragedy.

Yet the key to his

resolution in both cases is art, the primary element of
which is the dynamic relation of artist and audience.

York:

^^Quoted in Joseph Blotner, Faulkner;
Random House, 1974), II, 1494.

A Biography (New
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Quentin's audience, of course, as always,

is himself.

By

contrast, the audience in A Fable is the anxiety- and dreadridden populace of the district, a microcosm of all of
France as well as the entire western world, and the artist
is the apparent moral opposite of the Christ-figure who
embodied the initial authorial stance.
Thus, Faulkner's already hard-won certainty of man's
propensity for conflict eventually prevailed again over his
strong idealistic urge, various manifestations of which
constitute the primary formal element of many of his major
characters.

The exception is the character who came to be

the hero of A Fable, the "old general," Supreme Commander of
the Allied Forces who are "co-embattled" against Germany
during World War

In this character Faulkner resolves

the problematic of man's dualistic creative/receptive
faculty which he evoked in his characterization of Quentin
and reconsidered in the succeeding major artist-figures in
the canon.

The old general embodies Faulkner's conclusion

that this faculty, though susceptible to perversions that
diminish the quality of life, is the means also to mythoi
that nourish individual, community, nation and, potentially,
world.

The source of both harmful delusions and sustaining

illusions, man's artistic impulse is a primary constituent

-^William Faulkner, A Fable (New York:
Random House,
1954), p. 4.
All further references to this work appear in
the text.
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of his being.
Around the old general revolve all other rhetorical
elements of the novel, whether literal or metaphorical.
Having initially conceived A Fable as "an indictment of
w a r , a t

some point Faulkner remembered what he had

concluded earlier about the inevitability of conflict, and
the ideological center of the novel shifted from the
corporal, who embodies belief in what Eric Voegelin terms
metastasis, to the old general, who recognizes that conflict
is endemic in the human c o n d i t i o n . T h u s Faulkner became
aware that his intended epic image of a world free of
conflict had ineluctably evolved into yet another novelistic
image of the strife that inheres in man's existence.
Discussing the prophet Isaiah's attempt to transcend
existence "into a divinely transfigured world," Voegelin
introduces the term metastasis to signify "the state of the
psyche in which the experience of cosmic rhythms, in the
medium of historical form, gives birth to the vision of a
world that will change its nature without ceasing to be the
world in which we live concretely."^"

This is not the place

to consider Voeglin's detailed sketch of the Hebrew

^^"To Harold Ober," in Blotner, Selected Letters, p. 178.
^^Eric Voeglin, Order and History, Volume One;
and Revelation (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State Univ.
1956), p. 452.
^^Voeglin, Order and History, I, p. 452.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Israel
Press,

106

prophets' struggle with this propensity, but to note rather
that it is fundamentally the same one that informs Quentin's
visionary "ekstasis"^^ and Isaac McCaslin's millennialist
myth of himself as Jesus, come again to redeem the McCaslin
family.

In A Fable this impulse to empiricize myth rises to

comparable narrative heights in the three characters who
constitute the "trinity of man's conscience" referred to on
the dust jacket of the novel's first printing.

The

structure of the novel, which results to a large extent from
the stationing of these characters in relation to the old
general, is a major element of Faulkner's intention to
undermine the reified mythoi of adherents of metastasis.
The dust-jacket reference to "the trinity of man's
conscience in the persons of the young aviator, the Old
Quartermaster General and the dedicated soldier from the
ranks" is problematic, particularly since Faulkner referred
to the triptych in response to a question at the University
of Virginia, where "trinity" becomes "trilogy," the
connotations of which are significantly different.

Nowhere

is such a trinity overtly mentioned in the text, so it is
available to the reader only by inference and through three
extraneous references, the two mentioned above and the
aforementioned discarded "Preface" to the novel.

The

problem with critical inference regarding this issue is one

l^Andre
(Bloomington:

Bleikasten,
The
Most
Splendid
Failure
Univ. of Indiana Press, 1976), p. 140.
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of balance, since the textual prominence of Gragnon, who is
not one of the trinity, overrides that of Levine, the
aviator, who is.

Furthermore, the trinity, at least as

Faulkner interpreted it at Virginia, does not include the
Christ-figure, the corporal who inspires the mutiny, nor
does it account for the sentry.

Yet another problem with

the remarks on the dust jacket involves determining just
whom Faulkner meant by "the Old Quartermaster General"— the
old general, or the Norman classmate who succeeds him in the
position.

Faulkner clearly meant the generalissimo when he

mentioned the Quartermaster General at Virginia, though this
character's tenure in the position is brief.

Moreover, in

the discarded preface, Faulkner names "the old Quartermaster
General who says in the last scene,

'I am not laughing; what

you see are tears,'" as the "passive third" of the
trinity.Not

Faulkner's remarks, however, but the textual

positions of Levine, the old Norman, and the runner

^Blotner, Faulkner, II, p. 1494.
Lewis P. Simpson has
written convincingly of the interchange between Faulkner and
a young student at the University of Virginia in "A Fable of
Civilization," in his The Brazen Face of History (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 209-31.
Simpson
focuses on Faulkner's stipulation of the old general as the
person of the trinity who embraces acceptance. My reading of
this character essentially agrees with Simpson's, though it
depends to a large extent on the Norman classmate of the
general being in this position.
As Faulkner did on several
occasions when trying to recall elements of his fiction, he
apparently confused characters in this attempt to illuminate
the old general.
The mistake, however, may suggest a
fundamental similarity between the two generals, despite their
significantly different views of man.
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establish their thematic relation as the intended referents
of the trinity.
A Fable is comprised of ten chapters, which Faulkner
referred to as "actions" in a note scribbled on an early
page of the typescript setting copy.^®

Although scholars

have ignored this textual fact, the old general quite
literally stands at the center of the novel.

This

centrality results to a large extent from Faulkner's
structural emphasis on time, but it also contributes to the
rhetorical end of highlighting the general's relation to the
characters of the trinity.
experience,

Always interested in individual

in this novel Faulkner focuses rather on a

spectrum of relations within a broad span of time.

The

present is dawn on the Wednesday two days after a regimental
mutiny which ultimately eventuated in the refusal of rankand-file soldiers of both sides to continue the war.

The

mutinied regiment is being driven in lorries into the city
of Chaulnesmont, the Allied command center, where their fate
will be decided by the old general.

The harried people from

the district that spawned the regiment are converging on the
Place de Ville, site of the Hotel where the command sits.
At the end of this comparatively short initial chapter.

^“Michael Millgate, ed., William Faulkner Manuscripts 20,
Volume III; A Fable (New York; Garland Publishing, 1986), p.
7. Faulkner wrote:
"Printer:
There are ten actions.
Each
one begins at top of new left or right page, with the simple
cross and the day designated.
Please allow ample sinkage."
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Faulkner images the major conflict of values in the novel as
the corporal and the old general, with the throng as
backdrop, poignantly stare "full at each other across the
moment" (p. 17). In the course of the novel, this present
moment will give way to the daily progression of events, but
not until a flashback details the events leading up to and
including the mutiny on Monday, then progresses to Wednesday
through a series of scenarios and sub-plots that include
internal flashbacks, as it were, some of them extending over
a number of years.

The structure of the novel poses a

problem quite simply because the old general does not
reappear for the next 175 pages, by which point Faulkner has
interposed a number of extremely complicated incidents and
characters not apparently related to the confrontation
imaged in the first chapter, and presented in a texture so
rich in detail as to be virtually incomprehensible without
concentrated reading and reflection.

These incidents and

characters achieve full meaning only in relation to the old
general.

The chapter in which he resurfaces, "Wednesday

Night," which is both the thematic and the structural center
of the novel, generally alternates between narration of past
incidents that grounded his moral education and of present
moments in which he is forced to apply the knowledge
acquired through these experiences.

However, the long

chapter is more a kunstierroman than a bildungsroman,
because in his method and perspective the old general
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embodies the premier type of the artist according to
Nietzsche's precise definition of art in the grand style.
The point at which the reader should notice the special
relation between the general and the characters of the
trinity occurs in the chapter that follows "Wednesday
Night."

Here Faulkner unravels the fictional knots tied in

the three characters' earlier appearances in the text.

The

resolution of each character's crisis occurs in its own
textual segment— first the runner, then Levine, finally the
Norman— separated from the one that follows it by a space in
the text.

Moreover, immediately after these three segments,

the focus shifts to the imprisoned corporal and his
disciples, with the lengthy "temptation" dialogue between
general and corporal soon to follow, thus accentuating the
thematic importance of the trinity's ideological relation to
the general.
Levine is the character about whom Faulkner said in the
discarded preface, he "sees evil and refuses to accept it by
destroying h i m s e l f . I n

the reference to the "trilogy"

years later at the University of Virginia, Faulkner
similarly referred to him as "the one that said. This is
dreadful, terrible, and I won't face it even at the cost of
my life."20

Levine reads the fraudulent show designed by

l^Blotner, Faulkner, II, p. 1494.
20gwynn, Faulkner in the University, p. 62,
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the conflicting forces to mislead the enlisted men as a flaw
in the very nature of being that he cannot live with.^l
Like Quentin, Rosa, and Isaac, his problem with existence is
that it fails to live up to the promise of the myths it
elicits.

More specifically, the myths that the culture of

these characters has bequeathed to them often fail to stand
the test of time and reality.

Herbert Schneidau describes

this perspectival situation as a "failure to identify
morality and c u l t u r e . C o n f r o n t e d by this general
eventuality, as people inevitably will be, one must face the
conditions of existence on their terms and either embrace
them or else respond creatively— by remythologizing, as it
were— or both.
The old Norman or quartermaster general eventually
sees, with the help of the old general, the inherent
conflict that informs existence and precludes the
elimination of evil.

When he learns of the general's role

in the resumption of the war and the execution of the
corporal, he recognizes that his nearly lifelong devotion to
a myth of the old general as the "savior" of both France and
"Man" has been a waste of his selfhood (p. 264).

As

21in
this
regard Levine
recalls
Ivan Karamazov's
repulsion toward an existence in which the suffering of
children occurs, in Dostoevsky’s The Brother's Karamazov.
^^Herbert N. Schneidau, Sacred Discontent; The Bible and
Western Tradition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press,
1976, p. 16.
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quartermaster general he had been compelled to participate
in bringing the German general "across the lines" for the
apparently cynical meeting designed to counter the effect of
the mutiny.

His essentially Christian perspective eliciting

from him feelings of extreme guilt— particularly since the
runner's battalion and the "unarmed German force" it met
were destroyed by artillery when they attempted to repeat
the earlier mutiny— he wishes to resign the position and so
appears before the old general (p. 327).

In the view of the

Norman, the military enacted the conspiracy merely "in order
to hold our last desperate and precarious place" on earth
(p. 327).

The people therefore, he asserts, "are capable of

saving themselves" and need only to be "defended, protected"
from the military (p. 328).

To defuse this argument, the

old general informs the Norman that the mutiny failed
because Polchek betrayed the corporal, "as that or them or
at least one among them for whom man sets in jeopardy what
he believes to be his life and assumes to be his liberty or
his honor always does" (p. 330).

The Norman, then, fails to

take into account all of man's "capacities," the implicit
logic being that man's inherent imperfection necessitates
general social adherence to order and commitment (p. 330).
Contrary to the quartermaster general's initial belief that
the marshal will execute the corporal out of fear that the
letter's success will result in a diminishment of the
former's power, the marshal in fact acknowledges, both here
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and in the long dialogue with the corporal, how essential
idealism is to the well-being of man, as his expression of
the paradox of this conflict indicates:
"If I gave him his life tonight, I myself could
render null and void what you call the hope and dream
of his sacrifice.

By destroying his life tomorrow . .

. I will establish forever that he didn't even live in
vain, let alone die so.

Now tell me who's afraid?

(p.

332)
The most important foil to the old general is the
battalion runner, who in the course of the novel moves from
one extreme to another.

Besides the general, greater

narrative attention is devoted to this character than to any
other in the novel.

He is developed in the second longest

chapter in the novel, "Tuesday, Wednesday, Wednesday Night,"
and the process is one of development by implication,

so to

speak, since the chapter actually involves the Reverend Tobe
Butterfield's narration to him of the horsethief episode
involving the sentry; the runner's attempt to use the sentry
for the purpose of accomplishing the corporal's pacifist
goal constitutes, of course, an image of the story's effect
on him.

In this regard Faulkner exemplifies once again

man's propensity to take for reality events merely depicted
in language.

The runner interprets the story as an example

of the power of love, then enacts his own repetition of this
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myth in coercing the sentry to lead a mutiny of his
regiment.
Before the war the runner had been an artist of sorts
("not only a successful architect, but a good one") and an
intellectual "aesthete"

("doing a little more than his share

of the talking about art or politics or life or all three,"
p. 60).

Being "among the first London volunteers," a hero

at the Battle of Loos and lately an officer, he approaches
his company commander with the request that he be allowed to
resign his commission, not because he loves man so much that
he prefers to "sleep in the same mud he sleeps in," but
because,

rather, he hates man and wants to be "free" from

any responsibility for him (p. 61).

The runner's

misanthropy, however, is not due to the fundamental
ignobility of man or to man's predilection not to fulfill
his potential, but (and here his thinking parallels
Levine's) to the absurdity of man's condition, which for the
runner is signified by the fact that he, "by the simple
coincidence of wearing this little badge on [his] coat,
[has] not only the power, with a whole militarized
government to back [him] up, to tell vast herds of man what
to do, but the impunitive right to shoot him with [his] own
hand when he doesn't do it" (pp. 61-62).

This caricature of

the metaphysical uncertainty of human being compels the
runner to "realize how worthy of fear and abhorrence and
hatred [man] is" (p. 62).
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The runner's myth of the preposterousness of man's
condition is no less illusory than the imaginary
reifications of Faulkner's earlier artist-figures.
Moreover, the runner's view of man ironically results from
the same perspective that will lead him to embrace an
apparently opposite view after his observation of the
response Harry, the sentry, gets from rank- and-file members
of the battalion.

The runner's two responses to the human

condition, the first one of repulsion and (quite literal)
resignation, the second of hope and action designed to
ameliorate, spring from the same unwillingness to accept the
world on its contingent terms.

Thus, to counter his own

myth of the inherent degradation of man, he invents a myth
of self-resignation from any responsibility for what occurs
within this condition.
This attitude, however, is replaced by what appears to
be its opposite extreme when the runner observes the "clump
of thirteen men in horizon blue" and the relation of the
sentry to his debtors, learns of the mutiny of Gragnon's
regiment, and makes the acquaintance of the "old porter" who
has enlisted in the army to facilitate his quest to find his
missing son (pp. 67-68).

Influenced by this character's

reading the realization of Christian mythos in the unfolding
of events, the runner, with his own pronounced faculty for
mythopoeia, embraces the porter's view of the corporal as
Christ returned for the initiation of the millennium.
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Accordingly,

in his mind the corporal and his followers take

on the force of mystical power in their confrontation with
"ruthless and all-powerful and unchallengeable Authority,"
which "would be impotent before that massed unresisting
undemanding passivity" (p. 68).

No less now a man of action

than when he publicly shamed himself with a prostitute in
order to lose his commission, the runner attempts yet again
to institute an abstract mythopoeia within the dynamic
stream of event, forcing the highly reluctant sentry to lead
the men of the battalion into a futile repetition of the
earlier regimental mutiny.
The runner's metastatic politics of "unresisting
undemanding passivity" is predicated on his reading of love
as a potentially overarching force in human affairs.

There

is, of course, the love of the porter for his son, manifest
in his unyielding, self-sacrificial search for him.

But it

is two other, highly unusual manifestations of love that
convince the runner the conditions of the millennium are
implementable.

These are the relation of his creditors to

the sentry and the devotion of the sentry and Tobe to the
renowned horse.

In

"Tuesday Night," Faulkner underlines

the first relation as one of love by having a colonel
describe it that way to a staff major who is investigating
it,

"because the only word I can think of is love" (p. 59).

The more emphatic myth of love, however, is that spun by the
Reverend Butterfield.

Not only he and Harry are devoted to
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the horse; apparently the entire populations of villages and
towns the group passed through confederated to prevent
federal and state authorities and hired investigators from
capturing them.

Hearing Tobe witness to this capacity of

man to unite in the pursuit of a single end, the runner is
propelled further into his illusion of the possibility of
forced peace.

Faulkner undermines his idealism, though,

through other voices in the chapter and, after the long
biography of the old general in "Wednesday Night," in the
segment depicting the runner's misguided forcing of the
sentry's hand and the subsequent annihilation of the
battalion and its German counterpart.
The frame narrator of "Tuesday, Wednesday, Wednesday
Night," for instance, asserts the "inherent doom" of the
story of the sentry and the horse,

"since, being immortal,

the story, the legend, was not to be owned by any one of the
pairs who added to its shining and tragic increment, but
only to be used, passed through, by each in their doomed and
homeless turn"

(p. 154).

In contrast to this view of the

myth of love as an archetype to be "passed through" stands
the runner's conviction that the kerygma can be (and is, in
the person of the corporal, being) established in the realm
of human affairs.

Another passage images the detached

perspective of the ex-Federal deputy's lawyer, who envisions
himself "against, as a frieze or tapestry," the roster of
heroes "who were the milestones of the rise of man,"
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including "Caesar and Christ."

The effective modus operandi

of these figures, whose primary values— according to this
reading— only apparently conflict, is, "by putting some of
him [man] in motion in one direction, by him of him and for
him, to disjam the earth, get him for a little while at
least out of his own way"

(p. 101).

This remark ironically

comments on the active remythology of the old general, whose
self-perpetuating grand legend not only palliates, but
infuses with hope the troubled relatives of the regiment.
In contrast to the runner's sense of man's worthiness of
"fear and abhorrence and hatred"

(p. 62), the general

reveres man for having "that in him which will

enable him to

outlast even hiswars," namely, his capacity for creative
adaptation, even to the worst of his shortcomings (p.
352).23
Faulkner establishes the old general's mesmerizing,
myth-provoking effect on others through their remarks about
him.

General Gragnon’s army commander, for instance,

despairs before him;
230).

Why?

the paradox

"If I were a saint, I would weep"

Why not, rather, rejoice?

(p.

It may be because of

that the old general, seen here as an example of

23?he
antecedent of
"that"
is,
of
course,
man's
"deathless folly," the general's term for the paradox of man's
creative relation to the world. It is this faculty that leads
to the spate of inventions by means of which man will continue
to respond to existence, so that his capacity to be "still
talking, still planning" will enable him to escape the from
"last red and heatless sunset" of earth to "the next star in
the blue immensity of space" (p. 354).
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the man-of-men concept, embodies the moral force necessary
to confront and manage evil, but, as a man himself, contains
too much knowledge of the inherent evil in man to approach
sainthood himself.

Or, it could be that the saint weeps for

joy that this man constitutes the moral pinnacle of man.

In

this sense, he represents man's moral, social and
psychological potential.

He "executes," as it were, on the

basis of both morality and intellect.

But the narrator of

Gragnon's hearing does not agree with Lallemont's
perspective.

In the view of this voice, virtue and

deliberation play no role in the determinations of the old
general, who merely sits "for a specified time over the
meaningless papers . . . until the moment came not to judge
nor even condemn, but just to fling away the impending
papers and execute" (p. 228).

Both views are

interpretations, as is Gragnon's sense that the old general
has photographic memory— "that he remembered the name and
face of every man in uniform he had ever seen."
He knows me at once"

(p. 230).

"It's true.

This is Gragnon's natural

myth-making capacity at work, a reflection of the author's
too, as it suggests the legend that has naturally been
building up around the old general.
To be sure, the old general has assumed the position of
a powerful presence in the novel at this point.
at the vortex of the social situation it depicts:
hearing and the city's tumult.

He stands
Gragnon's

This hearing, in which the
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division commander requests the execution of the regiment,
is one of many that metaphorically interplays with Tobe
Butterfield's hearing.

The request is based on Gragnon's

myth of the providential "beneficence" that, in his mind,
necessarily undergirds a life predicated on adherence to
principle.

"It [the request] had been right" (on the bases

of "honor and integrity") and "it was still right"

(on the

basis of "that quality" that enabled Gragnon to become
division commander), since the "honor and integrity" which
the "beneficence" had seen in him, rather than the
"beneficence" itself, was forcing "the compulsion"

(p. 231).

Gragnon fails to recognize that his presumably logical
argument is fundamentally aestheticist.

For Faulkner it is

another aspect of man's psychological propensity for myth.
The mind not only needs the lie, but also quite naturally
contributes to its establishment.

Thus another paradox

occurs in the establishment (substantiation) of falsehood,
something that is fundamentally insubstantial.
engaged in mythopoeia as much as Quentin, though
obviously.

Gragnon is
less

Even if the ascetic character of his early

religious socialization in an orphanage, coupled with his
military training, may account for his easy embrace of such
an abstraction as "beneficence," Gragnon elevates this
invention, predicated on his self-perceived capacity for
absolute faithfulness to the "rules," to a position of
mystical force.

It

because it must

since it cannot
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but be, given his absolute devotion to it.

The rules of

existence are thus and so, and I have followed them to the
letter, so my expectations must be realized.

Accordingly,

Gragnon's "speech," reported by the narrator but gratuitous
to the text, has no connection "with what lay on the table,"
the sword proffered in submission to the perceived rules of
engagement (p. 231).

Although Gragnon adjudges his "speech"

to be authentic, like many of the utterances in response to
disappointment imaged in the novel, it lacks the practical
connection to the primary value the novel espouses through
the image of the old general, in both his actions and his
language— namely, the sustenance of life itself.

In saying

that "the beneficence itself didn't need the gesture," the
narrator exposes the fallacy of Gragnon's myth (p. 231).
Gragnon's proffering of the sword, a miniature symbol of the
larger "gesture" of executing the regiment, is inferior to
the old general's gesture of sparing them and scapegoating
the corporal.

The latter action, though equally poetic,

enforces the superior value.
Gragnon must blindly serve his destiny by asserting
abstractions— proffering the sword, making the speech,
executing the regiment, and taking his own life— that, for
all their poetry, undermine the aesthetic possibility that
inheres existence and is imaged in the old general's ongoing
poetic actions.

Gragnon's stoic intention to kill himself

as the only orderly response to the "fixed" situation he
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perceives is all the more patently absurd when the reader
remembers that the whole business of the mutiny was set in
motion so that the group commander, "Mama Bidet," could get
his baton.

Yet despite Gragnon's point of view that the

whole war is the consequence of natural forces "conceived .
. . by some immaculate pollenization like earth's
simultaneous leafage . . . "out of the mutual rage and fear
of the three ocean-dividing nations themselves," he persists
in his form-based Stoicism (p. ??).

The German general's

attention to ritual is similarly absurd.

The modus operandi

of both characters is outside the dynamic stream of events,
the paradoxical (aestheticist) fusion of which constitutes
the potential for occurrences that one cannot project with
absolute precision, but can absolutely negate with such
rigidity of action as that of Gragnon and the German
general.

This sustained moment of possibility Heidegger

attempts to clarify with his dialectic of unconcealment and
concealment, of unretarded process or ontogenesis. Gragnon's
static myth of the beneficence vitiates it.
Gragnon perceives "the old gray inscrutable supreme
general" as having "the face of one who long ago had won the
right to believe in nothing whatever save man's deathless
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folly" (pp.

2 3 2 - 3 3 ).24

This viewpoint initiates the old

general's biography and, at its point of utterance, actually
seems to be the voice at the ideological center of the
novel.

And although the first-time reader lacks the

information needed to discern this erroneous perception of
the division commander, Gragnon mistakenly says that the old
general merely presides and therefore does not need "to
control" the plan "as it took its ordained undeviable
course" on the basis "of the vast solvent organizations and
fraternities and movements" which hold power in the western
world (p. 233).

This sarcasm expressed toward the

establishment corresponds to the pacifist attitude which
induced Faulkner's original plans for A F a ble.

By

publication date it has become the shortsighted perspective
of a character who stands as a major foil to the protagonist
who embodies the Weltanschauung the novel images.

The

entire lengthy passage is overstatement, some of it in rich
Shakespearean syntax that indicates Faulkner's penchant for
employing the bard's strategy of putting into the voice of a
character truths larger than the more limited one of his
immediate understanding.

The "design" Gragnon postulates is

no design at all, but the consequence of an irreducible

2 -This is actually the language of a third-person voice
which announces that it refracts the perspective of Gragnon.
For example, it remarks, "As the group commander himself had
practically told him this morning . . ." and "In fact, it
seemed to him now that . . . " (p. 231).
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complex of material forces in their historical evolution (p.
2 3 2 ).25

Moreover, it is an erroneous projection on his

part, since the attack— in practical terms the old general's
sacrifice of Gragnon to Bidet— was purely personally
motivated and not an altogether significant part of the war
at all.

Yet the old general does design on the basis of a

controlled strategy which allows the disclosure of valuesustaining imagery to occur.

This strategy takes into

account the fluidity of existential evolution and the
spectatorial capacity of consciousness within it.

Gragnon's

lengthy reflection, in dialogue with the old general's
statements and actions, is reductive in its "all or nothing"
interpretation of the event.
of his destiny.

He sees it absolutely in terms

The failure itself disgraced him, thus

demonstrating his inability adequately to train all the men
in his command, the specific nature of it, the mutiny, being
largely irrelevant.

Gragnon's "quality" of incorrigible

belief in the necessary realization of his myth of "the
beneficence" demands that he make the request that the
regiment be executed (p. 231).

But the old general

recognizes a more fundamental social need as the society for

" . . . all that vast powerful terror-inspiring
representation which, running all democracy's affairs in
peace, comes indeed into its own in war, finding its true
apotheosis then, in iron conclave now decreeing for half the
earth a design vast in its intention to demolish a frontier,
and vaster still in its intent to obliterate a people" (p.
232, my emphasis).
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which the regiment fights is likely to experience moral
disintegration if the regiment is executed.
An examination of another of the fables within A Fable
that Faulkner interprets in his correspondence will
demonstrate the fallacy of the will to truth that
purportedly informs the genre.

It occurs within the story

of the groom, the old negro, and the stolen racehorse— one
of the two major fables of the novel.

A federal deputy

hired by the millionaire owner of the horse, having become
fascinated by the developing legend, not only has resigned
from the pursuit, but also has committed himself to
facilitating the party's continuing evasion of the
authorities.

When the groom is apprehended and arrested in

a small Missouri county seat, the deputy returns to his home
in New Orleans, sending in his place an expensive attorney
whose task is to protect the groom and the old negro.

The

groom mysteriously disappears from the jail, but in the
meanwhile the negro, reportedly hiding in the tail of his
frock coat tens of thousands of dollars won betting on the
horse, is captured by the deputy, who, at the insistence of
a mob of irate citizens, takes him to the courtroom for a
hearing.

The attorney asks for and is given (by the mob)

ten minutes "to consult" with his client, during which
interval the attorney's chauffeur attempts to drive the
negro away from the town (p. 173).

Sensing the ruse,

however, the mob apprehends the old negro in the street and.
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in a moment of irony that recalls a number of scenes in
Faulkner, merely compels him to leave town.

"We dont like

rich niggers here," the mob's spokesman tells him (p. 189).
In a financial bind, Faulkner was trying to sell this
part of the work to a magazine.

Corresponding about it with

Ober, he offered this interpretation of the scene:
the last 60 pages are a complete story in a way:
an anecdote of a mob (man at his basest) pe r 
forming an act of right and justice despite
himself, because of base motives.

They freed two

thieves not because of pity for them but because
they would defend at all costs man's right to get
that much money, no matter how.^6
This glossing of his own text by the author offers
interesting clues about what he intended to convey in A
Fable.

The book begins with a mob scene, ends with one, and

includes many others.

Does Faulkner consider all of them

representative of "man at his basest," and do they
indisputably appear to be that way in the text?

What of the

indicated a priori view of "right and justice"?

Is Faulkner

indicating that "despite himself," i.e., his baseness, man
(the mob) will inevitably discover justice?

Moreover, is

man in the mob condition, as the unusual parenthesis

26" t o Harold Ober, Friday
Selected Letters, pp. 260-61.

28 Nov.

1947,"

in Blotner,
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suggests ("mob" is the antecedent of "himself," thus making
"mob" and "man" synonymous), in Faulkner's view
representative of the true nature of man?

There can of

course be no definitive answers to these questions,

just as

Faulkner's interpretation of the anecdote necessarily lacks
absoluteness.

Other plausible views may readily be

demonstrated, and Faulkner's rhetorical strategies
contribute to the inherent ambiguity.
The question the anecdote elicits in Faulkner's mind
may be phrased "What is the nature of justice?" or "How does
man, communally considered, arrive at justice in the
resolution of a dispute?"

The text obscures even the

specific charge to be adjudicated in the case of the old
negro.

Most of the narrative focuses on the attorney's

perspective, which changes from conviction that the mob will
do nothing to fear that their actions may culminate in a
lynching.

One point is clear.

Before the mob acts, they

insist on hearing the case in the courtroom, and their tacit
understanding is that the attorney will present it.

But the

reader must surmise for himself the charge, although the
obvious one is horsetheft.

Having anticipated this charge,

the attorney charts a defense that is typical in its "legal"
circumlocution:

The prosecution cannot demonstrate "that

the man had not been trying simply to find the owner and
restore him his property all the time" (p. 168).

Hence the

attorney's (and the reader's) confusion when the mob ignores
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the theft and focuses instead on the answer to the question
its spokesman puts to the old negro:
that fellow really win on that horse?"

"How much did you and
They interpret the

reply, "It was a heap," as indicative that he is a "rich
nigger," which they will not allow in the community.

Their

judgment is that he be on the train "when it leaves and dont
come back" (pp. 188-89).
Thus, one is left with the question "what constitutes
justice?" in this instance.

A Fable

postulates no

painstaking sociocultural evolution of a legal institution
capable of resolving conflict, such as the one Aeschylus
images in the Oresteia.

If justice has been done, whose

justice is it, since the legalities (i.e. prosecution for
theft) have been completely ignored by the process?

One

easy answer is that the community's sense of justice has
prevailed.

Another is that justice will eventually out,

regardless of the players and the circumstances.

Faulkner's

interpretation in the letter to Ober contradicts the first
answer and does not dispute, though neither does it affirm,
the second.

More importantly, the text in ways too numerous

to document undermines both possibilities.

Instead,

it

demonstrates the impossibility of verbalizing an absolute
answer.
Several voices in A Fable reflect on the tradition of
rapacity that arguably undergirds the wealth and power of
western civilization.
that

The Norman, for instance, asserts
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rapacity does not fail [since] all governments and
nations which ever rose and endured long enough to
leave their mark as such, had sprung from it and
in and upon and by means of it became forever
fixed in the amazement of man's present and the
glory of his past; civilization itself is its
password and Christianity its masterpiece,
Chartres and the Sistine Chapel, the pyramids and
the rock-wombed powder-magazines under the gates
of Hercules its altars and monuments, Michaelangelo and Phidias and Newton and Ericsson and
Archimedes and Krupp its priests and popes and
bishops,

(pp. 259-60)

In addition, the attorney describes his prepared defense of
the old negro as being "in the old fine strong American
tradition of rapine" (p. 168).

But if the tradition of

"legalized" rapine and its concomitant, the power of the
west, are to be sustained,

"illegal" rapine such as the

theft of the millionaire's racehorse must not be
sanctioned.

This view of the west may be described as one

in which the people have been conditioned to accept
"legalized theft" as the norm.

The community, however, does

not act according to this theory.

Rather, its "justice"

undermines the system and thereby demonstrates a weakness in
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the letter's theoretical foundation.

Faulkner's view that

the mob has performed "an act of right and justice" is thus
disputed by the view of rapacity expressed by this
character.
Faulkner also demystifies the notion of absolute
justice through the language of the primary narrator of the
anecdote.

This detached voice describes the courtroom as

"the tabernacle, the shrine itself, of [Man's] last tribal
mysteries," thus suggesting superstition as an influential
factor in the institutionalization of justice.

The voice

challenges the Aeschylean image of justice as being
partially grounded in a human capacity for reason.

Man

decreed it, built it, sweated it up . . . t o be no
symbol nor cradle nor any mammalian apex, harbor where
the incredible cockleshell of his invincible dream made
soundings at last from the chartless latitudes of his
lost beginnings and where . . . the voice of his
affirmation roared murmuring home to the atoll-dais of
his unanimity where no mere petty right, but blind
justice itself, reigned ruthless and inattentive amid
the deathless smells of his victories: his stale
tobacco spit and his sweat.
was not

Because to begin with, he

but they, and they only by electing to be,

because what he actually was, was ^ and in the first
place he was not a mammal and as for his chartless
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latitudes, he not only knew exactly where he came from
six thousand years ago, but that in threescore and ten
or thereabouts he was going back there.

(pp. 172-73)

The juxtaposition of Darwinian empiricism with
Christian millennialism, presented in a satirical tone
weighted heavily toward the naturalistic view, debunks the
notion that reason significantly influences the adjudication
of human conflict.

It may not be the view of the author, as

it is merely one voice among many that vie for recognition
in the text, but it undermines any claim, including
Faulkner's in the letter to Ober, that the people's response
to the old negro constitutes "universal justice."

The voice

respects the "mammal" man's "invincible" capacity both to
dream and to acknowledge that justice is neither "blind"
(objective) nor "inattentive."

It ridicules, though, man's

belief in justice predicated on a "unanimity" that on the
one hand denies its biological classification (mammalia)
while on the other hand it asserts its divine status in a
providentially ordered universe it projects ("he was going
back there").
Another rhetorical strategy that suggests the
free-floating character of justice occurs during the
ten-minute interval when the turnkey tries to get the old
negro to the attorney's automobile, in which the chauffeur
would drive him to the sanctuary of a near-by town.

In a
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one-paragraph digression of some 500 words, the attorney
reflects on the chauffeur,

"a swaggering demi-d'Artagnan of

a mulatto murderer" whose release the attorney had secured
after a year in prison, not because he "held any brief even
for the murder of this particular woman, but because of the
way it had been done:

...

as the lawyer imagined it,

[the mulatto] simply ran past her with one single neat
surgeon-like back-handed slash of the razor . . . the two of
them running on side by side for two or three paces in the
moonlight until the woman fell, the man not even spotted and
the blade barely befouled"

(pp. 182-83).

technics may astound the reader.

Such verbal pyro

Surely he will be confused

about the placement of this virtuoso display of writing in
the middle of the anecdote.

Yet it sets up the "judgment"

of the mob by demonstrating the capriciousness of justice.
It also indicates the attorney's fear of man (he wants a
chauffeur capable of defending him) and his belief that the
mob's action is likely to be anything but just.
A few paragraphs later, just prior to the judgment that
the defendant leave town, the narrative voice presents
another internal view of the attorney.

This time, the

attorney postulates the invincibility of "man" when either
of two conditions is evident:

(1) the "ability to move en

masse at his own impulse"; and (2) "silence in which to fall
into thought and then action"

(p. 187).

Somewhat humorously

but nonetheless seriously, the attorney envisions evolution
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as a solution to the problems posed by the first condition.
In a thousand years the reliance on automation will have
"effaced the legs from a species just as that long-ago and
doubtless at the time not even noticed twitch of Cosmos
drained the seas into continents and effaced the gills from
their fish."

The second condition, however, which must be

"conquered" before peace can be sustained, seems
unconquerable.

This "silence in which man had space to

think and in consequence to act on what he believed he
thought or thought he believed" informs the mob's
confrontation of the old negro (p. 187).

This confron

tation, which stands in synecdochal relation to the general
condition of conflict in A Fable, highlights the problem of
language and interpretation developed throughout the text
and contributes to the irony of the mob's "adjudication"
which follows it.^^
In Faulkner perhaps to a degree unmatched by any other
prominent writer of prose fiction, the problem of the will
to truth through language predominates.

Consider the scene

in Go Down, Moses when Uncle Isaac McCaslin recalls a
conversation with McCaslin Edmonds.
from Keats'

Having quoted a stanza

"Ode on a Grecian Urn," Edmonds tells him the

poet "was talking about truth.

Truth is one.

It covers all

^^Compare Nietzsche's suspicion of thinking in Beyond
Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York;
Vintage,
1966), pp. 45-47.
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things which touch the heart— honor and pride and pity and
justice and courage and love.
though, "didn't know.
that."28

Do you see now?"

Isaac,

Somehow it seemed simpler than

The text of A Fable indicates that its writer,

like Isaac, distrusts the capacity of language to convey
truth.

The "fable" of the old negro, the attorney, and the

mob not only presents a variety of perspectives but remains
open to as many responsible "readings" as there are
responsible readers to produce them.

The strength of

Faulkner's own metastatic will to truth notwithstanding, his
stronger sense of man's essentially perspectival condition
eventually took control of his invention of this novel.
Consequently, the aesthetic principle imaged under the
ironic title A Fable is not that of art as representation of
truth, justice or event, but rather that of art as the
inherent repetition of the "open" or radically potential,
"happening" condition of perpetual conflict that
paradoxically constitutes the ground of existence.

2®william Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York:
1973), p. 297.

Vintage,
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Chapter IV
The Artist's Directive:
Remythologizing the Kerygma in A Fable

Faulkner's fiction intersects with the most fundamental
question of western discourse, that of man's capacity for
conscious decisions that shape his experience.

Having

presented over the course of about fifteen years (1928-1942)
several sharply delineated images of highly intellectual
protagonists who struggle with this problem in attempting to
resolve personal crises, in 1943 Faulkner began ten years of
work on A Fable, a novel in which yet another protagonist
struggles to understand the conditions of existence, with a
view to the potential for amelioration.

One important

difference from the preceding series of characters, however,
involves the magnitude of the crisis which the character at
the structural center of A Fable faces.

In contrast to the

personal crises imaged in earlier novels, the conflict
imaged in this novel involves the entire western world.

But

the problem remains essentially the same, namely, to what
extent can man engage in actions that predictably shape the
quality and conditions of his future.

In A Fable Faulkner

crystallizes as it were everything his development of the
earlier characterizations had revealed to him about the
relation of consciousness to the world, embodying in the
135
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primary protagonist of this novel (1) an understanding of
the basic ontological principle that the character of the
temporal guarantees the recurrence of conflict and, despite
this factor of the contingent as the ground of man's
existence,

(2) an awareness of man's inherent capacity for

and susceptibility to formal creative acts that extenuate
his suffering and sustain his existence.
Scholarship has for the most part misread the character
in A Fable who embodies this understanding,

the old

general— the marshal or Generalissimo, Supreme Commander of
the Allied Forces.^

The old general is an anomaly within

^Delmore Schwartz, for instance, in one of the early
considerations of A Fable, argues that, far from taking steps
to sustain man, the old general has concluded that "human
beings are worthless" and that "everything truly human" is
contemptible. See "Faulkner's A Fable," in Donald A. Dike and
Davis H. Zucker, eds.. Selected Essays of Delmore Schwartz
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 298-99; Joseph
Urgo, in one of the few recent studies of the novel, agrees
with "Schwartz's contention that the old general is an evil
force against which good human forces ought to fight." Among
the mistakes that Urgo makes in what is an interesting
misreading of A Fable is his identification of the authorial
point of view with the language of a narrator who refracts the
point of view of a particular character.
Urgo quotes
Gragnon's reflection that "vast solvent organizations and
fraternities and movements . . . control by coercion or
cajolery man's morals and actions," for instance, to support
his negative view of the hierarchy the general rules.
Urgo
also argues that the general dissembles when he asserts to the
corporal that man "is capable of enduring and will endure."
Yet Urgo offers no substantive support for his extravagant
claims (1) that what the general "really means . . . is that
man can endure authority" and (2) that when the general "says
that man will 'prevail,' he means survive even his reign."
See Faulkner's Apocrypha: 'A Fable,' 'Snopes,' and the Spirit
of Human Rebel^'on (Jackson:
Univ. Press of Mississippi,
1989), pp. 108-112; for contrasting views of the general, see
Philip Blair Rice, who reads the general as "functionally the
supreme representative of Caesarism," yet "an ambiguous figure
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Faulkner's fiction, because coming to terms with the
writer's characterization of this figure is essential to
comprehension of his resolution of the discursive problem he
had considered in earlier major protagonists— the problem of
freedom versus necessity— or, to state the matter
differently, the Platonic problem of the value of art and
its relation to life.

In contrast to the old general's

methodology and perspective, Faulkner's earlier artistfigures' attempts to resolve personal crises through art
stand as strategies severely limited by the characters'
failure to understand that art as a human activity is not

from the beginning" who although he expresses "the more
difficult faith in man," cannot be accepted "as the author's
final spokesman," in "Faulkner's Crucifixion," in William
Faulkner;
Three Decades of Criticism, ed. Frederick J.
Hoffman
and Olga Vickery
(New York:
Harcourt
Brace
Jovanovich, 1960), pp. 377-79, and Heinrich Straumann who
writes that the general "unites in himself . . . a light and
dark principle [which] is immanent in all the orders and
values of existence," in "An American Interpretation of
Existence: Faulkner's A Fable," in Four Decades of Criticism
(Michigan State Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 335-57; Michael
Harrington in Faulkner's Fables of Creativity (Athens; Univ.
of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 116-18, similarly writes that the
general
seems "to incarnate both the heights of human
aspiration and the depths of human corruption." Moreover, "he
seems also to be in many respects the ultimate artist-figure
in A Fable . . . not only aware of the ramifications of the
fable in which he is involved but capable, to a certain
extent, of orchestrating it"; in the most thorough reading of
the entire novel to date, that of Keen Butterworth in A
Critical and Textual Study of 'A Fable' (Ann Arbor:
UMI
Research Press, 1983), p. 66,the general is read as the
embodiment of tragedy in that he "must choose to execute his
son because the son's idealism has threatened" the "heritage"
of "modern civilization itself," of which the general is the
primary guardian.
The affinity of my reading with those of
Harrington and Butterworth should become obvious in the
development that follows.
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only basic and compulsory but also the means through which
man has the potential to bring some order to an essentially
chaotic world.

To be specific, the old general marks the

ideological culmination of Faulkner's ongoing narrative
study of the significance of art in human affairs.

This

protagonist embodies the implicit postulate that, man's
capacity for creation being his most distinctive
characteristic, the values for which creates significantly
influence the quality of his experience.^

In utilizing his

understanding of the temporal functioning of man's dualistic
creative/receptive faculty to make himself the centerpiece
of a sustaining cultural myth, the old general discloses a
supreme state of consciousness that substitutes for
Christian valuation an axiology upholding the sustenance of
human existence.
The old general is the rhetorical linchpin of the
various strands of plot.

The main plot— involving the old

general and his biological son, the corporal whose
pacifistic evangelism brings to a halt World War I— presents
the most general image of the issue to which each of the
sub-plots speaks:

Given the nature of man and the

conditions of life, is conflict inevitable?

Has man the

^Loic Bouvard recalls Faulkner's telling him that "the
most important thing is that man continues to create, just as
woman continues to give birth," in "Interview with Loic
Bouvard," in Lion in the Garden:
Interviews with William
Faulkner, 1926-1962, ed. James IT Meriwether arid Michael
Millgate (New York:
Random House, 1962), p. 73.
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potential permanently to eliminate conflict and, if not,
what recourse has he in the midst of it?

Each major

character in the book either explicitly formulates his
perspective on this problem or else constitutes an image
thereof.

Although specifically the general upholds the

financial, political, moral and military superstructure of
his culture, he does so out of a conviction that this
framework will most effectively sustain the culture he
heads.

In contrast to the limited, confining moral visions

of Quentin Compson, Rosa Coldfield, Isaac McCaslin and the
quartermaster general, to the metaphysical solipsism of
Harry Wilbourne, to Gragnon's extreme adherence to military
ethos, to Levine's naive nationalism, and to the radical
activism of the battalion runner, the old general's artistry
is practically oriented.

He brings to the task of

responding to an immediate conflict an effectual
interpretation of the relation of consciousness to the world
that each of these characters either lacks or ignores.

This

interpretation asserts the inherently conflictive character
of man's existence, the physiological basis of human being,
and the perspectival as the fundamental condition of human
understanding and intercommunication.

The old general's

ideology of preservation, based on his conviction that these
conditions are fundamental to existence, underlies the
sustaining cultural myth he creates.
A Fable bears witness to Faulkner's agreement with
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Nietzsche that the primary influence on human behavior is
physiology.

Man experiences states of feeling that derive

from the relation of his bodily self to the phenomenal world
in which it exists.

A major consequence of this condition

is "perspectivism," Nietzsche's view that there are no
facts, only interpretations.

From this conclusion follows

the correlate that the individual must choose from competing
sets of interpretations the one he will embrace.
concept of valuation.

Hence the

Nietzsche asserts that the crisis of

confidence in the Christian values of two millennia is the
source of the general condition of neurosis that pervades
modern mankind.

Having considered the individual

implications of this problem in protagonists developed in
his major work from The Sound and the Fury to Go Down,
Mose s, Faulkner holistically images the cultural
significance of the problem in A Fable.

While he is by no

means as explicit as Nietzsche about the need for a new
valuation to replace the longstanding ineffectual Christian
influence, he nevertheless concurs with Nietzsche that the
task of sustaining mankind necessarily devolves upon the few
who have achieved superiority of perspective.

Faulkner

ascribes to the old general the attitudes toward life that,
for Nietzsche, comprise this perspective, which results in a
theory of art-as-praxis that Nietzsche terms "the Grand
Style."
According to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's
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fragmentary discourse on aesthetics, the "essence and
essential determination of art" involves the unity of art as
a countermovement to nihilism— a metaphysical problem— and
of art as an "object of physiology"— a physical one.

When

these apparently antithetical aspects of art actually
include each other, what results is the production of art in
the grand style, in which "measure and law are confirmed . .
. in the containment of chaos and the rapturous."

What

occurs in the grand style is "a triumph over" plenitude, an
emphasis on measure, the experience of sustained tranquility
as one's manner of being, and the propensity to resist "what
is animated."3

it understands valuation to be the basis of

man's actions and aesthetics to be the key to decisions
about value.

It also discerns that "aesthetic delights are

biological d e l i g h t s , a n d that the movement from the latter
to the former, from sheer feeling to "estimates of aesthetic
value," is informed by "logical feelings," an expression
intended to convey man's capacity for "having a feeling for,
letting one's mood be determined by, order, boundary, the
overview."5

in his creative "freedom with regard to the

extreme opposites, chaos and law," the artist in the grand
style does not crudely compel chaos to take form, but

^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 132.
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 165.
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, pp. 120-21.
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employs "that mastery which enables the primal wilderness of
chaos and the primordiality of law to advance under the same
yoke, invariably bound to one another with equal necessity."
The physiological, then, "is the basic condition for art's
being able to be a creative countermovement" to nihilism.®
Recourse to Heidegger's assessment of Nietzsche's
discussion of the romantic/classical opposition will clarify
this concept of the grand style.

Although classical art as

defined by Nietzsche is not purely synonymous with the grand
style, the two approaches are fundamentally similar,
particularly in terms of the detachment of the artist who,
with "unconstrained disposition" (the essence of "mastery"),
yokes the powerfully antithetical forces of chaos and law
into "an event's self-imposed l a w . T h i s

is, to be sure,

terribly strained language, but Heidegger refers to the
Greek term techne, not in the sense of "making" or
"producing," but as "that knowledge which supports and
conducts every human irruption into the midst of beings."®
This definition, which comprehends the strategy of the old
general in relation to the fear-driven multitude in A Fable,
stands in contrast to the "romantic" art of Quentin and
other important artist figures in Faulkner's earlier

®Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, pp. 125-28.
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 128.
®Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 80, my italics,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143

fiction.
According to Nietzsche, "a romantic is an artist whose
great dissatisfaction with himself makes him creative— one
who averts his glance from himself and his fellows, and
looks back."®

For the romantic artist "what is properly

creative is discontent,

. . . desire and hunger," but this

is a general attitude that ironically foreshadows "its
opposite."

Faulkner's narrative images for the mythopoeia

of Quentin, Isaac, Harry, Rosa, Gragnon and the "trinity-ofconscience" characters in A Fable discloses that each
character's myth is an attitudinal reification of a
projection of consciousness, not, as it purports to be, an
absolute representation of reality.

Indeed, Rosa's image of

the "instant" as "arras-veil" and Harry's expressed ontology
that underlies his aesthetic methodology support the anti
romantic view of the open character of experience.

In the

old general, Faulkner actually images the "opposite"
approach to existence, "the contrary possibility . . . that

®One is reminded of Sartre's erroneous identification of
Faulkner's "metaphysic of time" with the image of "a man
sitting in a convertible looking back."
"In Faulkner," he
writes, "the present does not exist, it becomes; everything
w a s ."
This assessment certainly applies to Quentin, Rosa,
Harry, and Isaac, but it hardly fits the creative energy of
Charlotte Rittenmeyer in The Wild Palms or the controlled
artistry of Doom in "A Justice" and the old general.
See
Jean-Paul Sartre, "Time in Faulkner: The Sound and the Fury,”
in William Faulkner:
Three Decades of Criticism, ed.
Frederick J. Hoffman and Olga W. Vickery (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 228.
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the creative is not a lack but plenitude, not a search but
full possession, not a craving but a dispensing, not hunger
but superabundance."
takes

Whereas "creation out of discontent

'action' only in revulsion toward and withdrawal from

something else"— as the disaffection of Quentin from his
perception of Caddy, of Isaac from his perception of his
family's history, and of the battalion runner from his
perception of the inherent degeneracy of "man"— creation
from a sense of the plenitude of existence, a sense which
the old general repeatedly shows himself to be in possession
of, "flows purely out of itself and its own

fullness .

The former approach is reactive, the latter active.
Heidegger defines the Greek term ethike episteme as
"knowledge of ethos, of the inner character of man and of
the way it determines his behavior," and aisthetike episteme
as "knowledge of human behavior with regard to sense,
sensation, and feeling, and knowledge of how these are
d e t e r m i n e d . T h e old general's "active" response to the
needs of the community stems from his observation of its
chaotic state and his comprehension of its capacity for
response to an image that corresponds to its inherent sense
of order.

In other words, he perceives the particular

aesthetic state of the people and appeals to it through an

Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 132.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 77-78.
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image that corresponds to their inherent "primordial"
propensity for "the overview."

Faulkner's repeatedly

emphasizes the citizenry's heightened physiological state,
induced by fear that their relatives in the mutinied
regiment will be executed by order of the marshal.

They are

wrenched by anguish and terror . . . and drawn to the
city whether they would or not . . .with no other will
and desire except to relinquish their grief and anxiety
into the city's vast conglomerate of all the passions
and forces— fear, and grief, and despair, and impotence
[theirs], and unchallengeable power and terror and
invincible will [what they perceive to be
characteristic of the general]

. . . the grieving and

the begrieved on one hand, and on the other the lone
gray man supreme, omnipotent and inaccessible . . . who
dealt in wholesale death and who could condemn the
whole regiment and miss its three thousand men no more
. . . that he would miss the nod of his head or the
reverse of the lifted hand which would save them.^^
To emphasize further this opposition between the general and
the frenzied community, the narrator presents an image of
"that whole band of irredeemable earth from the Alps to the
sea, studded with faces watching in lipless and lidless

^^William Faulkner, A Fable
1954), p. 124.

(New York:

Random House,
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detachment for a moment, a day or two days, for the old gray
man at Chaulnesmont to lift that hand"

(p. 125).

It is the

primary opposition in the novel both, thematically, in its
implicit posing of the question of how best to resolve a
cultural crisis in a manner that sustains man and,
rhetorically,

in its providing the tension around which the

novel is structured.
In the first reference to the old general, Faulkner
delineates the attitudes the character will manifest
throughout the novel.

He is a man "who no longer believe[s]

in anything but his disillusion and his intelligence and his
limitless power" (p. 13).

This description suggests that he

once strongly embraced some belief, but subsequent to an
unfortunate effect of this embrace, disillusion has replaced
belief, so that the old general's desired manner of being
now involves engaging only in actions that enhance his
personal strength.

The tone and substance of this

description will, to be sure, initially alienate the
character from many readers.

However, by the end of the

novel, it should be clear that the detachment that resulted
from his former naivety facilitated the establishment of
himself as the centerpiece of a sustaining national myth.
His dis-illusion about the corporal's idealism makes
possible the legend he creates to sustain the political
order and, by implication, man.

In contrast to the

Christian perspective— long reified in the western world yet
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never so powerful— the old general's art is grounded in this
world, for, playing on their hope, fear, and suffering to
create a surrogate theodicy, it responds to immediate
psychological needs of the people.
When the corporal engineers the mutiny that threatens
to stop the war, the general's problem is twofold:
act, and in whose interest?

how to

To be sure, the eminence of

this character, in this particular situation, compels a
decision, the assertion of which necessarily constitutes
simultaneously an ascription of value.

The old general is

presented with a number of possibilities, each representing
a value vying to predominate.

There is Gragnon, the

rebelling regiment's division commander, whose rigid
adherence to the military code of honor and sense of his own
position within it force him to request execution of the
entire regiment.

There is Marthe, sister of the corporal

and daughter of the woman on whom the old general sired him,
who, hoping to prevent her brother's execution, appeals to
the old general's sense of personal guilt.

There is the

German general, who, believing war to be a prerequisite for
the survival of humanity— and military officers therefore to
be the most superior human beings— seeks a pact that will
result in the resumption of hostilities between Germany and
the Allies.

And there is the corporal, the Christ-figure,

who refuses to renounce his cause, preferring the symbolism
of martyrdom to his own life.

These values, however, the
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old general judges to be secondary to what for him is the
ultimate value, namely, the sustenance of the culture he
heads.
In A Fable, through the microcosmic image of the French
district caught up in a frenzy of "anxiety and dread,"
Faulkner images an entire culture at a critical juncture of
its history (p. 4).

The community, fearful that the general

will embrace Gragnon's request that the mutinied regiment be
executed, stands as it were on the threshold of emotional
annihilation.

The fifth chapter of A Fable, "Tuesday,

Wednesday," depicts the frenzied mass, obsessed by fear that
the execution is imminent, driven between Chaulnesmont and a
prison compound several miles away where the regiment awaits
the general's decision.

"They had no plan," the narrator

relates, "only motion, like a wave"

(p. 130).

They lack a

"reassuring certitude which," in the words of Derrida,
itself beyond the reach of freeplay."

"is

This absence of

confidence in a "fundamental ground" is the source of their
anxiety, "for anxiety is invariably the result of being
implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of
being as it were from the very beginning at stake in the
g a m e .

"^3

The pendulum could swing either way, on the one

hand into utter nihilism, and on the other into a faith

^^Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the
Discourse of the Human Sciences," in Writing and Difference,
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), p.
279.
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which, although quite literally predicated on illusion,
provides the hope needed for their cultural sustenance.

In

short, the people are ripe for a reassuring illusion, which
the general implements by executing the corporal, who, like
Jesus, has become "a protagonist for anguishment, an object
for execration"

(p. 129).

Contrary to the views of numerous

voices that comment on the old general, his experiences have
provided him with the broad social perspective that enables
him to create such an image, and in actively usurping "the
legend of God," he presents it.
At Virginia, asked about the old general, Faulkner
patently indicates that this character's most basic trait is
his pronounced creative capacity and predilection.

He is

the "dark, gallant, fallen" angel "who had been cast out of
heaven . . . because God Himself feared him."

Responding to

the questioner's puzzlement that the old general is the
father of the corporal, Faulkner pointed to the general's
artistry:
That was a part of Satan's fearsomeness, that he could
usurp the legend of God.

That was what made him

fearsome and so powerful, that he could usurp the
legend of God and then discard God.

That's why God
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feared
Prom an orthodox perspective, this comment blatantly crosses
the border of acceptability into the realm of out-and-out
sacrilege.
the

n

o

v

e

Yet it has mostly been ignored in criticism on
l

.

To assert that Satan not only could but did

"usurp the legend of God" and that Satan did discard God is,
first, to elevate Satan over God in terms of their relative
capacity to invent legends.

Moreover, Faulkner undermines

the omnipotence of God (as McCaslin Edmonds does in the
rhetorical questions he poses to Isaac McCaslin— see p. 86
above) by asserting that God "feared" Satan.

While these

assertions disclose Faulkner's intention to consider in A
Fable questions related to man's general propensity for
mythmaking and, perhaps more importantly, for mythembracing, they also demonstrate his interest in the
specific influence of Christian mythos on western
civilization.

The basic narrative strategy involves the

invention of an intertext to this mythos that parallels the
paradigm in its basic structure, but inverts the relative
value of its principal components.

Thus, according to this

revaluation of "the fairy tale which conquered the western

l^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, Faulkner in
the University (New York, Vintage, 1965), p. 63.
^^The notable exception is Lewis P. Simpson in the essay
"A Fable of Civilization," in his The Brazen Face of History
(Baton Rouge; Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 209-31.
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world," God assumes the inferior position and Satan is
invested with primary p o w e r . T h e

strategy here does not

exclusively entail the process of figurative
demythologization Faulkner had employed in the development
of Quentin and the intervening artist figures in his
fiction; instead, like Nietzsche in Thus Spake Zarathustra,
Faulkner remythologizes Christian mythos to the end of
imparting to the reader an image of the relation of art and
sociopolitics.
Otto Rank writes that "the specifically artistic
impulse to create and the moulding of its forms of creation
[are] outgrowths of the contemporary culture and the
individual dynamism underlying the artist-personality."

The

"motive power of the individual urge to create" interplays

^^Paulkner, The Wild Palms (New York:
p. 130.

Vintage, 1966),

am influenced here not only by Herbert Schneidau's
definition of demythology as a rhetorical strategy whereby
prophets
like Jeremiah and
Amos
attempt
to undermine
deleterious social practices and attitudes predicated on
illusory
perspectives
("myths"),
but
also
to
Rudolph
Bultmann's attempt "to strip the mythological framework [of
the kerygma] from the truth" it enshrines. The methodology of
both the Hebrew prophets and Bultmann is descriptive, while
Faulkner's might be called "imagistic," insofar as this term
signifies the novelist's "demythologizing" narrative images of
the harmful reifications of Faulkner's artist figures.
In A
Fable he turns to the process of remythology in his narrative
reconsideration of the kerygma.
See, generally, Herbert
Schneidau, Sacred Discontent: The Bible and Western Tradition
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1976) and Rudolph
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Kerygma and M y t h ,
trans. Reginald H. Fuller, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (London:
S.P.C.K., 1964), p. 4.
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with "canons of style evolved from the collective
unconscious."^®

As an image of individual man's use of the

creative faculty, the old general differs from Faulkner's
earlier artist figures in his ability to objectify his
recourse to Christian mythos rather than internalize it, as
do Quentin, Rosa, and Isaac.

These earlier characters

interpret personal experiences mythopoeically, specifically
on the basis of idiosyncratic readings of the kerygma.

In

using this mythos for emotional resolutions of ultimately
irresolvable conflicts, they follow a cultural practice that
spans two millennia, one that Faulkner had grave
reservations about by the time he wrote The Sound and the
Fury.

The old general understands his culture's

predeliction for recourse to Christian mythos in its futile
attempts to realize ideals.

A product of the culture that

he acts to sustain, the general recognizes the archetype
that inheres in the ongoing crisis.

His "motive power"

(perspective or "individual dynamism") being to establish
and sustain the sociopolitical order, the general's
reaccentuating "usurpation" of the legend of God
acknowledges the community's unconscious propensity for a
positive response to this mythos.
The long biographical flashback that primarily
constitutes "Wednesday Night"— an ironic saint's life of

York:

l®Otto Rank, "Author's Preface," in Art and Artist (New
W. W. Norton, 1989), pp. xiv-xvi.
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sorts— establishes the general's moral authenticity.

In

developing the biography, Faulkner relies on several
narrative voices, each with its own self-assured view of the
general's character.

One voice, for instance, provides the

broad social view of the general, which holds that he is the
embodiment of a "splendid fate" that even the strictest of
circumstances, such as his enrollment at St. Cyr, will not
enable him to "escape" (p. 245).

Behind this point of view

lies the remythologizing hand of the author, whose strategy
for controlling the reader's perspective is to have the
general in fact "escape" this projected fate, at least in
one of the dominant senses in which it is indicated. The
general fulfills his destiny in terms of the stature that he
achieves, but he does not embody the amoral values that each
of the secondary narrators assumes to be an inevitable
concomitant of his "fate."

Thus the primary tool of the

artist in this strategy is irony, which is the operative
condition of perspectivism.
Faulkner's narrative images of various observers of the
general's life— including his classmates at St. Cyr, a staff
captain, and a particular "Norman" classmate at St. Cyr —
create a foreshadowing structure of irony that sets up the
final scene of the novel, the general's interment, which
demonstrates his lasting influence on the people.

In

contrast to the morally insubstantial rise to eminence that
these perspectives predict, a reflexive reading of the novel
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demonstrates that the general, both a literal and a
figurative embodiment of moral authenticity, lived his life
as though aware of the sociocultural significance of his
death.

As images of the tendency of both individuals and

groups to perceive an object or series of events and m i s read
it into truth, the numerous misinterpretations in "Wednesday
Night" confirm the general's mythmaking strategy in relation
to the people.

As dead military hero, the general

ironically sustains the people, who are cast in the novel's
final scene as an unthinking mob that offers frenetic,
Dionysian devotion to the corpse about to be interred in a
national monument.

From a purely aesthetic standpoint, the

general does with his life what Faulkner does by imaging the
points of view of the various observers, namely, utilize the
perspectival character of man's existence to invent an image
thereof that sustains man while indicating his inherent
creative potential.
Through a practical use of man's faculty for creation
and its psychological sibling, the spectatorial impulse—
what Nietzsche terms "aesthetic doing and observing"— the
general creates a legend of himself that fulfills the
people's unconscious need for illusions that counter the
onset of an emotional void.^^

Relying on his Bergsonian

^ F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans.
Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1968), p. 518.
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sense of the temporal quality of man's experience, through
these observers Faulkner indicates the general's propensity
for vanishing from public sight, only to reappear later in
an ongoing dialectic of absences and presences that
constitutes the structure of the legend he develops.

By way

of the fundamentally poetic interplay of their consciousness
with this recurrent structure, the observers become
"preservers" of the general's legend "with an essentiality
equal" to that of the general who creates it.^®

For

example, one narrator relates that the old general, then "a
captain with a brilliant and most incredible future, had
vanished" only "to reappear thirteen years later as a
brigadier"

(p. 244).

The "people who up to that time [when

he vanished] thought they knew him, know neither where he
has been nor why, though they are certain they know how" he
has acquired the higher rank.

The old general's ironic

response to these expectations demonstrates his awareness of
the sociopolitical significance of art, in this case a
national legend that results from the people's spectatorial
capacity and inclination.

The old general apparently knows,

even at the inchoate stage of the military career that
provides the initiatory structure of his maturation, the

^^Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in
Martin Heidegger:
Poetry, Language, Thought (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 71. "It is the work that makes the
creators possible in their nature and that by its own nature
is in need of preservers."
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capacity of art for establishment and preservation, and he
responsibly employs his burgeoning stature in his direction
of a life-sustaining legend— of which he is the
centerpiece— that spans several decades.
The legend of the old general is engendered within the
exclusive community of his anomalous upbringing.

Until he

enters St. Cyr, "the world outside the Faubourg St. Germain
had scarcely ever seen him," and few have ever heard of him
"except as a male Christian name."
is told,

He grew up, the reader

"in the somber insulate house of his mother's

eldest sister in the rue Vaugirard," which is where the
runner goes on his visit to Paris to research Harry.

This

sister who raised him was the wife of an opportunist, "a
cabinet Minister who was himself a nobody but a man of
ruthless and boundless ambition who had needed only
opportunity and had got it through his wife's money and
connections."

The youth grows "to the threshold of manhood

. . . his uncle's heir and heir to the power and wealth of
his bachelor godfather," the federation chairman "who had
been his father's closest friend."

Like Gragnon, he is "an

orphan, an only child," though the conditions of his
upbringing contrast starkly with those of the division
commander

(p. 246).

Faulkner thus suggests by this implicit

contrast that the humble upbringing often championed in
myths and legends does not necessarily produce strong
character, nor does its opposite, the silver-spooned
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upbringing, necessarily produce poor character and values.
In contrast to his more revealing foil, however, Isaac
McCaslin, who is also "the last male of his line," the
general embraces the paternal responsibility his upbringing
entails.
The reader learns in "Wednesday Night" that the old
general is personally disinterested, but interested in the
endurance and well being of mankind.
novel, it is clear that at

By the

some point in the

end of the
process of the

old general's maturation, he chose his own destiny, as it
were, which was different from the "destiny" everyone who
knew anything about him had predicted (p. 246).

At this

point (and Faulkner chooses not to image its actual
occurrence), the general begins to act so as to contribute
to the quite naturally developing image of himself.

He thus

fulfills his destiny in accordance with his chief value— the
sustenance of his culture.

In contrast to the multitude of

unconnected people who are

delineated in his

window, the general enjoys

power and prestige that give him

the opportunity for large cultural influence.

reverie by the

That he

chooses to use it to establish particular values makes him
heroic, at least according to the point of view of the
primary narrator.
Fellow classmates at St. Cyr experience "surprise,"
"amazement," and "downright unbelief" that the youth (who
would become the general) was there "at all," not because of
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his apparent "fragility and indurability," but because they
read him as the embodiment of a "golden destiny of an
hereditary crown prince of paradise."

The "golden youth,"

the "Parisian," he is the heir to money and influence, not
only by virtue of connections, but also of his youth, gender
and place, specifically, Paris.

He "had only to reach

majority in order to inherit that matchless of all
catastrophes:

the prestige of exhausting his life" by

riotous living (p. 247).

Yet instead of opting to employ

the special relation to Paris that his connections offer
him, he chooses to be "just another anonymous one is a class
of candidates for professional careers" (p. 248).

Through

this remark Faulkner ironically highlights the essential
nobility of character of the old general, whom a previous
perspective in the novel had cast as an unthinking,
merciless head of a sociopolitical establishment that is
indifferent to the well-being of its denizens.

The general

works to establish security for the masses, sacrificing the
inherited life of luxury in favor of the responsibility of
his social eminence.

Rather than the "lover" of Paris, he

becomes her protector.
Relying on the irony inherent in the principle of
perspectivism, Faulkner employs a narrator who demonstrates
the discrepancy between the youth's genuine character and
the classmates'

imaginary projection of his deviousness.

According to this projection, it can only be that "not he
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but his family . . . compelled him into the army" since he
has become a "threat" to their name and position.

The

family needs to "quarantine" him, both to protect its
reputation and to provide him with a "refuge" from the
consequences of his behavior, placing him beyond both his
capacity to harm them by association and the capacity of
justice to harm him by forcing reparations for what he has
done.

According to this perspective, the family is

perpetrating a scheme to "gain a sort of blinding redundance
on the great name's original splendor from the golden braid
which his hat and sleeves would someday bear," (p. 249)
because if war provides the youth with opportunity, he will
"be a general at forty" and eventually a marshall of France
"when the nation buried him" (p. 242).

This reading of the

youth's presence at St. Cyr, however, proves to be erroneous
when he does not use the influence.

With "the highest marks

ever made at the academy," which obviate the jealousy they
might otherwise have felt toward him for the "Quartermaster
Captaincy which rumor said was waiting for him at the
Academy's exit," he is a superior student who has no need
for special treatment (p. 249).

Even so, when the general

leaves without the captaincy, exiting instead with a
subalternship, the classmates— still reading yet thinking
they are literally perceiving truth— see the refusal of the
captaincy as a show or "gesture," "not the youth's" but the
relatives' who are directing Lhe development of his national
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image.

Thus, this interpretation goes, the refusal is not

genuine since the family is "powerful and potent enough to
afford even discretion and modesty" and will therefore
privately confer the captaincy.

But what transpires instead

is the youth's departure ("quietly, almost surreptitiously")
for Africa, with neither unearned rank nor undue equipage,
for the purpose of fulfilling the requisite field-service
obligation (p. 250).

Ironically, the classmates expect a

gesture from the family, but get from the youth one that is
the opposite of their projections.

Extending into the

future, it is the first element of the sustaining national
image of himself that he is directing.

Already at twenty-

one, about to embark on a major period of the process of
maturation that has been underway since his entrance into
the academy, the youth manifests characteristics that will
serve his establishment of this image more than three
decades later.
To account for the youth's enigmatic departure, the
classmates conclude that he will go to a "remote frontier"
where there will be no check to his relatives' ability to
secure pleasure for him.

This projection, predicated on

their unexpressed belief in "rapacity itself"— which is
postulated by the primary narrator as a force that overlays
human affairs and is, paradoxically, "compassionate,"
"omnipotent," "all-seeing and all pervading"— leads the
classmates to conclude, perhaps unconsciously, that the Quai
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d ' Orsay will gently signal

("out-breathe") the youth's

success in the heroic saving of a fragment of the empire
that was lost during the Napoleonic wars.

A "national

unanimity" will proclaim him in a response so "loud and
long" that it will "obfuscate" the mere facts of the case
and "distract the mind from all curiosity regarding them."
The family's scheme will have eventuated therefore in the
creation of a protagonist "without past on a stage without
yesterday," accompanied only by his "accomplishment," "like
two masques for a pantomime furnished out of the bloodless
lumberroom of literature."

The people will observe,

"with

amazed admiration," the youth matured into supreme marshal
of France, though in substance he will be "like wisps of
mist or vapor" among "concrete-bedded mastodons" and "like
the saint in an Anglo-Saxon tale" who cheaply buys her
sainthood by exchanging her maidenhood for it (p. 251).

And

"not one" of "the sheeplike acclaiming mass" will want to
check the details of his heroism.

Having been created out

of whole cloth, he will be "immune even to the uproar" that
acclaims him in a ritualistic triumphal march.

The general

indeed achieves the legendary status postulated in this
voice, but as a consequence of his virtue and
responsibility, not his utilization of the principle of
rapacity (p. 252).
Through the youth's disappearance across the
Mediterranean, by means of which he continues the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162

development of his legend, Faulkner underlines his
aestheticist ideology, casting this evanescence in
figurative terms of the birth of destiny.

The classmates

learn not only that the youth from the "port base" "to
assigned duty somewhere in the interior," but also that no
one knows "exactly where and on exactly what service"
252).

(p.

Even so, they had expected both the obscurity of

place and the secrecy of event, since part of the family's
scheme would have him situated somewhere "actively and even
aggressively private, like an oasis in the desert's heart
itself," "where on a lion-robed divan he would await untimed
destiny's hasteless accouchement"

(p. 253).

Yet "truth," in

Heidegger's sense of the term as developed in the "Origin,"
is not predictable but disclosive.

Instead of the flight to

an oasis, the youth goes to a place where the conditions of
his existence are exactly the opposite of what the
classmates think they will be.

Or, stated differently, the

conditions as they actually exist are exactly what the
classmates thought the family would spare him through the
use of its unlimited power.

Expecting his existence to be

"benignant and inscrutable, irascible and hieroglyph like an
American Indian totem pole in ebon Eden innocence," they
discover that he has gone to the worst possible post and,
moreover, that he serves not only "his own one year tour of
command, but that of his successor too, and was now ten
months forward in that of what would have been his
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successor's," so that those watching his career,

"except

that one" who will succeed him in the post, think "that
earth itself had faltered, rapacity itself had failed"
253).

(p.

The youth's ironic action of apparently needlessly

continuing to serve at the post challenges the classmates'
myth of the force of rapacity.

He chooses not to wait

passively for the birth of destiny, but to adopt a stance
toward its transpiration.

Through the Heideggerian conflict

between what the classmates know and expect of their fellow
student (earth) and what he actually does (world), the youth
adds another element to the sustaining national image of
himself.
The most thematically resounding view of the old
general belongs to an individual classmate at St. Cyr, the
future quartermaster general, whose view differs from that
of the classmates in general.

Like his counterparts in the

"trinity of conscience," he reads the phenomena he
encounters and constructs around them a mythos that
satisfies his value system, itself based on a particular
mythos whose manifestations are widespread in his culture.
As the third unit of Faulkner's "trinity of conscience"— the
one who represents acceptance— he stands "Number Two to the
other's One on the day of graduation."

Among the students

at St. Cyr, he is the first to connect the youth's "face
with his great name," and he sees in him "the promise of a
destiny which would be the restored . . . glory and destiny
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of France too"

(pp. 246-47).

The classmate's great

grandfather had been a protege of Desmoulins "until
Robespierre executed them both."

Like this ancestor, a

political idealist willing to sacrifice his life for a
deleterious ideal, the classmate had come to Paris to be an
art student, "but relinquished his dream to the Military
Academy for the sake of France as the great-grandfather had
done his to the guillotine for the sake of Man"

(p. 254).

And like the great-grandfather in his susceptibility to
mesmerization by a figure with a strong personality, the
classmate "looked once at that one which to all the world
else had been that of any seventeen-year-old youth and
relinquished completely to it" (p. 254).

Satisfying his

impulse to respond through art to the severe lack that his
encounter with the youth elicits, he "picked up the three
figures— uncle, nephew, and godfather . . . and turned them
around and set them down again in the same positions and
attitudes but obversed"

(p. 254).

The classmate's mythopoeia occurs, however, not
immediately, but "several years" after he makes the
acquaintance of the youth, "almost ten in fact after that
day when [the classmates] had watched that sun-stricken
offing behind Oran accept that fragile stride and then close
markless behind it like a painted backdrop."

This image is

reminiscent of several in Go Down, Moses, in which Isaac
McCaslin responds to the phenomenal unraveling of images
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that constitutes his experience.

The narrator ironically

remarks that the youth walks into the desert "carrying
unreality with him to establish where before there had been
none."

When after four years the youth is still in the

desert, whether or not he had been "an actual threat once,"
he is "now an enigma burying its ostrich-head from the staff
commission which would drag him back to Paris and at least
into vulnerable range of his old sybaritic renunciation."
For six years he performs "voluntarily" a "duty" which every
officer in the army but he should have been compelled to
perform "before it came to him" (p. 254).

Continuing the

strategy of imaging the development of the legend of the old
general as a process of the interplay of occurrence and its
backdrop of nothingness, of evanescence and materialization,
Faulkner has the narrator relate that the youth "vanishes
from Africa too," six years later, "none knew where except
the Norman classmate's passionate and hungry hope."
Nothingness, which in this case results from the absence of
the youth from the public arena, is necessary to the legend
that is developing around his figure.

After the sojourn in

Africa, he "vanished not only from the knowledge of man but
from the golden warp and woof of the legend too," with
nothing left but "a name in the Army List," with the
position of sublieutenant.

Underscoring the youth's

powerful presence in the mind's eye of his classmates,
despite his quite literal absence, the narrator remarks that
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he is "not even dead, not even whereabouts unknown"

(p.

255).
In a scene reminiscent of Conrad's motif of a small
group of men who offer various vantage points on a
particular subject, Faulkner brings together five military
men, including the Norman classmate, who discuss sometime in
1885 the known events of the youth's life since he left the
Academy two years earlier.

This framework enables the

author to continue the development of the Norman's response
to the youth and simultaneously to image the more detached
rhetorical level of events regarding the general's artistry.
Included in this group is a staff captain who is descended
from "a Napoleonic duchy whose founder had been a butcher
then a republican then an imperialist then a duke."

In this

minor character Faulkner offers a foil not only to the
Norman, with his genuine devotion to the golden youth, but
to the youth himself.

Only "five years out of St. Cyr," the

staff captain seems to "three of the four watching and
listening to him" to be "the true golden youth which that
other one of eleven years ago whom he was talking about had
refused to be."

He brings to mind what the nephew might

have achieved by this point,

"since this one had behind him

only the simple proprietors of banks and manipulators of
shares."

The "burly blunt brutal" staff captain talks

glibly of "the almost forgotten sublieutenant . . . who
should have been the ideal pattern and hope not merely for
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all career officers but for all golden youth everywhere," as
Napoleon was for "ancestorless," impoverished,
conscienceless Frenchmen— a remark that foreshadows the
symbolic embodiment of hope the general becomes for the
people by the end of the novel.

The captain notes the

paradox of the youth's sense of something so grand that he
would sacrifice for it his unparalleled opportunities, yet
"so ephemeral" as to keep him there for only six years—
another of Faulkner's ironic images for man's perspectival
condition.

The staff captain, his point of view skewed by

his status as a sort of sybarite manque, wonders what can be
"so incipient with satiation and at last revulsion that
after only six years the subaltern master must vacate it."
In the opinion of the staff captain, the youth enjoys the
benefits of his relation to the powerful Comite de Ferrovie
(pp. 255-56).

Yet what kept the youth there, and what

induces him to leave, is not personal gratification, but his
sense of duty to his countrymen.
Having learned that the youth must relinquish the post,
the Norman classmate, thirteen days later, "looked from the
back of the camel across the glaring markless intervening
miles, as a thousand years later the first pilgrim must have
looked at the barely distinguishable midden which the native
guide assured him had been, not Golgotha of course but
Gethsemane," a "nest of ragged and meagre palms."

Yet the

"outpost" where the youth is stationed is a garden only in
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the the mythos of the Norman, and in a terribly ironic
sense, as the novel will soon disclose the general's
affinities with Pontius Pilate.

Like the "first" pilgrim,

the Norman pursues the apogee of his spiritual sensibility,
which is embodied in a charismatic individual whom he
actually perceives to be a re-incarnation of God.

At first

viewed as the liberator of France from Prussian occupation,
in the classmate's evolving mythos, which Faulkner broadly
reports rather that depicts, the future general incarnates
the long-anticipated second coming of Christ.

The irony

here is stark since the old general is a usurper of the
legend, not, as the Norman thinks, its embodiment or
fulfillment.

Yet he is the embodiment of a legend, a

sustaining, albeit not a Christian, one.

The Norman is

"passionate for suffering, sick with hope," thus recalling
Isaac McCaslin's hope and belief in the eventual realization
of his vision of Christian mythos (p. 258).

In the

relationship of the Norman to the youth, the self-made
proselyte, true to his ancestor's outstanding
characteristic, addresses the incarnate God.

In effect, the

quartermaster general is a would-be prophet, a John the
Baptist.

Like Isaac McCaslin, he understands mythmaking,

yet fails to see its limitations, especially as prophecy.
He reads the youth as God returning in "the shape of man's
living hope," but only from the broadest, most coldly ironic
vantage point of the novel does the youth embody the
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realization of anything like "man's hope" (p. 263).
In contrast to the Norman classmate's reading of
Christian mythos into ongoing events, the old general
recognizes the basic analogy, but remythologizes it to suit
his end of establishing order.

The general's remythology

reaccentuates, as it were, the dominant biblical version of
the sociopolitical archetype of rebellion versus authority,
stressing its currently relevant elements.

I borrow the

term "re-accentuate" from Mikhail Bakhtin, who defines it as
one of two processes whereby the transformation of language
phenomena occurs "at a very rapid rate of exchange."

The

process "involves the tact with which an author assigns his
accents, sometimes smudging and often completely destroying
for us their finer nuances."

Reaccentuation occurs as the

result of "a change in the background animating dialogue."
One of Bakhtin's goals in uncovering this process is to show
the tensional interplay of authorial intentionality with the
"living word," which, as it were, cuts its own semantic path
"and is therefore in all things true to itself."

Due to

the intentional residue "embedded in them," language
phenomena (i.e., the kerygma)

"have proved capable of

uncovering in each era and against ever new dialogizing
backgrounds ever newer aspects of m e a n i n g . T h e

process

See
"Discourse
in
the Novel,"
in The
Dialogic
Imagination;
Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, trans. Michael
Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson, (Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 419-20.
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is analogous to Hans-Georg Gadamer's view of hermeneutics,
which reads "understanding" as "mediation" rather than
"reconstruction";

"Understanding itself is not to be

thought of so much as an action of subjectivity, but as the
entering into an event of transmission in which past and
present are constantly mediated."^2

Both Bakhtin's concept

of reaccentuation and Gadamer's hermeneutics of mediation
parallel Faulkner's emphasis on the sociopolitical interplay
of art and interpretation in A Fable and Heidegger's
postulation of the aesthetic strife between world and earth
that results in the disclosure of truth.

Making decisions

characteristic of Nietzsche's concept of the "grand style"
and publicly establishing his image in a manner that
parallels Heidegger's conception of the "origin" of art, the
old general invents a reaccentuated image of Christian
mythos that effectively palliates the anxious people.
Faulkner's allegory of the masses versus authority in
"Wednesday Night" indicates the old general's identification
of the current crisis with the biblical pretext and his
awareness of the potential for abuse that inheres in both
unbridled freedom and tyrannical power.

The masses at the

bottom of the war-time hierarchy in Chaulnesmont
figuratively parallel the masses of old Jerusalem, just as

22gee
David
Linge,
"Editors
Introduction,"
in
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Hans-Georg Gadamer, trans. David
E. Linge (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976), p. xvi.
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the old general parallels the power structure in Rome.

But

if this is so, then my argument that the old general
embodies the primary point of view of the novel means that
this perspective is figuratively lodged in Roman values.
This is true, but in the qualified sense that by the end of
the process of writing Faulkner had overcome his earlier
expressed conviction that absolute pacifism is a viable
moral option in a complex world.

He is neither wholly

critical nor wholly supportive of the spiritual power
embodied in the image of the ancient city of Jerusalem and
represented in the novel most prominently by the runner, the
corporal, and the quartermaster general.

Yet in the extreme

positions taken by these characters, spirituality, in
attempting to establish itself absolutely, is equally
dangerous as unrestrained, inappropriately value-centered
power.

While Faulkner does not altogether repudiate

attempts to realize such abstract ideals as justice and
honor, he images his recognition that man in general lacks
the political sensibility, practical wisdom, and detachment
that are necessary for absolute freedom.

Without the

constraint of law and the embodiment of order in a highly
visible authority structure, chaos will hold the day.

In

effect, in this allegory occurring in the mind of the old
general, Faulkner underscores his re-reading of the kerygma
in A F a bl e.

He underlines power, but it is power predicated

on a particular value.
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At the bottom of the social hierarchy are "anonymity's
absolute whose nameless faceless mass cluttered old
Jerusalem and old Rome too while from time to time governor
and caesar flung them bread or a circus as in the old snowy
pantomime the fleeing shepherd casts back to the pursuing
wolves fragments of his lunch, a garment, and as a last
resort the lamb itself" (p. 242).

This metaphor apparently

points to the corporal as the lamb of God or, ideologically,
as complete righteousness being grossly sacrificed by selfserving, avaricious authority.

The larger point, though,

which is only available upon a holistic consideration of the
novel,

is that such a reading (and, by implication, the

Kerygma's reading of the sociopolitical world)
oversimplifies the conditions of human existence and
postulates the impossible as highly probable and realizable
if mankind will recognize and take appropriate steps in
relation to certain correctable flaws.

Here the political

entity is cast in the guise of the shepherd, while the
hungry masses are seen as pursuing wolves— the laborers,
beggars, and thieves who do not "always understand that what
they do constitutes beggary and theft"
sympathetic, though detached,

(p. 242).

In his

reading of the people's

situation, the general acknowledges to himself that these
unaware "wolves," "whose luck is out always" and who have no
nexus to power, "are denied any opportunity whatever to
share in the rich carnival of their country's wasting
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lifeblood"

(p. 242).

A desperate and largely despairing

group, they have "nothing in fact save a reversion in
endurance without hope or pride even in the endurance to
endure."

Here the general postulates the possibility of

stoic pride in one's capacity to endure, but suggests that
these people lack even the consciousness of this capacity.
They simply endure, without self-congratulation or solace in
the virtue.

They exist as "tolerated and rightless aliens"

from the power and comfort superstructure, "without hope of
betterment," wanting only "permission to exercise" endurance
(p. 242).

The last resort, the sacrifice of the lamb,

appeases them and suggests the old general as shepherd of
the people's needs in his decision to execute his son, the
corporal.
Understanding the importance of predictability to the
sustenance of order, the general's war-contextual usurpation
of Christian mythos counters the community's fear-driven
incapacitation by yoking, in a powerful single image, "the
primal chaos of wilderness and the primordiality of law."
It is the general's life-centered valuation, however, in
contrast to the arrogant national solipsism of the "Austrian
paper hanger," that aligns the general with the primary
authorial voice in A F a b l e . E v i d e n t

in the grand style.

^Referring derogatorily to Hitler, Isaac McCaslin tells
Roth Edmonds that "when the time comes and some of you have
done got tired of hollering we are whipped if we dont go to
war and some more are hollering we are whipped if we do, [the
country] will cope with one Austrian paper hanger, no matter
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writes Heidegger, is "resistance to external pressure to
change"

(cf. the general's resoluteness in the face of the

arguments of Gragnon, the German general, the quartermaster
general, Marthe, and the corporal) and to "what is animated"
(the frenzied mass).

The general's tragedy involves the

conflict between his primary value, life— dependent in his
view upon maintaining the existent political order— and the
claims of his biological family.

Through the personal

shortcomings evinced in his relationship with the corporal's
mother, the general paradoxically suffered into the truth of
a new value that necessitates aggravating his relation to
his eastern family in the interest of the preservation of
his culture, his sense of guilt and the need to make
reparations for his past irresponsibility being overridden
by the higher value, the sustenance of man in genere.
One may say of the corporal that he seeks, through an
aestheticist strategy like that of the general, to cultivate
and establish a particular value— absolute pacifism— in the
observing Western consciousness.

He prefers the future-

oriented symbolism of his martyrdom to his own existence.
His "crucifixion" will be an "irruption into the midst of
beings" that will, like all such emergences, assume its
particular significance on the basis of the interpretations

what he will be calling himself," in William Faulkner,
Down, Moses (New York; Vintage, 1973), p. 339.
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it r e c e i v e s . Y e t

the general's decision goes "forward in

the midst of physis and on its basis," letting what is
"already coming to presence arrive" in the course of events
that began with the mutiny of Gragnon's regiment.25

The

corporal, by contrast, like his protege the runner, attempts
to force the issue.

His actions constitute over-reliance on

the ability of the aesthetic to establish a particular
condition within man's existent realm of contingency.

He

embodies the same propensity for deleterious embrace of
illusory ideals that Faulkner recognized as a young man and
studied in such early characters as Bayard Sartoris and
Quentin Compson.

D. H. Lawrence speaks to this problem in

his analysis of Doestoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor" episode in
The Brothers Karamazov, Faulkner's paradigm for the
relationship between the corporal and the old general.
Lawrence recognizes in the episode "the final and
unanswerable criticism of Christ," whose "inadequacy . . .
lies in the fact that Christianity is too difficult for men,
the vast mass of men."

It "is impossible because it makes

demands greater than the nature of man can bear.

And

therefore, to get a livable, working scheme, some of the
elect, such as the Grand Inquisitor himself, have turned
round to 'him,' that other great Spirit, Satan, and have

24Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 80.
25neidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 82.
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established Church and State on 'him.'"

Faulkner's re

reading of the paradigm presents the old general as one who,
like Ivan Karamazov's Inquisitor, understands that "to be
able to live at all, mankind must be loved more tolerantly
and more contemptuously than Jesus loved it, loved, for all
that, more truly, since it is loved for itself, for what it
is, and not for what it ought to b e .

The ideology of A

Fable's primary voice is not contained in the question of
what happens if the corporal succeeds, but of what ought to
be made to happen given the impossibility of his success.
The general embodies the same capacity for protective
patronization, but ultimately evinces confidence in man's
capacity to create himself, as it were, beyond problems—
many of his own devising— with which he is perpetually,
contingently confronted.

The general asserts that man has

"that in him" which will, paradoxically, enable him to free
himself from "his enslavement to the demonic progeny of his
own mechanical curiosity," namely, his "deathless folly"

(p.

352) for creative response to his own deleterious
creations— "a voice planning still to build" something
beyond what currently exists (p. 354);

"he must endure, at

least until he himself invents evolves produces a better
tool than he to substitute for himself"

(p. 347).

Implicit

D. H. Lawrence, "The Grand Inquisitor" in Fyodor
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, ed. Ralph E. Matlaw (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1976), pp. 829-31.
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in this expressed respect for man's capacity for invention
is the general's sense of his high responsibility to guard
against man's creating himself out of existence.

The

general appreciates the tension between his position or
"articulation" and the idealistic one represented by the
corporal (p. 347).

Underscoring the importance of dream,

desire, and imagination, the general tells the corporal that
his championing "of an esoteric realm of man's baseless
hopes and his infinite capacity . . . for unfact . . . can
exist side by side together" with the general's ideology of
"this mundane earth"

(p. 348).

For, ultimately, man's

creations, be they "tanks bigger and faster and more
impervious and with more firepower than ever before" (p.
353) or strategies (such as the corporal's and the runner's)
designed completely to eliminate conflict, are "inherent
with the same old primordial fault since [man's creations]
in the end will fail to eradicate him from the earth" (p.
354).
The general's ideology of preservation, then, in tune
with that of the primary voice of A Fable, appreciates the
strife of contingency and creativity that inheres in the
relation of consciousness to the world.

It accepts

idealism, be it of Jesus or of Hitler, as an inevitably
recurring form of that strife.

Its fundamental ideology,

however, flows from a concept of valuation that, while
eschewing tyranny, limits nonetheless his propensity for
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self-harm by establishing a framework of responsible order.
In A Fable, Faulkner manipulates the perspective of the
reader in the same manner that the general manages the
people's perspective in the construction of his mythopoeic
legend— by misdirection, suspense, and, finally, irony which
discloses the ideology of the dominant point of view.

The

symbolic public autobiography the general establishes by a
remythology of the kerygma is literally false and illusory,
but on a pragmatic level it contains the paradoxical truth
that the nation can sustain itself by belief in the general
as the receptacle of its aggregated power.

If the general's

image is illusory yet true, A Fable as Faulkner's
remythologized image of Christian mythos, designed with a
far more detached audience in mind, embodies the truth that
all metastatic myths are inherently illusory.

As a

narrative image of the inevitability of conflict, the novel
asserts the ambiguous, value-dependent potential that
inheres in m a n ’s ontologically secure capacity for freedom.
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